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ABSTRACT
Chapter one of this dissertation provides new evidence on the existence of dividend
clienteles for institutional investors. We directly examine individual institutions' preferences for
dividend paying stocks based on the characteristics of stocks held in their portfolio. Many
institutions follow persistent investment styles, maintaining relatively high or low dividend yield
portfolios over time. Institutions which hold portfolios of higher yielding stocks are significantly
more likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase or sell their stock in
response to a decrease. For a subset of institutions, we directly observe the proportion of their
portfolio managed on behalf of taxable clients. Consistent with tax-induced dividend clienteles,
institutions with more taxable clients are less likely to increase their holdings in response to a
dividend increase. Finally, we show that stock price reactions to announcements of dividend
increases are related to characteristics of the institutions holding the stock. Our results suggest
that tax status, as well as other factors are important in explaining observed clientele behavior.
Chapter two explores the determinants of heterogeneity in institutional investor portfolio
preferences and the relationship between institutions and the clients they serve. I find that the
characteristics of an institution's clients and the characteristics of the institution itself are both
important determinants of portfolio preferences and trading behavior. Specifically, I find that
institutions traditionally subject to prudent investor laws are more likely to invest in high quality
stocks, although, institutions sub-managing money for pension funds are less prudent than
pension managers themselves. In addition, I find that institutions with taxable clients are likely to
avoid unnecessary dividend taxation and turn over their portfolios less frequently.
More generally, institutions exhibit systematic shifts in their exposure to common risk
factors that may be explained in part by the levels and changes in client composition. While
evidence for a causal link between client shifts and institutional preferences is limited to mutual
funds, contemporaneous changes in clients and portfolio characteristics suggest that the
dynamics of institutional investment are closely related to the nature of the clients served.
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CHAPTER 1: Empirical Evidence on the Existence of Dividend Clienteles
Coauthored with Professor Edith S. Hotchkiss
I. Introduction
Beginning with Modigliani and Miller (1961), researchers have attempted for some time
to explain the importance of dividend policy for firm value. For investors in the U.S., cash
dividends are tax disadvantaged relative to capital gains. Modigliani and Miller (1961) point out
that investors may sort themselves into "dividend clienteles", where investors in high tax
brackets with the greatest aversion to dividend income tend to purchase low dividend yield
stocks, and low tax bracket and tax exempt investors invest in higher yield stocks. Despite the
potentially significant impact of dividend clienteles on asset prices and ultimately on firms'
choice of payout policies, there is relatively little empirical work that has been able to directly
show either the extent to which these clienteles exist or their impact on stock price behavior.l
The dividend clientele hypothesis does not directly provide a link between dividend
policy and firm value, in that whatever policy a firm follows, it will attract investors with
matching preferences. However, significant changes in dividend policy can lead to a clientele
shift as investors in a particular group readjust their portfolios to maintain their investment
requirements. This theoretically will lead to a change in ownership structure as the readjustment
takes place, and will affect asset prices if demand is sufficiently perturbed.
Our paper provides evidence on the existence and importance of dividend clienteles of
institutional investors by examining changes in ownership structure in response to changes in
firms' dividend policy. Further, we provide evidence as to whether observed clienteles appear to
be tax related or are driven by other factors such as institutions' tendency to follow persistent
investment styles. Specifically, we show that changes in the holdings of individual institutions in
response to a dividend increase or decrease are related to characteristics of the institution,
including the proportion of its portfolio managed for taxable clients. Our results contrast with
recent literature which concludes that tax based dividend clienteles are not important, based on
the fact that dividend changes do not produce large changes in total institutional ownership.2 We
also show that the stock price response to the dividend change depends on the investment
strategies of institutions holding the stock.
Our analysis characterizes individual institutions' preferences for dividend paying stocks,
based on the characteristics of stocks held in their portfolios. Regardless of the manager's type,
we find that certain institutions follow very persistent investment styles, maintaining over time
portfolios of relatively high or low dividend yield stocks. At the firm level, we then charasterize
the firm's ownership structure based on the characteristics of the institutional investors it has
attracted. Controlling for size, aggregate institutional ownership does not vary substantially as
the stocks' dividend yield changes. However, as the stocks' dividend yield increases, a greater
percentage of the stock is held by institutions whose portfolios are more heavily invested in
higher dividend paying stocks. Higher yielding stocks are also less likely to be held by
institutions characterized as growth investors.
For a sample of 5,618 dividend increases and 1 ,072 decreases between 1980 and 2003,
we use this description of ownership structure to examine whether there is a response to the
dividend change as clienteles readjust. We expect institutions following persistent investment
I Notable exceptions are Graham and Kumar (2006) who provide evidence of age- and tax-
induced dividend clienteles for retail investors, and Dahlquist, Robertsson and Rydqvist (2007)
who provide evidence of tax based clienteles for individuals and organizations in Sweden.
2 Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) find that average institutional ownership is 30% in the three years prior to a
dividend omission and 30.9% after. Binay (2001) reports a significant but small drop in institutional ownership after
dividend omissions and an increase after initiations. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) also report small changes in
institutional ownership around dividend changes.
strategies to trade around dividend changes in order to maintain those strategies. Controlling for
the effect of the dividend change itself, the average portfolio dividend yield of institutions
holding the stock is higher (lower) following a dividend increase (decrease). We also find that
more (less) of the stock is held by institutions whose portfolios are most (least) heavily invested
in high dividend yield stocks. For some firms in the sample, the changes in ownership are
economically very large. Thus, changes in dividend policy are associated with significant
changes in ownership composition.
Examining the trading response of individual institutions to the announcement allows us
to test whether clientele behavior appears related to tax status or other characteristics.
Controlling for portfolio turnover, the magnitude of the dividend change, and other firm and
event characteristics, individual institutions which hold portfolios of higher yielding stocks are
significantly more likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase or sell their
stock in response to a decrease. For banks and investment advisors, but not for pensions,
institutions which follow a growth strategy are significantly less likely to buy (sell) in response
to the dividend increase (decrease).
While these results suggest that investors' behavior is as expected based on their
demonstrated preference for higher yield stocks, it is not clear whether clientele behavior is
related to tax status or other factors. However, for a subset of investment advisors having data
available from Nelson's Directory of Investment Managers, we are able to directly observe the
percentage of their assets that are managed for taxable versus tax exempt clients. We find that
these institutions are significantly less likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend
increase when a greater percentage of the institution's assets are managed for taxable clients,
suggesting importance of tax- induced dividend clienteles.
Finally, we examine how the stock price response to dividend changes depends on the
investment strategies of institutions holding the stock. The magnitude of the response is
expected to depend on the degree to which the stock has attracted investors with a preference for
its previous dividend. Graham and Kum ar (2006) find evidence that investor characteristics are
impounded into ex-dividend stock price behavior for smaller cap stocks where retail investors
are likely the marginal price setters. Prior literature has found that the stock price response to
dividend changes is positively related to the pre-announcement dividend yield, which is argued
to proxy for the likelihood the firm has attracted investors with a preference for dividends.3
However, Christensen and Prabhala (1995) point out that this interpretation is problematic
because the pre-announcement dividend yield also proxies for the likelihood of the dividend
change itself. For dividend increases, we find that the stock price response is greater for firms
with higher ownership by institutions holding high dividend yield portfolios, and lower when the
stock is owned by a greater proportion of growth investors. We do not find the behavior differs
across institution types, in particular for pensions. Thus, our evidence is consistent with the prior
literature supporting the existence of clienteles, but links this result more directly to the actual
portfolio strategies of owner-institutions. This evidence does not, however, clearly indicate that
that it is tax considerations rather than investment styles which drive this behavior.
Overall our evidence is consistent with the importance of clienteles for institutional
investors, and suggests that tax status as well as other factors related to the persistence of
investment styles drive the active clientele behavior.a The remainder of this paper proceeds as
3 
na3a3 and Vijh (1990) and Denis et al (1 994) argue that if high dividend yield firms aLtract
investors with a preference for dividends, price reactions to dividend changes will be larger for
higher dividend yield stocks.
a A number of papers which examine ex-dividend day stock price behavior provide a different
approach to consider the existence of tax based clienteles (see for example Elton and Gruber
(1970), Kalay (1982), Michaely (1991), McDonald (2001), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986)
and Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) among others). Much of this literature is not supportive of a
follows. Section II provides descriptive evidence of the relationship between firms' dividend
yield and ownership characteristics. Sections III and IV examines changes in holdings of
individual managers over the quarter containing the dividend change. Section V examines stock
price reactions to dividend increases and decreases. Section VI concludes.
U. Ownership structure and data description
II.A. Institutional Portfolio Characteristics
We first describe the variables used to characterize the portfolio decisions of institutional
investors. Quarterly holdings of institutions as reported in 13(f) filings are obtained from the
Spectrum database for the period 03131/1980 to 1213112003. We examine holdings of stocks
listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges and Nasdaq which have data available
on CRSP.
For each institution, we calculate two different measures of their observed preference for
higher dividend yield stocks. The first measure is the percentage of the institution's portfolio
invested in "high yield" stocks, where high yield stocks are defined as stocks in the top quintile
dividend yield at that quarter.s Comparisons are similar using other cutoffs for defining high
yield stocks. The second measure we calculate is the "portfolio dividend yield"; for each
manager./ on Spectrum at quarter /, we calculate portfolio 
_dividend _yield ,, -
Pt* x P,, xtrytd,
lsu, * P,,
where ,Syr is the holdings of stock i by manager j, Pilis the price of stock i, and ltyldi, is the long-
purely tax based clientele effect. See also Lewellen et al. (1978) for earlier evidence related to
retail investors, and survey evidence of Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005).t Some stocks may become "high yield" not because payouts have increased but because the
stock price has fallen. For robustness, we redefine high yield stocks as those in the top dividend
yield quintile which have also had a nonnegative stock return over the prior year. All results in
this section and in subsequent tests are unchanged using this alternative definition.
term dividend yield of stock i. The long term dividend yield is defined as the ratio of dividends
paid over a one-year period preceding the quarterly date to the stock price at the end of the
period. The two measures of institutions' preferences for dividends have a significant positive
correlation of 0.81.
These measures, as well as the percentage of the institutions' portfolio invested in
dividend paying stocks, are reported in Table I for the first and last quarters of our sample
period. In addition to the dividend yield characteristics, we also calculate for each manager the
market value weighted market/book ratio of stocks held in the portfolio, as well as the historical
sales growth of stocks held. Historical sales growth is defined as the average annual percentage
change in sales over the prior two years.
For institutions as a whole, both the percentage invested and the portfolio dividend yield
decline substantially over our sample period (the median portfolio dividend yield is 4.9o/o at
3l3lll980 versus lYo at 1213112003 for example). This reflects both changes in institutions'
investment decisions as well as changes in the characteristics of stocks over this time.6
Therefore, we also calculate a market adjusted portfolio dividend yield by subtracting the market
dividend yield for that quarter (not reported in Table I, but to be used in our regressions). Tests
in the following sections of this paper consider the robustness of our results to alternative
definitions of these variables.T
"Clienteles" for certain stock characteristics such as dividend yield may exist not only
because of tax considerations at the managers' level, but also because of differences in capital
requirements, liquidity needs, or other investor constraints. For example, manager types such as
u Fa*u and French (2001); Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003).t Or.rt variable measuring the percentage of the portfolio invested in high yield stocks is strongly
related to the concentration of higher or lower dividend yield stocks, which is not reported for
brevity.
banks and pensions may prefer dividend paying stocks because of prudent investor rules.s
"Clienteles" also may arise simply because institutions follow persistent investment styles,
maintaining portfolios of growth stocks or higher yield stocks over long horizons. Therefore, we
also report portfolio characteristics for subgroups of institutions based on the manager's type as
defined by Spectrume, and based on our own classifications of institutions' investment styles.
We classify investment styles each quarter as growth, value, or other, using a valuation-ratio
scoring methodology similar to the classifications provided by Georgeson & Co., MSCI, and
Morningstar.lo
Consistent with prior research, Table I shows that banks tend to be income investors.
The mean and median portfolio dividend yield of banks is the highest of any manager type (5.3%
for the quarter ending 313111980), though there is still considerable heterogeneity within
Spectrum types. Investment advisors hold less dividend paying stocks than other manager types,
and in later sample years, tax exempt pensions hold somewhat more dividend paying and high
yield stocks than institutions overall. Growth investors by definition hold portfolios of stocks
with lower dividend yields and also hold higher market/book stocks.rr
* Del Guercio (1996); Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003); Grinstein and Michaely (2005).
Consistent with Modigliani and Miller's (1961) original discussion, we refer to the "dividend
clientele hypothesis" as the question of existence of clienteles either for tax based reasons or
from any other factors causing heterogeneity across investors.
e Institutions are classified as banks, insurance companies, investment advisors, and pensions.
We refer to "investment advisors" as managers classified by Spectrum either as investment
companies and their managers (Spectrum type #3), or independent investment advisors
(Spectrum type #4). We also eliminate from Spectrum type #5 (other) institutions that are not
clearly identified as private or govemment pensions or endowments, so that the remaining group
represents 100% tax exempt investors.
10 We identify value and growth stocks each quarter by ranking stocks by book-to-market,
dividend yield, PIE ratio, sales growth and earnings-per-share growth, and aggregate for the
stock's composite value/growth score. Growth stocks are defined as stocks whose aggregate
value/growth score ranks in the bottom third. An institution is classified as a growth institution if
its holdings of growth stocks places it in the top third of all institutions for that quarter.tt Itr 1980, "growth" institutions on average hold a portfolio comprised of over 90% dividend
paying stocks. Because of the $100 million floor for 13(f) filings, some institutions following
Despite the time trend of decreasing portfolio dividend yields, the relative investment
preferences of institutions are quite persistent over time. Each quarter, we rank institutions based
on their portfolio dividend yield and the percentage of their portfolio invested in high yield
stocks. We then examine the correlation of these ranks over time. Looking at the institutions'
ranks over 4 quarters, the average correlation for the ranked variables is 0.89 and 0.77,
respectively. Over 8 quarters, the correlations are 0.83 and 0.69. Among manager types, banks
show the lowest persistence in these ranks (correlations arc 0.72 and 0.50, respectively, over 8
quarters). We also find high correlations in ranks based on portfolio market to book ratio and
sales growth. These statistics suggest that certain institutions maintain their investment style
over relatively long periods of time.12
Institutions' trading decisions are also likely related to their overall portfolio turnover. A
number of recent papers use an institution's measured portfolio turnover to represent the
investor's investment horizon.l3 We identify institutions as "high turnover" as follows: for each
manager./onSpectrumatquartett,PortfulioTurnov€fit=+fl#],*n.,"N
is the number of stocks in the institution's portfolio. We then calculate the median portfolio
turnover for each institution over the six prior quarters (or up to six quarters when institutions
first appear on Spectrum). "High turnover" managers are defined as institutions whose median
portfolio turnover is in the top 20% of all Spectrum managers for that quarter. Table I (Panel B)
shows that high turnover institutions hold slightly less dividend paying stocks and high yield
growth strategies are more likely to enter the sample in later years as valuations of growth stocks
increase. This may impact the predictive power of portfolio statistics for this group in the early
years of our sample.it Th.r. results *e ,onsistent with Chan et al (2002),who find persistent investment styles for a
;gmple of 3,336 mutual funds.rr See for example McConnell and Wahal (2000); Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003); Gaspar,
Massa, Matos, Patgiri and Rehman (2006); and Gaspar, Massa , and Matos (2005).
stocks (stocks in the top quintile dividend yield) and have a lower portfolio dividend yield than
do institutions overall.
II.B. Firm ownership structure
Having characteized institutions based on their portfolios, we next examine ownership
structure at the firm level. Firm and ownership characteristics are measured for each quarterly
reporting date starting at 3131/1980, for all CRSP firms with l3(f) institutional ownership of at
least 20%. We do not include firms with low institutional ownership because institutions are
considerably less likely to be the price setting marginal investors in these stocks (Sias and Starks,
1997). Furthermore, our measures of whether a firm has attracted institutions with a preference
for higher dividend yield stocks are not as meaningful for firms with few institutional owners.
We also exclude firms included on CRSP for less than one year, closed-end funds, REITS and
utilities. Finally, we exclude firms with a dividend yield greater than l0% to eliminate outliers.
Table II describes the relationship between the stocks' dividend yield and firm and
ownership characteristics as of 1213112003; the relationships shown are extremely similar for
earlier quarters. We first divide the dataset into dividend paying versus non-dividend paying
stocks. We then further divide dividend paying stocks into quintiles based on the long term
dividend yield.
Panel A reports median statistics for all firms in the dataset. The market value of equity
is substantially smaller for the zero dividend yield firms, and varies considerably across the yield
quintiles. Since there is a strong relationship between dividend yield and firm size, we focus our
discussion on Panel B which reports statistics only for firms which have a market value of equity
in the top quartile for the quarter. For the larger frrms, the median level of total institutional
holdings, as a percentage of shares outstanding, is higher and is not significantly different
between dividend and non-dividend paying firms. Ownership by banks is higher for the
dividend paying stocks, consistent with earlier research, but is not strictly increasing across the
yield deciles.la Holdings by pensions, the only type which is entirely tax exempt, increase
slightly with dividend yield. We also calculate the percentage of the firm's stock held by
managers classified as growth investors, as well as the portfolio turnover of institutions holding
the stock. As expected based on the methodology, ownership by growth managers is highest for
non-dividend paying stocks (16.2%), and falls across yield deciles.
The last four rows in Table II describe the variables most important to our tests of
clientele effects; these variables are constructed to measure the extent to which a given stock has
attracted institutions with a preference for higher dividend yield stocks. For each stock, the
average portfolio dividend yield (or average market adjusted portfolio dividend yield) is
calculated as the weighted average portfolio dividend yield of all managers holding the stock at
quarter t, weighting by the market value of the managers' holdings in that stock. From both
Panels A and B, means for the average portfolio dividend yield increase monotonically for the
dividend yield quintiles (from 1.32% for the lowest yield decile to 1.55o/o for the highest yield
quintile for the larger firms in Panel B). We also calculate the percentage of stock held by "high
yield" institutions. High yield institutions are defined as managers in the top 30 or 40Yo of all
Spectrum managers, based on their percentage holdings of stocks in the top quintile dividend
yield at that quarter. Ownership by high yield institutions also increases monotonically with the
yield quintiles.ls
t4 Though our calculations differ, these results are consistent with Grinstein and Michaely
(200s).ls The relationship between our portfolio yield variables and firms' dividend yields is
qualitatively similar when we do not exclude low ownership (< 20%) firms. The description is
similar when we exclude firms with concentrated ownership or when we exclude from the
calculations institutions with greater than l0% of their portfolio in a single stock.
10
To further demonstrate the effect described by these variables, Figures 1 and 2 show that
as stocks' market adjusted dividend yield rises from non-dividend paying to the highest quintile
dividend paying, there is an increase in the average market adjusted portfolio dividend yield of
institutions holding the stock (Figure 1) and the percentage ownership by high yield institutional
investors (Figure 2). These figures include observations for all quarters from 1980 to 2003.
Both variables are used in subsequent tests to describe whether a firm is likely to have attracted a
clientele that prefers higher dividend yield stocks.
III. Changes in ownership structure around dividend changes
The dividend clientele hypothesis suggests that investors with a preference for higher
yielding stocks are more likely to increase their holdings of stocks following a dividend increase
and more likely to sell shares following a dividend decrease. Unfortunately, we cannot observe
ownership changes on a daily basis. The Spectrum data does allow us to observe changes in
holdings for institutions between the quarterly dates surrounding the dividend change. Several
recent studies have examined changes in aggregate institutional ownership surrounding dividend
changes. In general, the magnitude of these ownership changes is smal1.16 Rather than changes
in the aggregate institutional ownership levels, we examine changes in characteristics of
institutions holding the stock using the measures defined in the previous section.
From the dataset of firms included on CRSP, Compustat and Spectrum, we identify a
sample of firms that make significant changes to their quarterly dividend. For dividend
increases, we include announcements where the percentage change in dividends is between I0%
and 300%. The lower bound of l0% ensures we include only economically significant dividend
tu Binay (2001), Jain
aggregate institutional
(1 999), Strickland (2002),
ownership changes. For
and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) calculate
our sample, the mean changes in institutional
l1
changes, and the upper bound eliminates outliers. Dividend decreases include all announcements
where the reduction in the dividend is $0.01 per share or more. We examine only quarterly
taxable cash dividends paid in U.S. dollars. We exclude events where distributions due to stock
splits, stock dividends, mergers or other events occur within 15 trading days of the dividend
announcement. As in the previous section, we continue to exclude firms included on CRSP for
less than one year at the time of the announcement, firms with a dividend yield greater than 70yo,
REITS, closed end funds, utilities, and firms with less than 20% institutional ownership.
Descriptive statistics for the resulting sample of 5,618 dividend increases and I,012
decreases are shown in Table III. The standardized dividend change is defined as the change in
the per share dividend, divided by the stock price 10 days prior to the announcements. Firms
which cut their dividend have a significantly higher dividend yield before the change, consistent
with Christensen and Prabhala (1995). The excess stock return in the year prior to the dividend
change is positive for the increase sample, also consistent with the idea that these changes may
be anticipat ed.r7 Remaining ownership statistics are provided for comparison with earlier
statistics for all firms with Spectrum ownership data (Table II).
Table IV reports changes in characteristics of institutions holding the stock. For each
firm we calculate the change in the average market adjusted portfolio dividend yield of
institutions holding the stock over the quarter containing the dividend change. However, while
we use the change in holdings over the quarter, our calculation uses the institutions' portfolio
dividend yield at the beginning of the quarter. Similarly, the change in holdings by high yield
institutions is based on the change in holdings of managers classified as "high yield" at the
ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding are 0.32% and 0.07Yo for our dividend increase
and decrease samples, respectively.tt Th. stock return prior to a dividend decrease is small but positive. This either means that
dividend decreases were less expected or that the market reaction to anticipated dividend cuts
was not negative.
L2
beginning of the quarter. We also exclude the effect of the dividend change itself (which might
itself affect the portfolio dividend yield of institutions holding that stock). We then report the
mean, median, 7 sth (or 25tn) percentile, and maximum (or minimum) change in these
characteristics around the announcement.
The changes reported in Table IV are consistent with the clientele adjustments we expect:
there is a significant increase in the average portfolio dividend yield of institutions holding the
stock as well as an increase in ownership by high yield institutions when firms increase their
dividends. We also observe significant mean and median declines for dividend decreasing firms.
For some individual firms, the changes are economically large; for dividend increases, the 75th
percentile for the change in the holdings by high yield (top 40%) institutions is over 2o/o and the
largest change is over 50%. For decreases, the 25th percentile for the change in this variable is
-3.14% and the largest change is 
-32.97%. Thus, there appears to be a redistribution as
institutions with a preference for dividends trade with other institutions less likely to hold higher
dividend vield stocks.
IV. Changes in ownership by individual institutions
In order to directly examine the relationship between trading behavior and tax status of
the institution, we next examine the changes in holdings of individual institutions around the
dividend change. SpecificaIly, we examine logistic regressions for the probability that a given
institution increases (decreases) its holdings by at least L0% in the quarters surrounding a
dividend increase (decrease). Results are not sensitive to higher cutoffs (15% and 20%o) for the
dependent variable.ls Table V provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable in these
t* For dividend increases, we also examine regressions which include cases where institutions
enter the stock (holdings increase from zero to a positive number) and find results similar to
those reported.
l3
regressions. Around dividend increases, 18.34o/o of all institutions increase their holdings by at
least 10%. Institutions are frequent sellers at dividend decreases; 18.08% of institutions reduce
holdings by at least I0%. Among the manager types, pensions are the least likely to increase or
decrease holdings in response to a dividend change. In the following regressions, we remove a
small number of pension managers which obviously index their portfolios to the S&P 500 based
on reported holdings.
The regression results are reported in Table VI. We include a number of control
variables in addition to dummy variables indicating characteristics of the stock and of the
institution, measured at the quarter end preceding the dividend change. We report separate
regressions for large and small banks, investment advisors and pensions as behavior may differ
across the manager types.le Large banks are defined each quarter as those in the top third of
banks ranked by portfolio size.
Since we are interested in the economic as well as the statistical significance of the
ownership variables, Table VI also reports the predicted probabilities of buying or selling based
on these estimates. The base case is the predicted probability, setting all explanatory variables
either at their sample medians or at zero for the investor characteristic indicator variables. For
example, a large bank has a predicted probability of buying more than L0% in response to a
dividend increase of 15.55Yo for the first regression specification. Increasing variables from the
50th to 75th sample percentile corresponds to roughly a 0.6 standard deviation increase for each
variable.
le The regressions pool observations for all managers and all dividend change announcements.
Observations are not independent in that a single manager may hold stock in a large number of
sample frrms, so that statistical significance may be overstated. Therefore, we also examine
regressions (not reported) where we weight observations by lAI, where N is the number of times
the manager appears in the sample. This effectively weights very small institutions the same as
large managers; results are similar to those reported.
T4
Banks, investment advisors and pensions are each less likely to increase their holdings
around dividend increases for smaller firms and higher market/book firms. Also for all types of
institutions, as the pre-announcement short-term dividend yield of the stock increases,
institutions are less likely to increase their holdings in the quarter surrounding the dividend
increase. We also control for the institution's portfolio turnover (based on the prior 6 quarters),
as well as their "buying" intensity of stocks for that quarter (Lakonishok et al, l99L); the buying
intensity is defined as the increase in portfolio size, based on prices at the beginning of the
quarter, due to purchases of stocks excluding the dividend increasing stock. This variable
controls for the fact that the institution may be buying this stock simply as they are increasing the
size of their entire portfolio, ffid has a large significant effect.
Our key variables related to the clientele hypotheses are shown in bold for each
regression. We expect that institutions with either a high portfolio dividend yield or which hold
a larger proportion of high dividend yield stocks to be more likely to increase holdings in
response to a dividend increase. For large banks, increasing the portfolio dividend yield (from
the 50th to 75th percentile) increases the probability of buying in response to the dividend
increase by 0.51%. Further, a growth investor has almost a 1olo lower probability of buying. The
behavior of smaller banks, however, is not as we would expect based on the dividend clientele
hypothesis. This is consistent with our descriptive evidence and with Grinstein and Michaely
(2005), in that banks following prudent investor guidelines may prefer dividend paying to non-
dividend paying stocks, but not necessarily higher dividend yield stocks . Large banks appear
more similar to investment advisors; several large banks actually appear in Nelson's Directory of
Investment Managers, and these banks often manage a significant portion of their assets as
mutual funds.
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For investment advisors and pensions, the effect of the portfolio dividend yield is also
positive and significant. The effect is largest for pensions; increasing the portfolio dividend
yield variable increases the probability of buying by 0.85%; despite the fact that all pensions face
the same tax rate (zero), pensions that maintain higher dividend yield portfolios are more likely
to increase their holdings. The magnitude of the effects on the probability of buying are the
same for all regressions in Table VI when we measure the institution's preference for dividends
using the percentage of the portfolio invested in high yield stocks rather than the portfolio
dividend yield.
Panel B reports regression results for managers holding stock in the sample of dividend
decreases. Both banks and investment advisors generally have a high probability of selling at a
dividend cut; the base case probability of decreasing holdings is over 23% in all regressions for
both manager types. For large banks and investment advisors, the portfolio dividend yield is
again significant, consistent with expected clientele effects; increasing the portfolio dividend
yield increases the probability of selling in response to the dividend cut. Further, growth
investors are less likely to sell on news of a dividend cut. Neither coefficient is significant for
pension funds, however, which have a lower overall probability of trading. These results do not
suggest that pensions are more likely to prefer dividends based on their tax exempt status.
While these results suggest that institutions' behavior is as expected based on their
demonstrated preference for higher yield stocks, it is not clear whether clientele behavior is
related to tax status or other factors. However, for a subset of investment advisors, we are able
to directly observe the percentage of their assets that are managed for taxable versus tax exempt
clients, using Nelson's Directory of Investment Managrtr.to If tax based dividend clienteles are
to Cotnparing portfolio characteristics of investment advisors included in Nelson's Directory
those in the fulI sample, the only significant difference we find is that investment advisors
to
in
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important, w€ expect institutions with a higher level of funds managed for taxable clients to be
less likely to purchase stocks in response to a dividend increase, and less likely to sell in
response to a decrease. If the institution has unrealized capital gains on dividend cutting stocks,
however, this effect may be offset by the impact on the taxable investors of the sale. The
percentage of assets managed for taxable clients and the institution's portfolio dividend yield are
not significantly related; for the quarter ending 1213112003, the correlation between this variable
and the percentage of funds invested in high yield stocks is only 0.007.
We report regression results for this subset of investment advisors in Table VI.C. As in
the previous regressions, a higher portfolio dividend yield (or higher percentage of the
institution's portfolio invested in high yield stocks) increases the probability of buying in
response to a dividend increase and increases the probability of selling in response to a decrease.
Growth investors show behavior consistent with a preference for lower yielding stocks for
dividend decreases, but are more likely to buy on a dividend increase. Most importantly, for
dividend increases, as more funds are managed for taxable clients, the institution is less likely to
buy in response to the dividend increase. For dividend decreases, the propensity to sell is not
related to the taxabilitv of an institution's clients.
V. Stock price response to dividend changes
The dividend clientele theory predicts that investors will respond to a change in the ftrm's
dividend policy based on their preferences for dividends. For example, if a high dividend yield
firm significantly cuts its dividend, this may lead to a sell off by investors who originally
purchased the stock based on its dividend yield. Controlling for information effects, a significant
change in demand based on the stock's yield will cause the stock price reaction to be more
Nelson's tend to be larger, with a median portfolio market value as of 12131103 of $739.1 million
t1
negative due to the sell off. The magnitude of the response will depend on the degree to which
the stock has attracted investors with a preference for its previously higher dividend.
Conversely, if a low yield firm has attracted a clientele of investors with an aversion to cash
dividends (aggressive growth investors for example), this may attenuate the normally positive
stock price effect of increasing the dividend.
Previous studies which examine the stock price response to dividend change
announcements use the dividend yield to proxy for whether the firm has attracted high or low
yield investors. Rather than using dividend yield as a proxy for the likelihood of clientele
effects, we use our variables based on portfolio characteristics of institutions holding the stock
prior to the dividend change. This allows us to directly measure whether the stock is held by a
clientele of investors who have demonstrated a preference for high dividend yield stocks based
on their prior portfolio choices.2l
We report the cumulative abnormal stock returns at the dividend change announcement in
Table VII, for two day (-1,0) and three day (-1,1) windows starting at the day prior to the
announcement. Abnormal refurns are market model residuals using common stock refurns from the
period 250 to 60 days prior. Test statistics are calcutated as in Mikkelson and Partch (1986). As
previously documented, for the overall samples we observe significant negative stock price
responses to dividend cuts and positive stock price responses to increases.t' We do observe,
however, that the magnitude of these effects changes over the sample period; for the subperiod
versus S366.0 for all investment advisors.
zr Stricklan d (2002) finds that the stock price reaction to the announcement of the dividend
change is negatively related to his proxy for the level of taxable investors, but does not directly
examine characteristics of stocks held by individual institutions.
22 A number of papers document the stock price response to dividend changes, including
Aharony and Swary (1980) and Asquith and Mullins (1983). Allen and Michaely (1995,2003)
provide a comprehensive review of this literature.
1gg4-lgg8, the mean and median stock price reactions to dividend decreases are not signiftcarfi.z3
During the period 1999-2003, covering the end of the internet boom and the subsequent bear
market, the price reaction to dividend cuts is significantly negative again. Some difference from
prior studies may be due to the fact that we eliminate smaller (lower institutional ownership) firms
from our sample.
Table VIII reports our tests of the relationship between the abnormal stock returns and
ownership structure. The dependent variable is the three day abnormal stock return for dividend
increases and decreases, respectively (results are similar using the two day return). We include
variables used in previous studies to distinguish between theories which potentially explain the
stock price response. Dividend signaling models suggest that a dividend increase (decrease)
conveys positive (negative) information about current andlor future cash flows.2a Based on this
theory, we expect the magnitude of the stock price effect to be related to the size of the dividend
change; the regressions for dividend increases show a significant positive relationship between
the standardized dividend change and the abnormal stock return. Under the free cash flow theory
of dividends (Jensen, 1986), dividend increases by firms with free cash flow reduces the cash
available for negative NPV investment, increasing firm value. If Tobin's a (proxied by
market/book) is an indicator of expected profitability of future investment, dividend increases
will be more valuable for low Q firms (overinvestors) and dividend cuts will be viewed more
negatively for these firms. In fact, our regressions find that announcement effects are positively
related to the market to book ratio for both dividend increases and decreases. Denis, Denis and
Sarin (1994) find a similar lack of support for the free cash flow hypothesis.
'3 Th. percentage of significant negative observations (not reported) drops considerably over
time. See also Michaely and Grullon (2002) and Amihud and Li (2006).
'o Dirridend signaling models include Bhattacharya(1979),John and Williams (1985), and Miller
and Rock (1985).
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We also include control variables shown in previous work to be related to the abnormal
stock return. We control for firm size using the log of the market value of equity 10 days prior to
the announcement; this variable is negative and significant for the dividend increases.zs The pre-
announcement stock price level and volatility of returns (standard deviation of market model
residuals from estimation period) are used in previous studies to control for firm risk. The stock
price response is increasing in the volatility for dividend increases. Finally, Christensen and
Prabhala (1995) show that the pre-announcement dividend yield is also related to firms' growth
opportunities (Q), and to the likelihood that a firm will increase or decrease its dividend.26 This
confounds the interpretation of these variables in earlier studies as evidence of clientele or free
cash flow effects. Therefore, we include the excess daily stock return (days -250,-10) to control
both for prior performance and for the extent to which the market may have anticipated the
change. Positive prior stock performance is associated with a lower abnormal return for
dividend increases. We also include the market average dividend yield to capture the overall
dividend payout ratio and its variation over the course of the sample.
Our tests also control for institutions' portfolio turnover. For example, a bank may be
more likely to respond by selling in response to a dividend cut because of its preference for
holding higher yielding stocks. However, banks may be less responsive because they tend to be
more passive "buy and hold" investors, or because they are less subject to pressures based on
short term performance measures. By considering the institution's normal portfolio turnover, wo
can control for these effects.
2s We expect the information content of dividend changes to be smaller for larger firms if
asymmetric information is lower for these firms. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2001)
further suggest that larger, more mature firms increase or initiate a dividend due to a decline in
investment opportunities.
tu Chtistensen and Prabhala (1995) also suggest that the standardized dividend change and the
pre-announcement dividend yield will be highly correlated. Since this is true for our sample, we
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For dividend increases, regression (1) of Table VIII.A. replicates the basic results of
previous studies and shows that the stock price response is significantly related to the short term
dividend yield.27 However, regression (2) adds the firm's institutional shareholders' average
market adjusted portfolio dividend yield, which is positive and significant at the 10% level. This
result is consistent with the interpretation that dividend clienteles are important in explaining the
stock price reaction. For robustness, regression (3) reports the same regressions with our
alternative measure of whether the firm has attracted a large proportion of "high yield"
institutions prior to the dividend increase; this variable is also significant at the l0% level.28
The dividend clientele hypothesis predicts that as the proportion of taxable investors
decreases, the stock price reaction to a dividend change will be larger. If the proportion of stock
held by institutions proxies for the proportion of investors that are less taxed, the price response
will be greater when more stock is held by institutions. Further, if more stock is held by tax
exempt institutions such as pensions, the stock price response to dividend increases will be
greater.2n Signaling models, however, have the opposite implication.30 Regressions (4) through
(6) consider additional characteristics of the institutional ownership structure for the dividend
increase sample. Neither the level of institutional holdings, nor the type of institutions (banks,
investment advisors or pensions) holding the stock is significantly related to the stock price
also examine regressions removing the standardrzed dividend change variable and find this has
no significant impact on coefficients for the remaining variables.
" All subsequent results are similar using the long term dividend yield measure. Though not
highly correlated for the sample of dividend increases, we also examine regressions (not
reported) using the lagged (prior quarter's) standardized dividend yield.t* Si*ilar results are obtained using the high yield variable with a 40o/o cutoff (see Table II).
Regressions including only observations for the first dividend increase for each firm are similar
to those reported, as are regressions including only more extreme dividend increases. We also
examine but do not find evidence of non-linear effects, either by using dummy variables for
higher levels of ownership by these institutions, or by adding squared terms to the regressions.
2e Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000); Stricklan d, (2002).
'o Be*heim and Wantz (1995).
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response. While these regressions are supportive of important clientele effects, there is no
evidence here to suggest a tax-based clientele based on the abnormal returns.
Lastly, our measures of investment style are highly related to the institutions' portfolio
dividend yield variables. Regression (7) shows that the stock price response is lower for firms
with higher levels of ownership by growth investors; these institutions are unlikely to hold higher
yielding stocks.
Table VIII.B. repeats these tests for the sample of dividend decreases. The evidence of
clientele effects for this group of firms in previous studies is weaker; Denis, Denis and Sarin
(1994) for example do not find a relationship between the stock price response and pre-
announcement dividend yield for dividend decreasing firms. The announcement returns
themselves are also not consistently negative (Table VII), particularly for periods when growth
strategies become more common. Our results show the (lagged) short term yield is significantly
related to the stock price ,esporrse.3l However, the average portfolio dividend yield and
ownership by high yield institutions variables are not significant. This result suggests that rather
than clientele effects, other factors such as information effects are more important in explaining
the stock price response to dividend cuts.
Overall, the results in Table VIII are consistent with the importance of dividend clientele
effects for dividend increases but not for dividend decreases. The stock price effect however is
unrelated to the level of holdings by institutions as a whole or by pension investors, used
previously to reflect how much of the stock is held by tax exempt investors. More generally, our
results are consistent with Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003), Amihud and Li (2006), and Graham
and Kumar (2006) that shareholder composition influences prices around corporate events.
3t Since the stock's short term dividend yield and the standardized dividend change are highly
correlated, regressions in Panel B use the lag (by one quarter) of the short term dividend yield
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VI. Conclusions
Although it has been more than 40 years since Modigliani and Miller (1961) first
described the dividend clientele theory, there is still little direct empirical evidence that helps us
to understand the importance of clientele effects when firms set their dividend policy, let alone
the extent to which these clienteles exist. The dramatic increase in institutional ownership over
recent years affords us the opportunity to examine these issues. Our approach is to directly
examine institutional shareholders' preferences for dividend paying stocks based on the
characteristics of stocks held in their portfolios. We provide descriptive evidence consistent with
the idea that higher dividend yield firms tend to attract "high yield" institutional investors. Many
institutions follow persistent investment styles, tending to maintain relatively high or low
dividend yield portfolios depending on their style.
Although changes in aggregate institutional ownership around dividend changes are
small, we find significant changes in the characteristics of institutions holding the stock;
dividend increases (decreases) are associated with increased (decreased) holdings by institutions
that appear to prefer dividends based on their prior portfolio choices. Further, when we examine
the trading behavior of individual institutions, changes in holdings around dividend increases or
decreases are related to characteristics of those investors' portfolios. In particular, for a subset of
investment advisors, we are able to directly observe the proportion of their portfolios managed
for taxable clients. Consistent with tax based dividend clienteles, these institutions are less likely
to buy additional stock around the announcement of a dividend increase when more of their
portfolio is managed for taxable clients. Finally, we show that stock price reactions to
announcements of dividend increases are related to characteristics of the institutional owners,
variable. Coefficients for the investors' portfolio dividend yield are unaffected by changes in the
z)
and appear generally consistent with predictions of the clientele hypothesis; we observe no
significant effects for dividend decreases, however. Our results suggest that tax considerations
as well as other factors such as the persistence of investment styles drive clientele behavior for
institutions.
definition of this variable.
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CHAPTER 2: I)eterminants of Institutional Investor Behavior
I. Introduction
The heterogeneity of investors is an important factor driving financial markets. Investors
with different investment objectives from one another or with preferences that evolve over time
are a key source of trading activity within markets3t. Fnrth.rrnore, the presence of heterogeneous
investors can affect the way information is incorporated into the market and the way that market
prices react to news or events.
This paper explores several testable hypotheses which relate the fundamental
characteristics of institutions and their clients to observed differences in their portfolio.
First, I consider the prudent investor hypothesis which states that the risk-taking (or
inversely the "prudence") of an institution is directly affected by the legal leverage allowed to the
different client groups it services. Trzcinka (1998), in a review of industry practices and
academic literature, provides a detailed description of how prudent investor laws can affect the
holdings and trading behavior of trust fund and pension fund managers. The implication of this
hypothesis is that trust fund and pension fund managers, who are exposed to this legal threat, will
avoid making risky investment decisions and tilt their portfolio towards prudent investments.
They are also less likely to make active trading decisions on which they could be later chastised
and tend to hold positions longer. Del Guercio (1996) looks at the institutions holding "high
quality" stocks (defined as stocks with an A rating or higher), and finds that bank ownership is
significantly higher for high quality stocks and significantly lower for investment advisors.
At the institutional level the prudent investor hypothesis asks whether the portfolios of
bank and pension institutions differ from other institutions less likely to encounter regulatory
constraint. By incorporating data on the client composition of institutions I can test the
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hypothesis more directly, controlling for prudent client types. I initially test whether institutions
labeled as prudent in previous studies are still considered prudent after adjusting for their clients.
In the case of pension fund clients, further differentiation is possible between funds held
directly by pension fund institutions and those managed by another institution on behalf of the
pension fund. Pension fund trustees will typically word contracts to transfer the legal
responsibilities of EzuSA33 to the sub-manager, resulting in an alignment of investment
objectives and similar prudence to pension fund managers themselves. Differences in strategies
may arise, however, as a result of discrepancies between the tenacity of the enforcement of
ERISA (a federal law overseen by government regulators) and the enforcement of the investment
mandate contract (a locally drafted document with the onus of oversight falling on the trustees).
The extent to which these relationships exist, is tested by contrasting institutions acting as
sub advisors with pension fund institutions. Additionally, ERISA currently requires that
prudence be measured at the portfolio level rather than at the stock level. I test whether Pension
fund managers take these diversification effects within the portfolio into account.
The second hypothesis considers the effect that taxes have on the investment decisions of
institutions. Institutions should invest in a manner that maximizes the after tax investment
performance for their clients. All else being equal, institutions with primarily taxable clients
should invest less in dividend paying stocks and turn over their portfolio less frequently.
A large body of work exists that attempts to relate the taxability of institutions to
observed dividend clientele effects. Strickland (1997) separates institutions into taxable
(investment advisors) and tax exempt (foundations and pensions) and finds that taxable
3' See for example the model of Barberis and Shleifer (2003).
" Th" Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was enacted to protect the
interests of employee pension plans. ERISA is a specific example of a prudent investor law
which gives beneficiaries the ability to pursue legal action against the trustees of a pension fund
if it can be shown that their investments were less than prudent.
3r
institutions prefer low dividend yield stocks while tax exempt institutions show no systematic
preference. Jain (2003) finds evidence that as a whole, institutional investors prefer higher
dividend paying securities. The argument that institutional investors are generally tax exempt is
used to infer that tax exempt institutions are attracted to dividends. Hotchkiss and Lawrence
(2007) find evidence of clientele effects in the reaction of institutions to dividend
announcements. and relate this effect to the taxability of institutions.
Taxes can also affect an institution's propensity to trade. Seida and Wempe (2000)
observe a shift in trading patterns after the Tax Reform Act of 1986; legislation which increased
the capital gains tax. Their study fosuses on individual investors, finding that their propensity to
realize capital gains decreased after the act took effect.
The third hypothesis generalizes the relationship between clients and institutional
portfolio characteristics and asks more generally whether institutions' exposure to common stock
risk factors is related to the clients served by the portfolio. By mapping institutional portfolios
onto market beta, size, value/growth and momentum stock factors3a we test whether institutions
form preferences along common style dimensions and whether these preferences are related to
clients and in turn the clients' preferences.
When evaluating these hypotheses, we need to control for a number of additional
determinants which may also affect investment decisions. Differences may arise as a result of
overall market or individual investor style preferences and client demographics. Several of these
systematic differences are documented in other studies.
The model of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) shows how differences in style preferences of
institutions can lead to clientele effects and herding behavior. Meanwhile, Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) provide a model for explaining institutional style preferences as a side effect
'o See Fama and French (1 993) and Carhart (1 997)
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of agency issues where the objectives of the asset manager and client diverge. Their model
shows how institutions can be tempted to hold stocks with strong historical performance or
stocks which favor a shorter investment horizon to minimize the probability of interim trading
losses affecting the client-manager relationship.
Bennett, Sias and Stafts (2003) explore a perceptible shift in institutional preferences
from large stocks towards smaller stocks. They compare style shifts within institutional types
against changes in the relative importance of different institutional types (as measured by
aggregate holdings). They show that a change in style preferences rather than a change in the
importance of market participants describes the shift.
Chan, Chen and Lakonishok (1999) show that while styles are persistent, the likelihood
of changing style increases after poor performance. Mutual funds form styles around popular
benchmarks and rarely take extreme positions relative to the benchmark. When they do stray
from a benchmark, they are likely to have a growth tilt.
Several of these hypotheses provide explanations for specific aspects of the general
heterogeneity of investors and may not be directly identifiable in this sample without additional
information about the clients of each institution. Some hypotheses can be controlled for by
incorporating information about the size of the institution, returns on stock style portfolios and
other related portfolio characteristics.
This paper tackles these hypotheses by combining information on the portfolio of an
institution with data on its client composition and tax status. By looking at snapshots of client
and portfolio composition, the static relationship between institutions, clients and their portfolios
is established. Observations constructed from changes in composition provide insight into the
dynamics of the relationship between institutions and their clients. Contemporaneous covariance
indicates a general interaction between institutions and their clients, while covariances formed by
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lagging either client changes or portfolio changes give an insight into whether the relationship is
caused by institutions responding to changes in their client base, clients responding to changes in
an institution's investment stvle or a combination of the two.
I find that prudent investing has as much to do with institutional charter as the clients an
institution services. While pension institutions and bank/trust companies are more prudent than
other institutions, pension fund assets are less likely to be invested in A-rated stocks when
managed by a third party investment manager instead of a pension fund manager. The prudence
of pension fund managers is more focused on the traditional stock level screening tests for
prudence while third party investment managers are more likely to take a portfolio approach to
risk management.
I find that institutions with taxable clients are less likely to invest in high dividend yield
stocks and are likely to have a lower turnover than institutions with tax exempt clients. This
demonstrates that institutional investors do take into account the tax exposure of their clients'
portfolios.
The results suggest a general relationship between client composition and portfolio
characteristics. This relationship is particularly evident when looking at changes in client
composition and changes in portfolio characteristics.
Knowing if and how client preferences or institutional charter affect investment decisions
provides additional tools for economists and market participants trying to understand trading
activity in the market place. It can also provide an insight for clients seeking to find an institution
to manage their assets in a manner consistent with their needs. The findings of this paper can
help institutions to better examine factors that drive their investment decisions, and using this
knowledge to more efficiently serve their client base.
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section III describes the data and scope of the sample,
discussing differences that arise as a result of the matching process and the potential effects that
these differences may have on inference; Section IV compares the different institutions in the
sample by introducing additional statistics provided in the enhanced sample, thus describing the
differences between Banks and Investment Advisors at a broad level and also demonstrates the
relationship between client categories and tax exposure in preparation for joint testing of
hypotheses on taxability and general client heterogeneity; Section V outlines the regression
methodology used in the remainder of the paper; Section VI presents the evidence of investor
prudence while Section VII investigates the relationship between client taxability and
institutional portfolios. Section VIII broadens the scope and develops the relationship between
client characteristics and stock-level risk factor weightings; Section IX looks at changes in client
composition and portfolio characteristics; Section X looks at the asynchronous relationship
between clients and portfolio characteristics to tests whether the relationship between client
composition and institutional behavior is driven by the institution or the client; Section XI
concludes the studv.
II. Data Construction and Sample Coverage
The hypotheses outlined above are addressed through a unique sample which combines
data on the client composition of institutional investors, institutional holdings and stock level
characteristics.
Details of institutional holdings are gathered from the CDA/Spectrum 13-f database.
Market data on U.S. equities is obtained from the CRSP/CompuSTAT merged database. Fama-
French and momentum factor returns are provided by Ken French as a database on the Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS) portal. These databases are matched (through a process
described in Appendix A) and combined to provide equity portfolio statistics (outlined in
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Appendix B). Nelson's Directory of Investment Managers provides information at the
institutional level on the clients of an institution. the allocation across asset classes and hish level
information about the institutions' charter and broad investment objectives.
The combination of these four databases provides a single panel of data which describes
both the characteristics of institutional portfolios and the institutions themselves. Portfolio
statistics derived from CDA and CRSP are related to the characteristics of the institutions and
their client base as derived from Nelsons.
The combined sample covers cross-sectional panels of institutional data for the year ends
1990, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2001,2002 and 2003. The final sample contains 4,927 individual
institutional portfolio snapshots. Tables I.a and I.b report summary information on the
institutions captured in the sample as of December 3 1, 1990, and December 3 1, 2003,
respectively.
In 1990, there were 972 institutions covered by the CDA/Spectrum database. Of these
institutions, 530 (55%) are included in the final sample. 305 of the institutions in the sample are
classified by CDA/Spectrum as Investment Advisors, representing half of the sample. A total of
78 Banks,23Insurance companies and 12 Mutual Fund companies are included for 1990 as well
as 37 institutions classified as "Other" by CDA/Spectrum. In addition, I include 75 institutions
identified as Pension Fund companies35 which, while not included in Nelson's directories, are
considered to be institutions with a single client type (pension funds) and 100% of their equity
portfolio invested on behalf of that client. Sections ii and iii of Table I.a shows the alignment
between Nelson's and CDA/Spectrum classifications. In 1990, the definitions align closely, with
3s The criterion for classification as a Pension Fund company is that the institution is classified as
"Other" by CDA/Spectrum and that the institution name contains either "Pension", "Corporate
Retirement" or variations thereof.
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87% of all Nelson's classified "Bank and Bank/Trust Companies"36 classified as Banks by CDA
and 86% of Nelson's Investment Advisors classified as Mutual Funds or Investment Advisors by
CDA.
In 2003, the sample has grown to 7 60 institutions representing 42% of the institutions in
CDdSpectrum at that time. Between 1990 and 2003, the most significant change is the growth
in prominence of the "Other" category on CDA/Spectrum. 61Vo of all institutions in CDA are
classified as "Other". In the intersection of Nelson's directory and CDA/Spectrum, the majority
of these institutions are classified as Investment Advisors by Nelson's, although a significant
fraction of Nelson's Banks fall into this category. As a result, only 49% of Nelson's Banks are
classified as Banks by CDA/Spectrum and 42o/o of Nelson's Investment Advisors are likewise
classified by CDA/Spectrum.
These statistics suggest that two issues should be taken to heart when analyzing the
sample. First, Nelson's directory institution types are more stable over time and hence preferable
to CDA characterizations, which may contain significant misclassifications in later years37. I
present certain results using both definitions as a robustness test and to relate the results to the
prior literature in this area.
Second, similarities and differences between the entire CDA database and the subset for
which Nelson's data is available must be understood. Table II.a provides portfolio statistics for
institutions in the CDAlSpectrum database as of December 31,1990. For each type of institution
in the database, I provide statistics for institutions in the final sample and statistics for those
missing from the sample. A t-statistic is provided to test whether the sample institutions are
'u Refe.red to as "Banks" or "Nelson's Banks" from this point onwards.3t Several papers including Sharma, Easterwood and Raman (2006) note the increased likelihood
that an institution will be classified as'oOther" by CDA/Spectrum after 1998. This study finds a
similar effect; however the utilization of Nelson's classifications bypasses misclassification
issues.
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systematically different from the missing institutions. Appendix B provides an overview of the
construction of the various portfolio statistics.
For the entire sample taken as a whole, institutions tend to be significantly larger than
those left out of the sample. They hold riskier securities (when measured by stock beta),
however, there is no evidence of a systematic difference in the quality of the securities held.
There is little evidence to suggest a significant value growth tilt in our sample; While the average
sales growth of stocks held by institutions in our sample is higher than other institutions, there is
no significant difference in dividend preferences or in the fraction of institutions classified as
aggressive growth based on a broad sample of value and growth measures.
For institutions classified as banks by CDA/Spectrum, the pattern is similar. However, a
significant difference in the average firm's age for stocks held by banks in the sample is also
observed.
Investment Advisors in our sample tend to invest in larger, less risky stocks with a higher
yield (though they invest less in stocks in the top dividend quintile). They are also likely to hold
more stocks with a rating by Standard and Poor's.
In 2003, institutions in the sample are still significantly larger than the institutions
dropped from the sample. They are more likely to invest less in A-rated stocks, yet are likely to
invest more in stocks with over 10 years of history. In our sample, Banks have a significant tilt
away from dividends relative to other institutions, maintain a higher average beta and turn over
their portfolio more frequently.
Institutions in the sample do exhibit some systematic differences from the broader
CDA/Spectrum database used in other studies. This sample represents larger institutions than the
broader database. While there are few systematic differences in style and risk preferences
between the sample and the broader sample, I take steps to demonstrate that the sample can
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replicate the results of previous analyses. The focus of this paper remains on new inferences
which can only be determined with the additional information provided by Nelson's investment
directories.
III. Descriptive Statistics
Table III.a presents a full set of descriptive statistics for the institutions in our final
sample as of December 3I, 1990. Information from all available data sources is now
incorporated, including equity portfolio statistics from CDA/Spectrum, institutional summary
statistics from CDA and Nelson's and detailed client composition and tax statistics from
Nelson's. For each summary statistic the mean and standard deviation across institutions are
reported with a t-statistic to test whether there is a significant difference in mean between the
institution type under question and the remainder of the sample.
Statistics derived from the portfolios of institutions are presented first in Table III.
Aggressive growth investors are defined as institutions that rank in the top third of institutions
when ranked according to their ownership of growth stocks38 for that quarter. % dividend paying,
portfolio dividend yield, portfolio average sales growth, portfolio average market cap and
portfolio average beta are calculated by taking a holdings-weighted average of the stock
characteristics in each institution' s portfolio.
The portfolio variance is a historical estimate of the portfolio risk based on current
portfolio weights and the risk profile of each stock3e over the past ten quarters; by taking into
account the covariance structure of stocks we get an accurate picture of the overall portfolio risk,
38 Growth stocks are defined by a scoring methodotogy that ranks stocks according to their
dividend yield, market to book ratio, PIE ratio, year-on-year sales growth and year-on-year
earnings per share growth.3e We use a three factor Fama-French regression to estimate the factor exposure and
idiosynchratic risk of each stock and aggregate these risk exposures to the portfolio level.
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taking diversification effects into account. Portfolio stock return standard deviation, on the other
hand is a simple cap weighted average of the individual stock standard deviations which does not
take the covariance of stocks into account. The ratio of these two variables gives a reasonable
estimate of the efforts taken to diversify positions in the portfolio.
Turnover calculates the fraction of an institution's portfolio which is bought or sold
during a quarter, averaged over the past six quarters.
The four factor weighting variables are calculated using the methodology outlined in
detail in section VIII. These variables represent the aggregate exposure of an institution's
portfolio to stock-level risk factors. A positive (negative) number implies that the portfolio has a
positive (negative) exposure to that particular factor; for the market risk factor weighting
(pfmktrf) a value of one implies that the portfolio has the same market risk as the market itself,
for the other factors, a positive factor implies a portfolio exposure greater than that of the market
average.
The remaining statistics are derived from data provided in the Nelson's directories.
Number of companies followed and research sources are statistics provided by investment
managers to describe their investment management style. Information on the total assets under
management and fraction of assets in U.S. equities are given as part of a broad overview of each
institution's holdings and allow us to estimate the impact of other asset classes and international
securities on inferences drawn from U.S. equity based 13(0 holdings.
The fraction of investments held on behalf of various groups of clients is provided in
another section of the reports in Nelson's directories. For this analysis we aggregated client types
into eight broad groups which capture the different investment, tax and legal objectives faced by
managers of those clients. The fraction of taxable investments provides an overall figure on the
fraction of assets under manasement which are held on behalf of taxable clients.
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Comparing Nelson's Banks against all other institution types, a significantly increased
preference for large cap value stocks with a high stock rating is observed, consistent with
previous findings on the prudent investor hypothesis. Their portfolios are significantly weighted
towards stocks with a low market risk factor (pfmktrf), low small cap risk exposure (pfsmb),
high value factor exposure (pfhml) and high momentum factor exposure (pftmd). Bank/Trust
companies are generally larger than other institutions and more likely to rely on street research.
Clients of BanVTrust companies are significantly less likely to be mutual fund or pension fund
clients.
Investment Advisors are generally smaller institutions with a tilt towards growth stocks.
They have a higher factor weighting on market risk and small cap stocks and lower factor
weightings on value and momentum stocks. They exhibit increased turnover and a preference for
in-house research. Clients of Investment Advisors are more likelv to be individuals or
foundations, and are less likely to be pension fundsa0.
Pension Fund institutions show evidence of a low risk, large cap value tilt in their
portfolio. They are significantty less likely to turn over their portfolio preferring a buy-and-hold
strategy.
The success of tests of hypotheses in this paper comes partially from the ability to
distinguish between preferences arising from the different investment objectives of clients, the
tax status of clients and the general institutional and market patterns which broadly affect client
investments. We have already demonstrated that certain institutions have biases towards certain
client types a result that we bear in mind when interpreting the results involving both
institution and client type. We also need to be mindful of the systematic relationships that exist
o0 The presence of Pension fund institutions in our sample, whose clients are 100% pension
funds, biases this test statistic. Relative to all non-pension institutions, Investment Advisors are
actually more likely to have pension fund clients.
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between client types and taxability when comparing competing hypotheses. Behavior in
institutions representing a particular client type may be attributable to the type of client directly
or to the general behavior associated with all client types of a similar tax exposure.
Table IV presents the results of a simple regression of the fraction of client assets subject
to taxation on the fractional ownership on behalf of each client group. The regression estimates
the taxability of each client group. Coefficients can be interpreted as the least squares estimate of
the fraction of the clients within that group subject to taxation 
- 
a coefficient of zero implies that
all clients in that category are tax-exempt while a coefficient of one implies all clients are
taxable. Pension fund clients are tax exempt4l. Foundations are also tax-exempt. Individuals,
Mutual Funds, Insurance Funds and Individual Trusts are generally taxable slients. "Other"
clients arc approximately 50-60Yo taxable.
IV. Regression Methodology
To understand the relationship between portfolio characteristics, institution
characteristics and the client types served, we start by focusing on the static relationship between
the variables.
This is achieved through a series of level-based regressions of the form
pf 
_stat,., = di + Brinst _stat,,, +...+ ti,t
We incorporate fixed effects for each institution to control for institution-specific effects.
When considering the standard errors of the estimated coefficients, the time series properties of
our dependent and independent variables must be taken into consideration. There is significant
ot In the case of CDA/Spectrum pension institutions this is by construction, for pension fund
clients of other institutions; this result reflects the observed pattern in the data.
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autocorrelationfi2 in both the independent and dependent variables. As a result, a simple pooled
ordinary least squares estimate of standard error would overstate the significance of the
coefficients.
Beck and Katz (1996, 20Aq discuss several approaches to dealing with time-series issues
in a panel data setting. While they warn against using naive adjustments of panel standard errors
using Feasible Generali zed Least Squares, their proposed solution, Panel Corrected Standard
Errors (PCSE) cannot be successfully applied in this setting as the sample has too few (seven)
yearly panels which are also unevenly spaced.
I heed their warnings and calculate bootstrapped standard errors as follows: For each
regression and each institution, time series observations of the dependent and independent
variables are taken. The relationship between the variables is broken by randomly matching time
series for dependent and independent variables. A regression is performed using this sample to
get a bootstrap observation for the coefficients under the null hypothesis. This process is
repeated 10,000 times until there are enough estimates to calculate a standard error for each
coefficient. The t-statistics reported in each table are calculated using these bootstrapped
standard errors.
In all cases, I control for several factors that could be correlated with both dependent and
independent variables. We expect that the size of an institution or its equity portfolio to be
indirectly associated with its client base and research decisions, however we must anticipate that
large institutions will hold more large-cap (and thus high yield, low growth) stocks, a greater
number of different securities and as a result, will turn over their portfolio more frequently.
In addition, the portfolio statistics only represent the U.S. equity fraction of an
institution's portfolio. The regressions implicitly assume that all clients are equally represented in
ot Not reported 
- 
The rank autocorrelation between observation years is betweenT0%o and 80%
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the U.S. equity portion of the portfolio and that measures of portfolio preferences based on U.S.
equities alone are representative of the portfolio as a whole. These two assumptions cannot easily
be controlled for. The approach I choose is to include the fraction of the portfolio invested in
U.S. equities (equitylct) in each regression. For CDA Pension institution there is not a figure
for the fraction of holdings in U.S. equities, however we can be confident that those U.S. equities
represent only pension fund clients. Based on this, I artificially set the statistic equal to 100% for
pension fund clientsa3.
Finally, we expect one of the key factors determining portfolio stock characteristics in a
given period to be the characteristics of the portfolio in previous periods. This relationship says
nothing about institutional or client preferences other than in the absence of trading, portfolio
preferences remain somewhat fixed. To control for some passive relationships which may
spuriously arise among portfolios concentrated in a particular group of securities, we include a
measure of the l-quarter-lagged portfolio beta in the regression. This variable is not used as a
dependent variable but can be expected to be correlated with passive differences in portfolios.
We investigate three facets of institutional portfolio preferences using this framework:
the prudent investor law, the tax efficiency of portfolios and general differences in portfolio
factor weightings on common stock return factors.
V. Tests of the Prudent Investor Hypothesis
The prudent investor hypothesis has traditionally been approached at the level of the
institution, the assumption being that Banks and Pension Fund managers are more susceptible to
legal action through the original prudent investor ruling and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (EzuSA). Such institutions will avoid securities and trading activities which
for portfolio characteristics and as high as 90% for client characteristics.
o' Th" alternative would be to set the level to the mean of other institutions.
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can be called into question in the event of poor performance. This traditional form of the prudent
investor hypothesis can be summ arizedas follows:
Banks and Pension Fund companies invest in higher quality, less rislry securities.
Prior literatureaa has used the fraction of an institution's portfolio invested in A-rated
stocks as a proxy for quality. Dividend yield and market cap have also been used to capture
"high quality, value" stocks. We expect institutions subject to prudent investor laws to invest in
more A-rated, high yield, low risk, large cap stocks. Implicit in the formulation of hypotheses is
the idea that other non-bank institutions will exhibit opposite traits.
To test this formulation of the prudent investor hypothesis, I consider the following
dependent variables: the fraction of portfolio invested in A-rated stocks, the fraction of portfolio
invested in dividend paying stocks, the cap weighted average portfolio dividend yield and the
general "risk" of the portfolio.
A portfolio's risk can be captured in a number of ways. One measure is the cap-weighted
average of historical stock returns volatilities which captures the portfolio preference for risky
securities but does not incorporate portfolio level diversification among uncorrelated securities.
This measure of risk is appropriate for trust fund clients where the prudent investor rule places
restrictions at the security level but makes no allowance for portfolio effects.
The second measure looks at the overall portfolio risk measured by average portfolio
variance calculated using historical portfolio weights and the empirical covariance structure of
stock returnsas. This measure should be more appropriate for pension fund clients where ERISA
aa Del Guercio (1990), Trzcinka (1999).
a5 To quickly estimate the variance of a large number of portfolios with a large number of
securities, we assume that stock returns are driven by a Fama-French 3-factor model and derive
the factor weightings, 3-factor covariance matrix and idiosyncratic risk for all securities at each
quarter end. The portfolio variance is then written as a weighted average of these factor
covariances and idiosyncratic risks.
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allows for managers to incorporate portfolio effects when calculating the overall risk of their
investments.
To capture the extent to which an institution is managing risk at the stock or portfolio
level, I also consider the ratio of the stock level risk measure to the portfolio level risk measure.
A large value here indicates that an institution has a small portfolio risk relative to the risk of the
underlying securities.
I regress each of these statistics on the log of the equity holdings, the fraction of assets
invested in U.S. equities, the lagged portfolio beta and 1/0 dummies indicating whether the
institution is classified as a Nelson's Bank or a CDA Pension Fund company.
Results of these regressions are provided in Table V.a. Both Banks and Pension Fund
companies exhibit a preference for A-rated securities in their portfolio. Pension fund institutions
also show a preference for high yield, large cap stocks and have an aversion to individually risky
securities as measured by the average return standard deviation of stocks in their portfolio. This
aversion to risk at the stock level does not carry over to the portfolio level; the aggregate risk of
their portfolio, as measured by the portfolio variance, is higher for Pension funds than other
institution. Current ERISA guidelines allow pension fund managers to use the covariance of
stocks to decrease their overall portfolio risk however the above results suggest that Pension
funds continue to focus their efforts at the stock level.
Regressions 8 through 1 1 in Table V.a provide additional tests of the basic results
observed in regressions 1 through 6. Regressions I and 9 show that there is little difference in the
stock quality and dividend preferences of institutions classified as Banks by Nelson's and those
classified as Banks by CDA. Regressions 10 and 1 I remove CDA Pensions Fund companies
from the sample with little change.
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This particular formulation of the hypothesis relies on a direct relationship between
Banks and client types subject to prudent investor laws. A key unique contribution of this paper
is a test of the prudent investor hypothesis on the client base of the institution rather than the
institution itself. We reco gnize that certain client groups 
- 
funds invested on behalf of trusts or
pension plans 
- 
represent the portion of an institution subject to regulatory constraints. The
second group of regressions tests whether Banks are considered more prudent because they tend
to invest more on behalf of trusts, pensions and client groups subject to enhanced regulatory
oversight. A more refined statement of this hypothesis can be written as:
Controlling for institutional charter, institutions with a larger fraction of pension and trust
fund clients will invest in higher quality, less risky securities.
This version of the hypothesis is tested in Table V.b through the addition of a statistic
representing the fraction of investments on behalf of trust and pension fund clients. By
continuing to include the institution types we control for heterogeneity in investment preferences
that are unrelated to client composition.
Regressions 1 and 2 of Table V.b show that while Banks and Pension Fund companies
continue to exhibit prudent behavior, institutions with a greater fraction of trust and pension fund
clients are actually less likely to hold A-rated stocks. This result is somewhat surprising. There is
a mild preference for dividend paying stocks which may also be related to the investment
horizon or style preferences of the client. We observe no particular bias in stock or portfolio risks
among pension fund clients.
In regression I in Table V.a, Pension Fund institutions (institutions with a sole client base
of pension fund clients) were observed to be more prudent (in terms of their preference for A-
rated securities) than other institutions. This result persists here; hence the significantly negative
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coefficient for this client group must come from the preferences of institutions with a mix of
pension, trust and other client types.
The key difference between the pension and trust fund clients in Table V.b and the
pension fund institutions captured in Table V.a is that this client group captures pension funds
managed by non-pension fund institutions. These institutions are hired by the board of trustees of
pension fund institutions and given the mandate of investing a fraction of the pension fund's
assets. The contract between the pension fund trustees and the sub-advisor is typically written in
such a way that the restrictions and legal implications of ERISA are passed directly to the sub-
advising 
^anagero6.
This preference of pension sub-advisors for non A-rated securities may typify
institutional managers, whose research resources allow them to more accurately estimate the
risks of lower rated securities, offering an enhanced rate of return to the pension fund client
while continuing to manage risks along the guidelines set out in ERISA. The lack of a significant
difference in portfolio risks for this client category does suggest that the "sting" of ERISA and
the prudent investor rule was somewhat diminished through the sub-contracting process that goes
on between the pension fund trustees and the sub-advisor.
As a final component of the analysis of the prudent investor rule in a static setting, we
present the results of a regression of institutional ownership on stock characteristics in Table V.c.
Prior research into the prudent investor hypothesis4T has typically focused on the relationship at
the stock level. Table V.c regresses a broad array of stock characteristics associated with
"investor prudence" on the level of ownership by different groups of institutional investors.
Regression I repeats the tests of prior studies using the years included in the sample and shows
o6 A few sub-advisors are given specific mandates to invest money using more advanced, active
portfolio techniques 
- 
in dollar terms; this group remains a small fraction of the sub-advisory
market and of the pension fund business as a whole.
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that older, larger A-rated stocks with positive earnings are likely to have greater holdings by
CDA banks. Regressi on 2 repeats the test on ownership by the sub-sample of CDA banks
included in our sample with no significant change in the results. Regression 3 demonstrates that
using Nelson's classification of institutions does not affect the results either. By contrast,
institutions classified as Investment Advisors bv Nelson's are likelv to hold less of an A-rated
stock.
VI. Tests of the Tax Efficiency Hypothesis \
The tax efficiency hypothesis can be tackled at two different levels. The simplest
approach ignores other hypotheses under investigation in this study and focuses solely on
information about the taxability of an institution's assets or the fraction of the portfolio invested
on behalf of all taxable institutions. The second approach takes into account that for several
client types the tax status and investment objectives are generally known (e.g. tax-exemption of
pension and retirement funds) and controls for the relative levels of these groups of clients. We
also control for the type of institution which has already been shown to be important in
determining portfolio characteri stics.
We expect taxable institutions and client groups to demonstrate a preference for low
dividend yield or non-dividend-paying stocks and to exhibit lower turnover. Consistent with this
hypothesis are studies by Strickland (1997) and Jain (2001) who both find that "tax exempt
institutions" are more likely to hold dividend paying stocks than "taxable institutions"4s. Seida
and Wempe (2000) provide evidence to suggest tax-driven turnover behavior by institutions
around the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
a7 Specifically Del Guercio (l 990).
48 Strickland (1997) indirectly arrives at the tax exposure of institutions by assuming that
foundation and pension fund companies are tax exempt while investment advisors are taxable. In
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During the years covered by the sample, tax laws remain relatively constant. Dividends
are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains and hence should be avoided by taxable institutions.
Turning over a portfolio frequently exposes the clients of the institution to capital gains taxes
which can often be offset by employing a buy and hold strategy or through active tax portfolio
managementae. The hypothesis can be summarized as:
Institutions with a high tax exposure prefer lower dividend stocks and turn over their
portfolio less often.
Table VI presents the results of the regressions testing this hypothesis. Regressions 1 and
2 look at the fraction of equity assets invested in dividend paying securities and the overall
dividend yield of the stock portfolio, respectively. The regressions control for the size of the
institution's equity portfolio as well as the amount of equity as a fraction of all assets and the
lagged beta of the portfolio. While the evidence is not strong enough to demonstrate a
relationship between client taxability and the fraction of dividend paying stocks held, regression
2 shows that institutions subject to a higher fraction of taxable clients are likely to have a lower
total portfolio dividend yield.
Portfolio turnover is considered in regression 3, which shows that taxable institutions are
likely to turn over their portfolio less frequently or less aggressively than institutions with less
taxable assets.
Regressions 4 through 6 demonstrate that this relationship is not driven by a large cap vs.
small cap tilt by investors. While dividend paying stocks are more likely to be large cap stocks,
there is still an aversion to dividend paying stocks after controlling for the average market cap of
stocks in an institution's portfolio.
a broader generalization, Jain (2001) assumes that all institutions are tax exempt and compares
their behavior relative to individual investors.
on S"" Stein and Narasimhan (1999).
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The joint relationship between client taxability, client types and heterogeneity amongst
institutional charters is investigated in regressions 7 through 12. Regressions 7 through 9 add
pensions, foundations and trust funds. While Pensions, foundations and trust clients are not
subject to taxation; they are also more likely hold dividend paying stocks due to prudent investor
considerations making it hard to separate the two effects for these clients.
We observe that the relationship between dividends, taxability and client types is difficult
to separate. There is not enough variance within other client types to separate out the tax effect
from the strong dividend preferences which pensions, foundations and trust funds have already
been observed to possess.
The turnover regression (regression 9) shows no discernable turnover difference for
pensions, foundations and trust funds. The taxability of clients is still significant at the 10%
level, suggesting that some relationship can indeed be explained by the tax constraints of the
institutional client base.
Regressions 10 through 12 add institution type. While the individual client groups
considered do not show a systematic bias in dividend and turnover preferences than that which is
encapsulated in the client taxability variable, Pension Fund institutions themselves do
demonstrate a significantly reduced turnover than other institutions.
These regressions provide evidence consistent with tax efficient behavior by investment
managers. Portfolio turnover is significantly lower for institutions with taxable clients. While
dividend preferences appear consistent with a tax efficiency hypothesis there may not be enough
evidence to separate the tax effects from other correlated factors. In addition, wo focus on a
stable period during which the tax laws remained constant. With a longer sample one could
investigate the effects of changes in tax law (such as the recent equalization of dividend and
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capital gains taxation) on institutional behavior. In section X we do look at the response of
institutions to changes in the tax exposure of their clients.
VII. Relationship between client characteristics and portfolio factor weightings
In addition to looking at the specific effects of client composition on prudent behavior
and tax efficiency, we also look at the more general relationship between client composition and
institutional portfolio s.
A natural way of categorizing portfolios is to look at the aggregate weight placed on
Fama-French and momentum factors. The exposure of the portfolio to the excess market return
(MKTRF), the small-cap vs. large -cap differential (SMB), the value growth tilt (HML) and the
momentum exposure (UMD) is calculated by the following procedure:
1) For each stock in the portfolio the factor betas are estimated using a 4 factor linear
regression of stock returns on factor returns.
2) The portfolio aggregate exposure is calculated as the weighted average of the factor betas
of all securities in the portfolio. For example:
pfmktrf,,, = I w,,j,,x pmhrf ,,,
J
Where w''j,' is the weight for institution i in stock j at time t and Bmknf ,,/ is the MKTRF
beta from the regression of the returns of stock j on the factors over a I year window concluding
at time t.
We focus our analysis on the relationship between these four portfolio factor weightings
and institutional characteristics. In Table VII we regress each factor on the log size of the
institution's equity portfolio, the amount of equity as a fraction of all assets, the lagged portfolio
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beta, the average log stock market cap and dummy variables for banks and pensions. Our focus
variables are the fraction of the portfolio subject to taxation and the fraction invested on behalf of
pension funds, foundations and trusts (we consider these two variables separately in regressions
l-4 and 5-8, respectively).
In regressions 1-4 we observe that pension fund institutions have a significantly lower
exposure to market beta than other institutions, consistent with our find. Taxable institutions
have a marginally significant preference for growth stocks, which is consistent with the dividend
aversion result in the previous section.
In regressions 5-8 a similar pattern is observed with pensions, foundations and trusts
showing a tilt towards value stocks. As in the prior section we cannot distinguish between the
general preferences of clients and the taxability of those clients. We also observe a significant tilt
away from momentum stocks by pension institutions.
The significant relationships between a number of these portfolio factor weightings and
the characteristics of institutions and their clients is a useful generalization of the specific results
observed in the previous two sections. This regression specification demonstrates that these
broad portfolio characteristics may be partially explained by the type of institution holding the
securities and the clients that the institution services.
VUI. Changes in client composition and portfolio characteristics
So far, only the static relationship between the characteristics of institutions and the
characteristics of their portfolios has been considered. It has been demonstrated that institutions
with a particular composition of clients, a particular tax exposure or of a particular charter tend
to have a systematic bias in their portfolio characteristics. We have also shown that relationships
exist using general Fama-French stock factor weightings to describe portfolios.
s3
These relationships describe a static equilibrium in which the client base and portfolio
characteristics are relatively stable. The next logical step is to investigate how changes in an
institution's portfolio are related to changes in client composition and the charter of the
institution, which does not changeso.
The relationship between portfolio decisions and client composition, if systematic can be
an active decision on the part of the investment manager, an active decision on the part of the
clients (passive on the part of the institution) or a combination of the two. For example, an active
relationship means that institutions are responsive to the needs and preferences of their clients.
They customize their investment decisions to match their client base, and as a result can be
expected to change their characteristics as their client base changes.
On the other hand, passive client management implies that clients flock to institutions
with characteristics they like. The institution need not respond to its client base, rather it
advertises its investment strategies and lets clients decide whether they are looking for these
characteristics.
Both of these institution-client relationships imply a dynamic interaction of client
composition and portfolio characteristics. If the relationships observed in previous sections are
driven by a dynamic relationship shifts in portfolio characteristics, they should coincide with the
appropriate change in client composition. The relative timing of these changes will differ
depending on the extent to which institutions are engaged in active client management. Over the
period of several years the aggregate effect will appear to be contemporaneous.
50 It is true that the business lines of a financial institution will change over time and that an
institution may completely change its focus. An assumption of this paper is that these changes
are reflected in client composition changes and that the initial institutional classification is the
most valid for determining long term differences between institutions. Some ambiguity arises
with mergers between institutions of two different charters. In this case we consider the
institution with the largest fraction of assets under management to dictate the charter for the
merged institution.
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This study looks next at the ability of changes in client composition to explain changes in
institutional portfolios over four year periods. Paralleling the foci of previous sections,
regressions are performed to test the prudent investor hypothesis, the tax efficiency hypothesis
and the more general relationship between client composition and portfolio stock factor
weightings.
The general format of the regressions is:
Lpf 
-characteristic,,, =a,+ Bxcharter -dummiesi., *T"t(eUM,,, - AUA7,)
+ rl x Ltaxabilit!,,, * tp x Lclients,,, + K x factor _return, * €,,,
where Lpf 
-characteristic,,, is the change inthe portfolio characteristic for institution i
over the four year period ending at time t and charter -dummies',' arc ll0 dummies indicating
whether the institution is a bank/trust company.
t(duu',' 
- 
A(JI'I') 
,, the change in assets under management in excess of the change in
assets under management of all institutions in Nelson's. This variable captures changes in
portfolio characteristics that arise from general increases in the assets under management rather
than client specific changes.
For regressions where the dependent variable is a Fama-French factor weighting,
factor 
-returry represents the retum differential between the top and bottom Fama-French
portfolios for that factor. For other characteristics, we cannot easily estimate a return differential,
so the market return in excess of the risk-free rate is used. The return differentials capture
changes in portfolio weightings which would naturally arise in a buy-and-hold setting as well as
institutions' tendency to chase outperforming stylessl
5r As in Barberis and Shleifer (2000), Froot and Teo (2003).
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LtaxabiliUi.' 
a16 
a^clients',' 
are the changes in taxability and client composition over the
period.
Table VIII summarizes the changes observed in variables under consideration. The mean
and standard deviation of changes are reported for all observations in the sample as well as those
arising from Bank/Trust companies and investment advisors alone.
For the entire sample, there is little trending but significant variability in the exposure to
the four stock risk factors. While there is on average a move away from A rated and dividend
paying stocks, the trend is not significant for institutions as a whole.
Assets under management have increased on average over the periods in question. The
cumulative returns on the Fama-French factor portfolios are positive, with the return on the
momentum portfolio displaying the most significant trend. These trends in the data justify
controlling for changes in assets under management and the return rcalized from exposure to
common risk factors.
Banks and Trust companies exhibit a significantly reduced tendency to increase portfolio
variance, turnover or the fraction of the portfolio allocated to A-rated stocks. They are over the
periods in question more likely to receive additional funds, particularly from mutual fund clients
and tax exempt clients.
Investment advisors on the other hand are more likely to increase portfolio variance, are
less likely to increase their assets under management and more likely to increase the fraction of
their assets managed on behalf of taxable clients.
Tables IX.a-IX.c present regressions of changes in four Fama-French and momentum
factor weightings on changes in client composition over the periods 1990-1994, 1994-1998 and
1998-2002. F-statistics and p-value are reported for the joint significance of each independent
variable across the four regressions, estimated in a seemingly unrelated regression framework.
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In Table IX.a, an increase in individuals is related to a decrease in the factor weightings
on small cap and momentum stocks. Increases in Pension funds, foundations and trust funds are
significantly related to decreases in the factor weightings on high beta, small cap and momentum
securities. Across all portfolio factor weightings, changes in the levels of individuals and
pensions/foundations/trusts yield statistically significant shifts in portfolio characteristics. The
overall change in assets under management is important, as are the factor return differentials.
BanlCTrust companies are less likely to change their value/growth factor weightings than
other institutions; however when this "static" behavior is measured across all four factors, it is
not significant.
Table IX.b controls for the interaction of client composition changes and aggregate
assets-under-management changes. The overall significance of changes in individuals and
pensions/foundations/trusts remains strong. Additionally, increases in assets under management
associated with increases in mutual fund clients or individual clients coincide with increased
portfolio market exposure.
Table IX.c removes changes in taxability from the regression 
- 
as a result, changes
pensions/foundations/trusts are now marginally related to changes in the value/growth tilt
institutional portfo lio s.
These results are consistent with those observed in the previous sections and show that
there is some evidence of a dynamic relationship between institutions and their clients.
Tables X.a-X.c look at changes in client composition and their relationship to the
portfolio characteristics considered in the tests of the prudent investor hypothesis and tax
efficiency hypothesis, namely changes in the fraction of portfolio invested in A-rated stocks, the
fraction of dividend paying stocks, the average portfolio beta, the average log market cap, the
portfolio risk and the portfolio turnover.
ln
of
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In Table X.a, increases in the levels of individuals and pensions/foundations/trusts are
related to increased dividend preference, a decreased risk appetite and an increase in holdings of
large cap securities, consistent with prior observations. In a dynamic setting, the relationship
between A-rated securities and pensions/foundations/trusts is not significant.
Changes in turnover are not significantly related to anything other than whether an
institution is a bank/trust company or not. This is not entirely surprising as the calculation of
turnover requires smoothing over several periods to get an accurate figure. Unless the changes
are substantial, this variable will either pick up noise (if the smoothing is inadequate) or miss
actual changes (if the smoothing is too great).
In Table X.b, we remove the change in taxability while in Table X.c we remove the
individual client changes. The results are not significantly changed for the remaining variables.
This regression framework shows that there is a dynamic relationship between client
composition and portfolio characteristics but does not address the causality or drivers of the
relationship. To address this we look at changes in adjacent periods.
IX. Asynchronous changes in client composition and portfolio characteristics
To address the question of whether institutions react to client changes or clients react to
portfolio changes, regressions are performed which look at the relationship between changes in
client composition between December 2000 and December 2001 and subsequent changes in
portfolio characteristics between December 2001 and December 2003.
In Table XI, changes in the four portfolio weighting factors between 2001 and 2003 are
regressed on changes in institutional and client characteristics over the period 2000 to 2001. A
significant relationship exists between changes in mutual fund clients and the risk and market
capitalization of stocks held. An increase in mutual fund holdings leads to a subsequent
increased exposure to market risk and small cap securities. The observed relationship is to be
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expected if mutual fund investors have substantially higher risk preferences than other investors
and the average manager does not change their investment style. Mutual fund managers are
contracted to invest new funds along the same investment style outlined in the prospectus, so
new funds will result in a mechanical change in the institution's portfolio, all else being equal.
No other client shifts exhibit a strong effect on portfolio characteristics in this framework.
Table XII shows effect of changes in portfolio characteristics over the period 2000 to
2001 on client composition over the period 2001 to 2003. With the exception of past changes in
client composition, which are anti-correlated with current changes, there is limited evidence of a
client reaction to changes in portfolio characteristics. A shift towards small cap stocks appears to
result in an increase in mutual fund clients.
Finally, Table XIII presents the effect of a 5% change in client composition on
subsequent portfolio characteristics. By looking at large client changes separately, noise
introduced by smaller, passive changes in client composition is mrnimized. This table looks at
the mean change in portfolio characteristics for large changes versus all other institutions. T-
statistics for the significance of the difference in mean changes are reported.
In Table XIII.a, institutions observing a 5%o increase or decrease in taxable clients over
the period 2000 -2001 are compared with other institutions. While the relative chancteristic
changes are consistent with tax efficient behavior, no single variable is significantly different
between groups.
In Table XIII.b, a 5o/o increase in the level of mutual fund clients results in an increased
exposure to market risk, while in Table XIII.c, SYo increases in the level of individual clients
result in a significant decrease in the exposure to market risk and small cap stocks.
Table XIII.d focuses on increases or decreases of greater than 5o/o in pension, foundation
and trust funds. A 5% increase in this client group results in a significant decrease in A-rated
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stocks, consistent with prior findings. Increases are also significantly related to a significant
increase in the exposure to small cap stockss2.
Changes in client composition result in some changes in portfolio composition,
particularly among mutual fund clients where increases in mutual fund investment lead to
increased portfolio risk at the institutional level. In general the lagged relationships are weaker
than the observed contemporaneous relationships and the results are based on static client
composition and portfolio characteristics. These weaker results are likely a factor of the limited
sample used to test dynamic changes 
- 
ideally a study of this nature would use a substantial
time-series of both client and portfolio statistics to estimate lead and lag dynamics.
X. Conclusion
The investment decisions of institutional investors are important for understanding
financial markets. This paper demonstrates that institutional clients are important in describing
institutions' investment decisions. The clients served by atr institution are used to provide
additional insight into the prudent investor hypothesis, the tax efficiency of institutional
investment and the general heterogeneity of portfolio exposures to common stock factors.
The prudent investor hypothesis predicts that investments on behalf of trust fund and
pension fund clients should be focused on securities with lower risk and other qualities which
can be deemed as "prudent", such as large cap, A-rated securities. This study finds that pension
fund institutions tend to be more prudent than other institutions and that investment on behalf of
pension fund clients leads to an increased preference for lower risk, large-cap, dividend paying
stocks.
t2 This result is consistent with the sign of the corresponding coefficient in Table XI; however
the result was not significant in that setting.
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Evidence which traditionally was used to support the prudent investor hypothesis may
need to be evaluated more carefully in light of several findings. The prudence of bank/trust
companies, which has traditionally been used to support the prudent investor hypothesis, is
present even after controlling for client composition even though bank/trust institutions are not
bound by prudent investor directly. Pension fund institutions are prudent when measured at the
stock level, however at the portfolio level, where ERISA laws encourage institutions to focus,
the prudence of pension funds is less pronounced. Additionally, sub-advisors of pension fund
assets, who are contractually bound by prudent investor rules, do not exhibit prudence when
measured by their preference for A-rated stocks.
Institutions pay attention to the tax exposure of clients. In particular, institutions with a
large fraction of taxable clients are less likely to turnover their portfolio. The dividend
preferences of institutions with tax exempt clients cannot be differentiated from the preferences
of pensions, foundation and trust funds. However, increased preference for dividends is
consistent with either a tax efficiency hypothesis or the investment preferences of the client
types.
Institutional portfolio exposure to Fama-French and momentum factors are related to
client composition and changes in client composition are correlated with significant changes in
exposure to these factors. In particular, pension funds, foundations and trust funds are related to a
reduced exposure to market risk and small cap stocks; increases in the level of investment on
behalf of these clients coincide with a decrease in this exposure.
These results support the general hypothesis that the clients served by an institution
partially determine the portfolio decisions of the institutions serving those clients. Evidence for
an active relationship between clients and institutions is generally limited to mutual funds where
increased investment requires additional funds be invested along a particular investment style.
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Other observed institution-client relationships could not be distinguished from a passive pairing
of certain institutional and client preferences.
This paper provides an intriguing foundation for future research into the determinants of
institutional investment behavior to build upon. Research into the role of institutional investors in
the marketplace may benefit by controlling for factors that may lead to otherwise unexplained
heterogeneity in preferences. An adequate explanation is still lacking for *hy, after controlling
for other characteristics, institutional charter is an important fastor in determining portfolio
preferences. Tests of the prudent investor hypothesis need to pay careful attention to the true
implications of the regulatory restrictions and control for the level of investment by clients
associated with such restrictions. The question of why directly-managed and sub-advised
Pension fund investments exhibit increased risk at the portfolio and stock levels is a fruitful and
interesting directions for future research.
For practitioners and market participants, this paper serves as a reminder that the
relationships between financial markets, institutions and the clients they serve are dynamic and
that understanding the specific preferences of investment clients is important for both winning
new business and maintaining existing relationships.
62
References
Barberis, Nicholas and Andrei Shleifer, 2003, "Style Investing" Journal of Financial Economics,
68. 161-199.
Beck, Nathaniel. and Jonathan N. Katz, 1996, "Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and
Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models", 
-/ournal of Political Analysis 6, 1-36.
Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz, 2004, "Time-Series Cross-Section Issues: Dynamics,"
Working Paper, New York University.
Bennett, James, Richard W. Sias and Laura T. Starks, 1999, "Stock Characteristics and
Institutional Ownership: Differences Across Investor Type and Time," Working Paper,
Washington State University.
Binay, Murat, 2000a, "Do Dividend Clienteles Exist? Institutional lnvestor Reaction to Dividend
Events," Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin.
Binay, Murat., 2000b, "Does Prudence Pay? Investment Performance of Institutional Investors,"
Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin.
Brav, Alon. and J. B. Heaton, 1998, "Did ERISA's Prudent Man Rule Change the Pricing of
Dividend Omitting Firms?" Working Paper, Duke University.
Carhart, Michael, 1997,"On persistence in mutual fund performance," Jownal of Finance 52,
57-82.
Chen Xuaqiuan., Tong Yao and Tong Yu, 2004, "Prudent Man or Agency Problem? On the
Performance of Lrsurance Mutual Funds," Working Paper, University of Rhode Island.
Cheng, Yingm.ei, Mark Liu and Jun Qian, 2006, "Buy-Side Analysts, Sell-Side Analysts, and
Investrnent Decisions of Money Managers," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41,
5l-83.
Davis, E. Philip and Benn Steil, 2001, "Insitutional Investors," Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
Del Guercio, Denise, 1996, "The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional
Equity Investrnents," Journal of Financial Econotnics 40,31-62.
Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1992, "Common risk factors in the retums on stocks
andbonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.
Froot, Kenneth. A., Paul O'Connell, and Mark Seasholes. 2001, "The Portfolio Flows of
Intemational lnvestors," Journal of Financial Economics 59, 151-193.
Gompers, Paul A. and Andrew Metrick, 2001, "Institutional hvs.L.r and Equity Pices," The
Quarterly Journal of Economics , 116 (l), 229-259 .
63
Grinblatt, Mark and Matti Keloharju, 2000, "The investment behavior and performance of
various investor types: a study of Finland's unique data set," Journal of Financial Economics 55,
43-67.
Grinblatt, Mark and Sheridan Titrnan, 1989, "Portfolio Performance Evaluation: Old Issues and
New Insights," Review of Financial Studies 2,393-421 .
Grinstein, Yaniv, and Roni Michaely, 2005, Institutional holdings and payout policy, Journal of
Finance 60.1389-1426.
Hotchkiss, Edith S. and Stephen C. Lawrence,2007, Empirical Evidence on the Existence of
Dividend Clienteles, Working Paper, Boston College.
Hotchkiss, Edith S. and Deon Strickland, 2003, "Does Shareholder Composition Aflect Stock
Retums: Evidence from Corporate Eamings Announcements," Journal of Finance, 58, 1469-
r498.
Jain, Ravi, 1999, "Institutional Investors Do Not Prefer Dividends: Individuat Investors Do,"
University of Califomi4 Los Angeles Ph.D. Dissertation.
Jensen, Michael. C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the firm: managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership stntchtre," Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Kodde, David A., and Franz C. Palm, 1986, "Wald Criteria for Jointly Testing Equality and
Inequality Restrictiors," Econometrica 54, 1243-1248.
Lakonishok, Josef., Andrei Shleifer, Richard H. Thaler and Robert W. Vishny, 1991, "Window
Dressing by Pension Fund Managerc," American Economic Review 8l Q),227-231.
Nofsinger, John R.. and Richard. W. Sias, 1999, "Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional
and Individual Investors," Journal of Finance 54,2263-2295.
Seida" Jim A. and William F. Wempe, 2000, "Do capital garn tax rale increases affect individual
investors' trading decisions?" 
-Iournal ofAccounting and Economics 30,33-57
Sharma, Vivek, John C. Easterwood, and Raman Kumar, "Institutional Herding and the Intemet
Bubble" Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Stein, David M. and Premkumar Narasimhan, 1999, "Of Passive and Active Equity Portfolios in
the Presence of Taxes, Journal of Private Portfolio Management,2 Q),
Strickland, Deou 2002, "Determinants of institutional ownership: Implications for dividend
clienteles," Working Paper, Ohio State University.
Trzcinka, Charles, 1999, "The Conflicting Views of Institutional Equity Investing in Financial
MNkets," Institutions & Instrumenls, Boston MA: Basil Blackwell, vol. 7, no. 5
Zhu, Ning, 2002, "The Local Bias of lndividual Investors". Yale ICF Working Paper
Appendix A: Overview of databases and matching process
CDA/Spectrum provides quarterly snapshots of the equity holdings of large financial
institutions. These snapshots are derived from SEC 13-f filings which are required of all
institutions with over $100m of assets under management. For every quarter from March 31,
1980 to December 31,2003, CDA provides a comprehensive list of securities held by several
hundred institutions, along with the number of shares held. This list includes all securities on the
SEC list of required CUSIPs 
- 
a list which generally covers U.S. based equities on the NYSE,
Nasdaq and Amex, but also covers OTC securities, ADRs, unit trusts and exchange traded funds.
The database comprises over 29 million individual records of stocks held by a particular
institution as of a particular snapshot date.
Since being acquired by Thomson Financial, CDA has merged their holdings data with
security price data obtained from the Thomson One database. This allows dollar positions and
equity weights to be easily calculated fbr all securities in the sample. While it is possible to
obtain dollar amounts after merging the holdings data with the CRSP database, we choose to use
Thompson Financial's prices to calculate weights as we have found it minimizes the magnitude
of outliers caused by a mismatch in the CUSIP matching process described below.
For broader information about the stocks held in the CDA database, we merge the
holding information with price and fundamental data obtained from the CRSP/CompuSTAT
database. CRSP covers all stocks on the NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex and is used to derive stock
level statistics about the dividend yield, market c?p, market beta and historical return of
securities. Accounting data from CompuSTAT is used to calculate additional equity style
statistics such as average sales growth and earnings growth.
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The CDA and CRSP/CompuSTAT databases are matched using an 8-digit CUSIP
identifier made up of a 6-digit issuer number and a 2-digit issue number. To provide the best
match between databases, we first match using the full 8 digit CUSIP and information from
CRSP on when the CUSIP is valid to avoid ambiguity around corporate actions. Frequently, an
exact match is not available (either due to changes in issue number or because a manager has
been using an outdated CUSIP in the l3-f form). To combat this we relax the matching process
and use any 6-digit CIJSIP in the CRSP historical data files that matches. This second pass
matching results in occasional mismatches and ambiguous matches. We compare CRSP and
Thomson price data to remove any obvious mismatching. Using CDA/Thomson data for prices
and CRSP data for other stock characteristics proves to be an accurate way of generating
portfolio statistics which are calculated as dollar-weight averages of individual stock
attributes53. Definitions of the portfolio level statistics used in this paper are provided in
Appendix B.
Data on the characteristics of institutional managers, their entire investment portfolio and
the clients served by the manager are obtained from Nelson's Directories of Investment
Managers. These books are produced annually and contain statistics for upwards of 1700
investment managers reflecting their holdings and institutional characteristics as of December
3lst of the previous year. Since the 2001 edition, the directory has been published in CD-Rom
format and can be parsed into a flat file database. Prior to 2001, data had to be gathered manually
t' By careful analysis of a few portfolio snapshots and statistics on the success of the matching
process, one can be confident that the level of error introduced in first-order portfolio statistics is
less than 1% (relative to the variability of the variable in question). For second-order or first-
difference measures characterized by changes in weights, the measurement error can be
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from books. This study uses data from the 1991, 1995, 1999,2001 , 2002,2003 and 2004
directories to provide a panel of data on institutional investors over a 13 year period.
Information in Nelson's directories is self-reported it is not mandatory that an
institution fill out all the available sections which detail the portfolio and client characteristics.
However, most of the institutions large enough to make the $100m requirement for 13-f filings
list the minimum data required for our analysis 
- 
namely the dollar portfolio amounts that are
taxable and tax-exempt and the dollar amounts attributable to each client type.
The data in Nelson's directories is matched to CDA by hand using the name of the
institution. Care was taken to ensure that each institution was matched accurately between the
two databases. When an ambiguity or lack of match arose, the historical names associated with
an institution in CDA were compared with the introductory text in the directory or corporate
history from the institution's website54. For many managers, comparing the equity assets under
management reported in CDA and Nelson's directory provided a tiebreaker when distinguishing
between institutions with popular or ambiguous names.
Additional care was taken to aggregate data for all subsidiaries when incorporating the
Nelson's data into the CDA/CRSP/CompuSTAT derived database55. Additional efforts were
significantly higher after the matching process. As a result, when calculating turnover we use
Thomson market data whenever possible to calculate active changes in weights.
ta The author recognizes that using a website to verify a match can introduce a survivorship bias
and favor institutions towards the end of our sample. However, in most cases institutions are
assimilated by large investment houses and can still be researched through the corporate history
-of the parent company.
') Institutions prefer to "advertise" under their separate subsidiary names in Nelson's directories;
however the SEC has strict guidelines that require most subsidiaries to file a single 13-f filing
under the legal or operating name of the parent company.
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made to enhance the manager identifier field in the CDA database to separate unrelated
institutions into separate time-series (where manager IDs have been recycled) and join
institutions together where a separate identifier is used in different reporting quarters (usually the
result of a lapse in reporting by an institution for several quarters).
Appendix B: Definition of Portfolio Statistics
The following variables are derived from the CDA/Spectrum institutional portfolio weights and
CRsP/Compustat stock data. Each statistics measures a portfolio characteristic believed to be
determined by one of the hypotheses outlined in the paper.
Risk / Prudence Variables
Fraction of portfolio invested in A-rated securities (pctarated): The dollar fraction of an
institution's equity portfolio invested in stocks rated A or higher by Standard and Poors.
I
pctarated 0,, =l*,.0., x l{rating > "A" I
Portfolio average log stock market cap (pflogmve): A dollar weighted average of the log market
cap of stocks in an institution's portfolio.
pf logmvek,t = i wi.*,, *h(marketcap,.,)j=l
Portfolio average beta (pfbeta): A dollar weighted average of the market beta of stocks in an
institution' s portfolio.
I
PJbeta0,, = Z w i,r,.t x F i,*t t,t-tz,t
i=1
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Portfolio average stock volatility (pfretsd): The dollar weighted average of the stock level return
standard deviation, estimated over the past year.
I
pfretsd 0,, = I wi,k., ^ s.d.(r,,,-,r,, )
Portfolio variance (pfvar): The variance of an institution's portfolio derived from the past 10
quarters of portfolio weights and historical estimates of stock covariances.
. | {pfvar,, = I )]w|,,f"wk,,rr n't l0k_,
Stock / Portfolio variance ratio: The ratio of the stock level volatility of a portfolio (pfretsd) to
the portfolio level volatility (pfuar).
var ratiok,, = pfretsdo., I pfvaro,,
Yield 1 Growth Variables
Fraction of portfolio invested in dividend paying stocks (pctdiv): The dollar fraction of an
institution's equity portfolio invested in dividend paying stocks.
r lD"'' Ipctdivo., 
- I w, r,, x I l1:-!-jj-t 0 |r=r "K'' L 4,, )
Portfolio average dividend yield (pfdy): A dollar weighted average of the dividend yield of
stocks in an institution's portfolio.
t D,.r-r-,
pfd! t., - I w i,k,, v --J'-i'/j=l r i-t
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Tumover Variable
Portfolio tumover (tumover): Portfolio tumover measures the total absolute change in positions
from the previous quarter (after adjusting for retums) relative to the final portfolio value. The
statistic is averages over the past 6 quarters.
-t_ ,
,, ll.,,ru-.,.*.", "(t*r,,,-,.")
turnover.. =' Y r=t63, Z*,r,"
Portfolio factor weightings
Stock level factor exposures are determined by betas from the regression
ri,t = B:*'r (r- -rr)* B:^uV,*ou -rt*g")* B!-'Q,^* -rgrowth)* Fi*o b, -ro)
Where rm is the retum on the market portfolio, rf is the risk free rate and, nmall, rlarge, rvalue,
rgrowth, ru and rd axe the retum on Fama-French portfolios for the size, value/growth and
momentum factors. This regression is performed on a rolling I year window of daily stock
retums for each stock.
Portfolio factor exposures are defined as:
pfmknfo,, 
- I w r,k,t " B:,*rPortfolio market exposure' t
portforio sma[ cap exposure: 
pfsmbo'' = T wt't''' " B:'ru
pJhml 0., - I w i,k,, 
" 
p:f'
Portfolio value/growth exposure' i
pfumd 0., - I w i.r., " p:foPortfolio momentum exposure
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Chapterl-TableI
Portfolio Characteristics of Institutions
Characteristics of equity portfolios for all Spectrum managers. High yield stocks are defined as stocks in the
Portfolio dividend yield is the weighted average dividend yield of stocks held at the quarter end. Sales growth
change in sales over the two prior years. Growth style classifications are based on a valuation ratio scoring
managers whose portfolio turnover (measured over the prior six quarters) is in the top 20%o of all managers.
top quintile dividend yield as of that quarter.
is measured as the average annual percentage
methodology. High turnover institutions are
A. Quarter ending 3/3I/1980
% of portfolio invested in:
dividend paying stocks high yield stocks
Portfolio
dividend yield
Mean Median
Portfolio
market/book
Mean Median
1.308 (r.274)
r.26r (r.242)
1.26e (1.276)
r.34e (r.302)
r.367 (1.2e8)
r.4e3 (r.42e)
r.216 (l.205)
Portfolio
sales growth
Mean Median
2r.4% (r 8.0%)
18.3% (17.s%)
30.8% (18.8%)
re.2% (18.2%)
r9.soh (r8.0%)
23.8% (1e.7%)
20.t% (r7.3%)
Mean Median
94.7% (97 .2%)
e6]% (e8.5%)
ez.e% (96.r%)
e2.3% (e45%)
e3.4% (e8.1%)
e0.r% (e2.8%)
e6.e% (98.8%)
Mean Median
n.4% (e.7%)
t2.7% (r0.7%)
12.0% (e.e%)
8.7o/o (7.9%)
r2.9vo (9.7%)
s.4% (s.3%)
1,4.4% (13.0%)
All institutions
Banks
Insurance
Investment Advisors
Pensions/Endowments
Growth
Value and other
4.8%
5.3%
4.6%
4.4%
4.9%
3.8%
5.4%
(4.e%)
(s.3%)
(45%)
(4.4%)
(s.r%)
(3.8%)
(s.4%)
N
465
88
36
98
34
154
3ll
B. Quarter ending 12/3I/2003
All institutions
Banks
Insurance
Investment Advisors
Pensions/Endowments
Growth
Value and other
High turnover institutions
53.8% (58.8%)
77.3% (78.6%)
66.r% (69.r%)
s3.6% (s7 .3%)
64.2% (70.5o/o)
32.s% (33.0%)
67.3% (71.0%)
44.5o/o (48.2%)
8.e% (7.1%)
ts.5% (13.0%)
ll.3o/o (9.3%)
85vo (6.7%)
13.0% (rr.2%)
3.4o/o (2.3%)
r2.4% (10.6%)
73% (s.s%)
3.286 (3. r e0)
3.26r (3.334)
2.es4 (3.286)
3.333 (3.2r 8)
3. r 03 (3.224)
3.7e0 (3.428)
2.e67 (3.067)
3.381 (3.1l8)
26.40/o (8.8%) 2,034
8.7% (6.3%) t45
r0.4% (7.4%) so
r4.s% (9.3%) s28
9.6% (7 .s%) 68
s4.3% (r2.7%) 792
8.8% (7 .4%) r,242
27.4% (r0.2%) 362
r.0%
1.5%
1.2%
0.9%
r.3%
05%
1.3%
0.8%
(r.0%)
(r.s%)
(r.2%)
(r.o%)
(r.3%)
(o.s%)
(r.3%)
(0.8%)
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Table II
Relationship between stocks' dividend yield and ownership characteristics
Medians are reported for all firms on CRSP and Spectrum as ofthe quarter ending 1213112003 with institutional ownership ofat least 20% of shares outstanding.
Yield quintiles are based on the long term dividend leld, defined as the ratio of dividends paid over a one-year period preceding the quarterly date to the stock
pdce at the end of the period. The short term yield is calculated as the last dividend paid (annualized) divided by the quarter end stock price. Manager t'?e
classifications are based on Spectrum. Investment style classifications are based on a valuation ratio scoring methodology similar to that of Georgeson & Co.,
Morningstar, and MSCI. "High tutnover" institutions are defined as managers whose portfolio tumover is in the top 20% of all Spectrum managers. The
average portfolio dividend yield is based on tlrc portfolio dividend yield of institutions holding the stock at the quarter end. "High yield" institutions are defmed
as managers in the top 30 or 40% ofall Spectrum manag€rs for that quarter, based on thefu percentage holdings of stocks in the top quintile dividend yield.
A. All firms
7o owned by high yield (30)
o/o owned by high yield (a0)
N
Non dividend
paying firms
54.5%
4.gYo"
2.4You
23.50 u
2.5o/o u
15.60h^
39.00h^
17.9106^
11.100 ^
28.760/ou
4g.7go ^
2,628
Dividend paying
firms
2.3%
6,472
57.5o/o
8.1%
3.7%
23.0%
3.4%
6.7%
50.8%
16.39%
8.49%
1.37%
0.75%
4l .88%
63.68%
994
Dividend Yield Quintiles
aJ
Long term dividend yield 0.0o/ou
Market value of equity ($ millions) 1,250 u
Ownership by (as Yo of shares outstanding):
Manager type:
All Institutions
Banks
Insurance Companies
Investment Advisors
Pensions
Investment style:
Growth
Value and other
0.6%
7,680
68.5%
9.40h
4.60/0
27.8%
3.9%
12.3%
56.2%
17.380
rr.26%
1.27%
0.65%
36.73o/o
56.2r%
r99
1.3%
4,764
59.4o/o
7.2%
3.3o/o
25.3%
3.2%
7.7%
sr.6%
t7.10%
9.24%
132%
0.70o/o
375r%
60.r4%
199
r.9%
6,945
s3.8%
8.2o/o
3.2%
2r.2%
3.3o/o
5.2%
48.6%
t6.29%
796%
t.37%
0.75%
4t.46%
63.41%
198
2.7%
7,477
52.8%
8.3%
35%
20.6%
3.7%
4.6%
48.2o/o
15.67%
7.39o/o
l.4t%
0.80%
4335%
66.89%
r99
4.9%
5,498
52.8%
8.50/o
3.8%
20.0%
3.1%
3.7%
49.r%
15.53Vo
6.59%
1.47%
0.85%
s0.94%
71.76%
t99
Portfolio turnover of institutions holdine the stock:
Ave portfolio turnover
o/o owned by high turnover
Portfolio dividend yield of institutions holding the stock:
Ave portfolio dividend yield l.09You
Ave market adjusted portfolio 0.48yo"
dividend yield
nindicates the difference in medians between non-dividend paying firms and dividend paying firms is significant at the l% level.
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Table II - continued
B. Large (top quartile) firms
Long term dividend yield
Market value equity ($ millions)
Ave portfolio turnover
o/o owned by high turnover
Ave portfolio dividend yield
Ave market adjusted portfolio
dividend yield
%o owned by high yield (30)
04 owned by high yield (a0)
Non dividend Dividend paying
paying firms firms Dividend Yield Quintiles
Ownership by (as Vo of shares outstanding):
Manager type:
All Institutions
Banks
Insurance Companies
Investment Advisors
Pensions
lnvestment style:
Growth
Value and other
0.00 ^
5,916 u
66.8%
6.gohu
4.30 ^
26.4Vou
3.7Vo u
16.20hu
50.6Vo^
rg.460A^
12.slYo^
1.230A^
0.610 ^
35.370h^
5l.30Yo ^
460
2.0%
13,938
645%
t0.l%
5.0%
22.7%
4.5o/o
8.1%
56.4%
16.77%
9.76%
1.42%
0.80%
47.68%
64.62%
446
1
4.50
t2,676
72.gVo
9.30
6.1%
27.40h
4.3%
13.2%
s9.6%
17.43%
ll.t5%
132%
0.70%
38.72%
56.25%
90
2
l.lo/o
9,831
67.6%
r0.0%
4.4Vo
2s.8%
4.4Vo
r0.6%
57.0%
r7.38%
t0.77%
1.34%
0.73%
40.32%
58.29%
89
3
l.8o/o
17,542
6r.0%
9.70A
4.40A
21.7o/o
4.50/o
7.1%
54.0%
16.70o/o
9.45%
1.40%
0.78%
45.85%
63.60%
89
4
2.5%
16,437
62.8%
tt.4%
5.0o/o
19.8%
4.9%
s.9%
s6s%
16.22%
9.37%
1.47%
0.85%
50.48%
67.r8%
89
5
4.zYo
13,222
58.3%
10.2o/o
s.0%
t8.4%
4.4%
3.9%
54.4%
t6.ts%
8.0s%
t.55%
A.93o/s
63.t2%
77.860/o
89
Portfolio turnover of institutions holding the stock:
Portfolio dividend yield of institutions holding the stock::
N
" indicates the difference in medians between non-dividend paying firms and dividend paying firms is significant at the l% level.
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Table III
Stock and ownership characteristics for sample of dividend increases and decreases
Dividend increases include changes in the quarterly dividend between 10% and 300%. Dividend decreases include reductions of $0.01 per share or more.
Sample ofdividend changing firms is based on changes in the quarterly taxable cash dividend, excluding REITs, closed end funds, utilities, and firms with less
than 20o/o institutional ownership prior to the dividend change based on Spectrum. Excess stock return is relative to the CRSP value w€ighted index.
Standardized dividend change is the change in the per share dividend divided by the stock price 10 days prior to the announcement. Dividend yield is measured
at day 
-10 relative to the dividend announcement. Average portfolio dividend yield is the w€ighted average of institutions holding the stock at the quarter end
Drior to the dividend announcement.
Dividend increases
(n: 5,618)
Dividend decreases
(n: 1,012)
Market value of equity ($millions)
Stock price (day -10)
Market/book ratio (FYE prior to change)
Excess stock return (days -250,-10)
S.d. of returns (days 
-250,-10)
Standardized dividend change
Short term dividend yield
Long term dividend yield
Yo of stock held by:
All institutions
Banks
Investment advisors
Pensions
04 ownership by:
Growth investors
Value and other
High turnover institutions
Average portfolio dividend yield
Average market adjusted portfolio dividend yield
%o ownership by high yield institutions (30)
o/o ownership by high yield institutions (a0)
mean
5,1 53
38.15
2.34
0.14
0.0201
0.0092
2.14%
2.10o/o
48.21%
7.83%
21.64%
3.23%
9.07%
26.0t%
7.75%
2.33%
0.95o/o
34.97%
48.54%
median
79r
33.38
|.77
0.11
0.0188
0.0053
1.93o/o
t.88%
47]8%
7.00%
20.94%
3.42%
6.89%
43.15%
6.58%
2.25vo
0.97%
33.620/o
49.t?%
mean
3,667
36.01
l.95
0.03
0.0222
-Q.4277
3.78o/a
3.8r%
49.05%
8.07%
24.t6%
3.44%
7.08%
25.42%
8.86%
2.34%
t.0l%
44.11%
57.46%
median
557
28.00
1.38
0.05
0.0206
-0.0141
2.85%
2.86%
48.67%
5.90%
22.94%
3.20%
433%
50.04%
6.59%
2.2t%
0.99%
42.72%
57.34%
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Table IV
Changes in characteristics ofinstitutional owners in quarters surrounding dividend change
For each stock, the change in the average portfolio dividend yield of institutions holding the stock and the change in ownership by high yield institutions are
calculated over the calendar quarter including the dividend change, using institutions' portfolio characteristics at the beginning of the quarter. Ownership
variables are as defined in Table II. P-values are shown in oarentheses.
Initial level: Mean Median change 75tn percentile Maximum
Mean Median change change
Dividend increrses Avenge portfolio dividend leld 0.960/0 O.98o/o 0.001% 0.001% 0.027% 0.694%(0.072) (0.080)
Ownership by high yield institutions (40) 49.56% 50.02% 0.099% 0.039% 2.079% 50.557o/o(0.073) (0.176)
Ownership by high yield institutions (30) 35.94% 34.78% 0.089o/o 0.1060/o 2.O19o/o 46.5740/o
(0.086) (0.012)
Initial level: Mean Median change 25th percentile Minimum
Mean Median change change
Dividend decreases Average portfolio dividend yield 0.98% 0.97Vo -0.016% -0.010o/o -0-041o/o -0.6820/o
(0.000) (0.000)
Ownership by high yield institutions (40) 57.68% 57.640/o -0.752Vo -0.641% -3.143o/o -32.966%
(0.000) (0.000)
Ownership by high yield institutions (30) 44.34% 43.16% -0.592% -0.3630/o -2.877o/o -32.9660/o
(0.000) (0.00r)
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Table V
Buying/selling by institutions around dividend change announcements
Institutions are classified as buying (selling) if the absolute change in holdings between quarterly
dates surroundins the dividend announcement exceeds 1002.
Dividend increase:
All institutions
Banks
Insurance
Inv. Advisors
Pensions
Dividend decrease:
All institutions
Banks
Insurance
Inv. Advisors
Pensions
Percentage of institutions which buy >: l0o/o:
18.34Vo
1730%
21.23Vo
19.24%
15.20%
Percentage of institutions which sell >: 10o/o :
18.08%
t6.27%
2r.t2%
19.slYo
t4.2r%
76
Table VI
Logistic regressions for buying/selling around dividend change
Base case probability sets each variable at the sample median, or at 0 for dummy variables. Table reports coefiicient, p-value (in
parentheses) and chalge in probability (7o) of buying/selling based on increasing each explanatory variable from the sample
median to the sample 75'percentile (or setting dummy variable = 1). "Large" banks have a portfolio market value in the top third
relative to other banks in the same quarter.
A. Deoendent variable: Buv> l0ol on dividend increase
Large banks Large banks Small banks Inv advisors Inv advisors Pensions Pensions(r) (2\ (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Base Case Probability
Intercept
Log market value of equity
Market/book ratio
Market return over quarter
Stock return over quarter
Market return, previous qtr
Stock return, previous qtr
Standardized dividend change
Market dividend yield
Short term dividend yield
Log market value of portfolio
Portfolio turnover
Buying intensity
Portfolio dividend yield
Growth investor (1/0)
15.55Yo
_4.934 ***
(0.000)
0.030 :k**
(0.000)
0.54%
-0.035 {""*
(0.000)
-0.640h
-0.178
(0.1 18)
-0.11%
0.249 **'F
(0.000)
0.30%
0.016
(0.882)
0.0r%
0.1 13 *
(0.0s5)
0.l3Yo
t.r37
(0.1s3)
0.04%
40.742 ***
(0.000)
0390h
-35992 ***
(0.000)
-1.05%
0.1 19 '1,*{{<
(0.000)
2.26%
-0.070
(0.1e3)
-0.07%
4.907 *{,{,
(0.000)
3.32%
4.035 **
(0.013)
0.51o
16.22%
-4.159 ***
(0.000)
0.029 ***
(0.000)
4.54%
-0.035 *c:r'.*'.
(0.000)
-0.670
-0.158
(0.163)
-0.t0%
0.253 {'<*{'<
(0.000)
031%
0.002
(o.e8e)
0.00%
0.1 13 *
(0.0s4)
0.140/o
1.148
(0.148)
0.04Vo
54.089 4'.:r'.*
(o.ooo)
l.l00A
-35.756 **:t
(0.000)
-1.08%
0.1l6 ***
(0.000)
2.27%
-0.062
(0.24e)
-0.06%
4.803 *{'.:F
(0.000)
3.43%
17.97%
-4.209 ***
(0.000)
0.071 **{'
(0.000)
1.17%
-0.026 *:rc4'|
(0.000)
-0.49Yo
0.202
(0.184)
0.12%
-0.048
(0.573)
-0.06%
0.373 **
(0.01l)
0.23%
0.020
(0.823)
0.02%
-2.271
(0.233)
-0.08%
33.914 **
(0.020)
0.49%
_43.400 ***
(0.000)
-r.26%
0.081 *:N'<!"
(0.000)
t.59%
0.017
(0.s3e)
0.01%
2.219 ***
(0.000)
0.94%
3 AJ1
(0.2s6)
-0.200
17.09Yo
-5.177 'F**
(0.000)
0.040 :t{"l'<
(0.000)
0.76%
-0.013 *:r'<*
(0.000)
-0.27%
0.108
(0.136)
0.06%
0.002
(0.e6s)
0.00%
-0.252 ***
(0.000)
-0.r5%
0.057
(0.135)
0.07%
2.143 ***
(o.ooo)
0.r0%
27.334 ***
(0.000)
0.s6%
_13.932 **{,
(0.000)
-0.37%
0.126 :r'.rr'.*
(o.ooo)
2.51o
0.091 **'.:f
(0.000)
0.r0%
3.804 **"'.
(0.000)
2.750h
2.171***
(0.003)
0.240h
17.07%
-5.153 *'{'.*
(0.000)
0.040 **,r.
(o.ooo)
0.75%
-0.014 :l"F*
(0.000)
-0.28o/o
0.1 l8
(o.l04)
0.07%
0.002
(0.e57)
0.00%
-0.257 ***
(0.000)
-0.15%
0.056
(0.14s)
0.07%
2.732 ***
(0.000)
0. l0%
32.966 **'F
(0.000)
0.670
-l2.gg5 **'F
(0.000)
-0.35%
0.126 :l({'!{'<
(0.000)
2.51o
0.090 {'i:"{'.
(0.000)
0. l0%
3.792 ***
(0.000)
2.74%
10.73%
-5.231 *'F:t
(0.000)
0.039 t':r'*
(0.000)
0.39%
_0.031 *t {.
(0.000)
-035%
-0.607 *t'.{'<
(0.001)
-0.23%
-0.091
(0.338)
-0.08%
-0.746 **',F
(0.000)
-0.29%
0.r23
(0. le8)
0.1 0%
3.657 ***
(0.003)
0.09Vo
4g.5gg **
(0.015)
0.6s%
-20982 'F*>r
(0.000)
-0.38%
0.092 {'<;r'.*
(0.000)
1.r8%
0.206 *
(0.0e0)
0.l3Yo
7.247 'F*>r
(0.000)
3.07o/o
12.028 ***
(0.000)
0.85Vo
r0.70%
-4.956 :r'{**
(0.000)
0.037 **{,
(0.000)
0.37%
-0.033 *'!:r'.*
(0.000)
-0.36%
-0.550 ]|"Nc{'<
(0.002)
-0.2t%
-0.083
(0.384)
-0.07%
-0.798 {c*,l'.
(0.000)
-0.3lYo
0.r29
(0.176)
0.tt%
3.647 ***
(0.003)
0.09%
86.672 ***
(0.000)
r.18%
_18.608 {.**
(0.ooo)
-0.34%
0.090 *{'<*
(0.000)
I.Lso/o
0.028
(0.820)
0.02%
7.174 ***
(0.000)
3.03%
N
-0.072 ***
(0.001)
-0.95"h
124,255 82,331
0.0r1
(0.287)
0.15o/o
283,613
0.040
(0.233)
0.39"/o
57,506r24,255
77
283,613 57,506
Table VI 
- 
continued
B. Dependent vsriahle: Sell > I0% on dividend decreuse
Large banks Large banks Small banks Inv advisors Inv advisors(r) (2) (3) (4) (5) Pensions Pensions(6) (7)
Base Case Probabiliw 2s.80%
lntercept -0.425
(0.374)
Log market value of equity -0.030 **
(0.016)
-0.77%
Market/book ratio -0.040 {'.{'*'
(0.000)
-1.07%
Market return over quarter 0.088
(0.705)
0.08%
Stock return over quarter -0.380 {'.**
(0.000)
-0.66%
Market return, previous qtr 0.368
(0.1 10)
0.30%
Stock return, previous quarter -0.310 :r'.:r':&
(0.004)
-0j3%
Standardized dividend change -2.381 *'r'*
(0.000)
-0.t1%
Market dividend yield 28.942
(0.24r)
0.81%
Short term dividend vield 7.823 ***
(0.002)
0.34%
Log market value of portfolio -0.052 'r'.**
(0.001)
-r33%
Portfolio turnover -0.078
(0.467)
-0.11%
Selling intensity -6.762 ***
(0.000)
-6.25%
Portfolio dividend vield 8.779 **
(0.018)
1.640/0
Growth investor (1/0)
N
Likelihood ratio
2l,l7l
3sl1
27 .54% 23.83%
-0.051 -2.110 'r'.*'r'<(0.e11) (0.003)
_0.031 ** 
-0.044 **(0.012) (0.017)
-0.840h -1.01%
-0.041 *:r,* -0.052 *'r,*(0.ooo) (o.ooo)
-r.r3% -r.25%
0.124 1.505 {'<*:r'<(0.5e3) (0.000)
0.rt% t.t4%
-0.370 *x* _0.909 *{,:r,(0.000) (0.000)
-0.67% -r.s3%
0.330 0.687 **(0.14e) (0.042)
4.28% 0.43%
-0.309 **{, -Q.429 **(0.004) (0.010)
-0.56Vo -0.73%
_2.306 **.* _6.401 {<,F*(0.001) (0.000)
-0.r1% -0.36%
58.953 {.{,* 21.290(0.006) (0.531)
1.740 0.47%
8.085 *,** 5.258(0.001) (0.2r5)
0.37% 0.44%
-0.059 :r** 0.050 *(0.000) (0.08e)
-t.59% t.zt%
-0.087 -0.059(0.417) (0.481)
-0.130h -0.06%
-6.740 :t:r,* -5.652 {,**(0.000) (0.000)
-6.53% -251%
3.065
(0.s0e)
0.36Yo
-0.082 *
(0.0ee)
-l.6leh
26.44% 28.17%
-2.207 *** -1.999 {,**(0.000) (0.000)
0.003 0.004(0.656) (0.5s7)
0.09% 0.r2%
_0.024 {,** _0.027 *+*(0.000) (0.000)
-0.69% -0.79%
0.342 ** 0.403 **,r'(0.027) (0.00e)
0.27% 0.34%
-0.486 'f *.1, _0.471 ,x**(0.000) (0.000)
-0.98% -0.99%
0.215 0.195(0.161) (0.204)
0.1s% o.ts%
0.010 -0.003(0.888) (0.e61)
0.02% -0.0r%
_2.462 *** 
-2.326 ***(0.000) (0.000)
-4.r4% -0.14%
-8.382 32.557 *(0.63s) (0.052)
-0.r4% 0.s7%
4.648 ** 5.979 ***(0.014) (0.001)
0.38% 0.s 1%
0.011 * 0.010(0.075) (0.122)
0.2904 0.26Vo
0.042 0.049(0.314) (0.244)
0.060/o 0.08%
_5.203 *** _5.157 ***(0.000) (0.000)
-5.230/0 -5.42%
12.057 ***
(0.000)
1.900
10.43% 10.92%
_2.278 *'F* 
-2.019 :r.,r'*.(0.001) (0.003)
0.018 0.017(0.400) (0.42t)
0.r8% 0.18%
0.000 0.000(0.e81) (0.e7e)
0.00% 0.00%
0.171 0.207(0.654) (0.587)
0.07% 0.08%
-0.074 -0.059(0.627) (0.6e8)
-0.07% -0.06%
0.083 0.082(0.827) (0.827)
0.03% 0.03%
0.342 * 0.333 *(0.0s4) (0.061)
0.32% 0.33%
-3.856 :r,:t:F -3.776 'k*'F(0.001) (0.001)
-0.13% -0.r4%
16.812 42.719(0.734) (0.338)
0.15% 0.41Yo
-3.5s5 -3.256(0.480) (0.516)
-0.15% -0.t4%
-0.042 ** _0.046 **(0.02e) (0.015)
-0.4s% -0.52%
0.483 * 0.473 *(0.0e1) (0.0ee)
0.28% 0.29%
_7.965 *'616 
-7.942 ***(0.000) (0.000)
-2.02% -2.10%
7.447
(0.1e2)
0.550h
2l,l7l
3508
12,125
2736
45,289
7713
-0.096 *,rrtc
(0.000)
-1.90o/o
45,289
7736
9,992
3084
-0.086
(0.2es)
-0.8r%
9,992
3083
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Table VI 
- 
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C. Investment advisors, Nelson's subsample
Dependent variable: buy > l0o/o on dividend increase(1) (2) (3) sell > 10Yo on dividend decrease(4) (5) (6)
Base Case Probability
Intercept
Log market value of equity
Market/book ratio
Market return over quarter
Stock refurn over quarter
Market return, previous quarter
Stock return, previous quarter
Standardized dividend change
Market dividend yield
Standardized dividend change
Short term dividend yield
Log market value of portfolio
Portfolio turnover
Buying (selling) intensity
Portfolio dividend yield
7o invested in high yield stocks
Growth investor (1/0)
Percentage taxable clients
N
Likelihood ratio
r7.0r% 16.96% 16.82% 30.33%
-5.173 *** -5.152 {r:F{< -5.149 *** -2.427 **'k(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.035 *** 0.035 :1,'1,* 0.035 {,:N,{, 0.015 *(0.000) (0.000) (0.ooo) (o.Oee)
0.6r% 0.59% 0.60% 0.43%
_0.014 **:r, 
-0.014 **i, -0.014 **:r, _0.028 {,:'<*(0.000) (o.ooo) (o.ooo) (o.ooo)
-0.27% -0.28% -0.28% -0.84%
0.047 0.054 0.052 0.444 **t6(0.5e6) (0.53e) (0.s57) (0.00e)
0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.390/o
-0.043 -0.046 -0.043 -0.480 :r':t:r'!(0.368) (0.32e) (0.362) (0.000)
-0.0s% -0.06% -0.0s% -t.Us%
-0.239 *** _0.233 **{, -0.240 **{. 0.164(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.334)
-0.14% -0.r4% -0.14% 0.r3%
-0.010 -0.011 -0.011 0.020(0.841) (0.817) (0.820) (0.810)
-0.01o/o -0.01% -0.01% 0.04%
2.572 t6** 2.51 [ *{'{' 2.542 *** _2.406 ***(0.ooo) (o.oo0) (0.ooo) (o.oo0)
0.09% 0.09% 0.09% -0.15%
79.105 {.*{. 91.019 *:l'{' 84.305 :k,1,'1, -2.036(0.000) (0.000) (0.ooo) (0.e26)
1 .640 | .89% 1 .7 4Yo -0.04%
2.572 *** 2.51 I ".*:r' 2.542 *** _2.406 ***(0.000) (0.000) (o.oo0) (0.000)
0.09% 0.08% 0.08% -0.l5Yo
-13.942 **'i -13.691 *.'F,F -12.692,F*x 4.656 **(0.ooo) (0.000) (0.ooo) (0.043)
-034% -0.33% -0.31% 0.43%
0.126 t6** 0.125 **'1, 0.126 ,1,:1,{, 0.020 **(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
2.31% 2.24% 2.26% 0.56%
0.087 *r,l.rl, 0.085 'N,:t,* 0.085 {,:1,* 0.067(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.20s)
0.09% 0.08% 0.08% 0.rr%
3.309 **,*. 3.301 {,** 3.289 :F*:r, -5.079 ;r,{,:tc(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2.18% 2.t3% 2.13% -5.7 5%
1.892 t 15.458 ***(0.06s) (0.000)
0.190 2.700
0.128 **
(0.037)
0.lloh
0.043 *:t*
(0.001)
0.550
_0.070 *:h*
(0.003)
-0.870h
163805
6881.4
30.31% 3t.64%
-2.297 *** _2.144 >F**
(0.000)
0.013
(0.147)
0.35%
-0.030 **.:r, _0.031 {(:k:e(0.000) (o.oo0)
-0.90% -0.97%
0.534 ,r,** 0.539 **,"
(0.000)
0.01I
(0.2s1)
0.27%
(0.002)
0.47%
-0.433 *'r'.{'.
(0.000)
-0.9s%
0.232
(0. r70)
0.18%
-0.005
(0.es5)
-0.0t%
(0.001)
-0.12%
98.158 'F{'{{'<
(0.ooo)
1.830h
-1.910 'r'<:r'*
(0.001)
-0.l|Vo
4.330 *
(0.060)
0.36%
0.013 *
(0.086)
034%
0.054
(0.301)
0.08%
-5.014 **')r'<
(0.000)
-5.r5%
(0.002)
0.48%
-0.453 *:r""
(0.000)
-1.02%
0.266
(0.116)
0.2t%
-0.016
(0.847)
-0.03%
(0.000)
-0.13%
95.786 ***
(0.000)
7.82%
-I.991 ***
(0.000)
-0.r2%
5.231 **
(0.022)
0.450/0
0.013 *
(0.08r)
0.36%
0.07r
(0.18s)
0.tr%
-5.016 **:rc
(0.000)
-5.33%
_0.140 ***
(0.000)
-2.770h
-0.030
(0.s34)
-0.61V"
29399
4138.52
-1.910**,:|< _1.991 :r,t<*
-0.053 ** -0.054 **(0.023) (0.021)
-0.67Vo -0.67oh
163805 163805
6883.87 6880.9
-0.010
(0.834)
-0.220/'
29399
4168.51
0.863 ***
(0.000)
l.l2o/o
-0.023
(0.627)
-0.460h
29399
4167.95
79
Table VII
Cumulstive abnomal stock returns at announcements of dividend increases and decreases
Cumulative abnormal retums (CAR) at announcement of dividend chaage. Abnormal retums are market rnodel residuals using
common stock retums for the davs 
-250 to -60 nrior to the announcement. P-values are shown in oarentheses.
Dividend increases (n:5,618)
mean median
Dividend decreases (n:1,012)
mean Median
1980-2003 CAR (-1,0)
cAR (-1,1)
Subperiods:
1980-1989 CAR (-1,0)
cAR (-1,1)
1990-1993 CAR (-l,o)
cAR (-1,1)
1994-1998 CAR (-1,0)
cAR (-l,l)
1999-2003 CAR (-l,0)
cAR (-1,1)
0.420
(0.000)
r.0l%
(0.000)
r.00%
(0.000)
0.46%
(0.000)
1,.31%
(0.000)
0.56%
(0.000)
0.90%
(0.000)
0.30%
(0.000)
0.92%
(0.000)
0.40%
(0.002)
0.29Vo
(0.000)
0.71%
(0.000)
0.70% (n:2,310)
(0.000)
0.30%
(0.000)
0.91% (n: 895)
(0.000)
0.29%
(0.000)
0.58% (n: 1,645)
(0.000)
0.26%
(0.000)
0.76% (n:768)
(0.000)
0.38%
(0.000)
-0.85%
(0.000)
-2.11%
(0.000)
-l.610
(0.000)
-0.67%
(0.010)
-3.48%
(0.000)
-r.65%
(0.000)
-0.s2%
(0.237)
-0.14%
(0.5e7)
-3.7r%
(0.000)
-1.25%
(0.003)
-0.03%
(0.365)
-039%
(0.013)
-0.07% (n: 322)
(0.3e0)
0.06%
(0.6s2)
-1.13% (n:230)
(o.oo5)
-0.68%
(0.037)
-0J4% (n:278)
(0.337)
0.00%
(0.476)
-0.56% (n : 182)
(0.060)
0.23Vo
(0.6e8)
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Table VIII
Abnormal return regressions
The dependent variable is the dividend announcement tlree day (-1,1) cumulated market model return. Firm and ownership characteristics ar€ as defined in Table IIl.
Standard enors are shown in parentheses. Institutional ownership is measured as a percentage ofshares outstanding. Year dummies are not reported.
A. Dividend increases
Intercept
Standardized dividend
change
Market/book
Ratio
Log market value of
equity (day -10)
Stock price * 1000
(day -10)
s.d. of stock returns
(days -250,-10)
Excess stock return
(days -250,-10)
Short term dividend
yield
Market dividend
(1) (2)
0.028 (0.008) {<** 0.025 (0.008)
0.256 (0.055) **'( 0.257 (0.055)
0.001 (0.000) 'n* 0.001 (0.000)
-0.002 (0.001) :F** -0.002 (0.001)
0.094 (0.037) 'k* 0.095 (0.037)
0.02s (0.r26) 0.072 (0.r28)
-0.014 (0.003) {<** -0.014 (0.003)
0.404 (0.068) *{<* 0.376 (0.069)
-0.226 (0.094) ** -0.199 (0.095)
-0.003 (0.00s) -0.003 (0.005)
0.3 r0 (0.172)
(3){(** 0.027 (0.009)
{<** 0.253 (0.055)
** 0.ool (o.ooo)
**'F 
-0.002 (0.001)
'*,t< 0.096 (0.037)
0.024 (0.126)
*** 
-0.014 (0.003)
*** 0.370 (0.070)
** 
-0.133 (0.107)
* 
-o.oo2 (0.005)
0.00e (0.00s)
(4)
*** 0.025 (0.008)
,r** 0.258 (0.055)
:F* 0.001 (o.ooo)
*** 
-0.002 (0.001)
ic,8'f 0.096 (0.037)
0.078 (0.128)
*** 
-0.014 (0.003)
**:r€ 0.370 (0.070)
-0.ree (0.0e7)
-0.002 (0.005)
* 
o.ro5 (0.183)
-0.004 (0.006)
0.00r (0.006)
(s)
*** o.o2l (0.009) **
*t<* 0.258 (0.055) *:r*
;t(* 0.001 (0.000) t<*
t(** 
_0.002 (0.001) {c**
:F'n 0.096 (0.037) *'r
0.07e (0.128)
*** 
-0.014 (0.003) ***
'F** 0.374 (0.070) 'N(*{<
** 
-0.158 (0.102)
-0.002 (0.005)
* 0.322 (0.t72) *
(6)
0.024 (0.008) ***
0.260 (0.055) I'N(')F
0.001 (o.ooo) 'F*
-0.002 (0.001) :r'<{'<*
0.095 (0.037) *',r
0.074 (0.128)
-0.014 (0.003) ***
0.365 (0.070) ***
-0.191 (0.095) **
-0.002 (0.00s)
0.366 (0.179) **
(7)
0.032 (0.009; ***
0.255 (0.055) ***
0.001 (0.000) *x*
-0.002 (0.001) *'r'!*
0.095 (0.037) **
0.045 (0.126)
-0.014 (0.003) ***
0.363 (0.071) *x*
-0.132 (0.106)
-0.002 (0.00s)
0.001 (0.006)
-0.009 (0.00s) *
0.017
5,618
yield
Institutional
Ownership
Ave mkt adj portfolio
dividend yield
Ownership by high
yield institutions (30)
Ownership by (as a 7o of total institutional ownership):
High turnover
Banks
Investment advisors
Pensions
Growth Investors
Adj R, 0.017 0.017 0.017
N 5,618 5,618 5,618
***)**,* denote significance at the lyo,sYo and l0olo level, respectively.
0.017
5,618
-0.006 (0.006)
0.005 (0.005)
-0.005 (0.006)
-0.014 (0.013)
0.017
5,618
0.017
5,618
8l
Table VIII 
- 
continued
B. Div.idend decreqses (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1)
Int€rcept 0.037 (0.040) 0.032 (0.041) 0.034 (0.040) 0.037 (0.041) 0.055 (0.047) 0.030 (0.042) 0.033 (0.042)
Stanaaraizeo oiviaena o.ojo (o.tltj o.oij <o.t+tj 0.026 (0.r4s) o.oj+ (o.Es) 0.020 (0.149) o.oz+ (o.tq, ) 0.029 (0.r4s)
change
Market/book 0.005 (0.003) * 0.005 (0.003) ''* 0.004 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) ** 0.005 (0.003) ** 0.005 (0.003) * 0.005 (0.003) *
Itatio
Logmarketva|ueof.0.o0i10.o031'-o.oo21obo:)0.000(0.00j).0.002(0'003).o'oo2to.ooj)-o.ooIio.ool|'-o.o.lio'ool)
equity (day -l0)
Stock price * 1000 0.196 (0.194) 0.194 (0.194) 0.167 (0.195) 0.214 (0.194) 0.193 (0.194) 0.202 (0.194) 0.191 (0.194)
(day -10)
s.d. of stock returns -0.851 (0.532) -0.774 (0.547) -0.795 (0.534) -0.767 (0.548) -0.777 (0.548) -0.796 (0.548) -0.86t (0.533)
(days -250,-10)
Excess stock return 0.039 (0.012) 'r'** 0.040 (0.012) *:r* 0.039 (0.012; *** 0.042 (0.012) *** 0.040 (0.012) **+ 0.039 (0.012) *** 0.040 (0.012) **{'
(days 
-250.-10)
short term dividend -0.443 (0.129; *** -0.462 (0.133) *:r* -0.399 (0.135; '**',t -0.450 (0.134) +'** -0.482 (0.135) *** -0.468 (0.134) +'*t' -0.429 (0.136) *'i*
yield (lagged)
Market Dividend -0.245 (0.495) -0.276 (0.497) -0.392 (0.513) -0.235 (0.499, -0.417 (0.52r) -0.279 (0.498) -0.321 (0.531)
Yield
rnsritutionai -0.034 (0.026) -o.orz (o.ozoj -0.034 (0.026) -0.033 (0.026) -0.032 (0.0t6) -0.032 (0.0t6) -0.032 (0.026)
Ownership 
.
Ave mkt adj portfolio 0.466 (0.774) 0.768 (0.813) 0.423 (0.776) 0.s80 (0.788)
dividend yield
Ownership by high -0.023 (0.021)
yield institutions (30)
Ownership by (as a o/o of total institulional ownership):
High tumover -0.013 (0.030) -0.003 (0.030) -0.009 (0.029) -0.012 (0.031)
Banks -0.035 (0.028)
Investment advisors
Pensions
Growth Investors
Adj R'
N
-0.023 (0.025)
0.073
1,012
0.072
1,012
0.073
1,012
0.072
1,012
0.071
1,012
-0.054 (0.064)
0.071
1,012
0.010 (0.023)
0.071
1,012
***,*'F,{< denote significance at the 106,5oh and 10% level, respectively.
82
%
observations
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
Figure I
Average market adjusted portfolio dividend yield of institutions holding the stock:
Frequency distribution by dividend yield quintile
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Figure 2
Percentage of stock owned by "high yield" institutions:
Frequency distribution by dividend yield quintile
"High yield" institutions are defined as institutions in the top 30% of all
institutions each quarter when ranked by their holdings of "high yield" stocks. High
vield stocks are those in the ton dividend vield ouintile each ouarter.
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Chapter2-TableI.a
Institutions in sample 
- 
Breakdown of coverage end institutional chssilications (As of December 31, 1990)
* Pensions are not included in Nelson's directory but are added to sample as an institution with a single client type based on CDA institution name.
85
. Breakdown of
CDA/Spectrum Institution Tvpe
TOTALBanks Insurance Mutual Funds lnv. Advisors Pensions Other
All CDArSpectrum Institutions 208 72 39 498 75 80 972
% Institutions Matched with Nelson's 41o/o 40o/o 44o/o 68% 100o/o * 54o/o 610/o
% Institutions missino data on clients 3o/o 8o/o 13o/o 7o/o 0o/o 8o/o 60/o
% Institutions in final samole 38o/o 32o/o 31o/o 61olo 100% * 460/o 55o/o
Total Institutions in sample 78 23 12 305 75* 37 530
Nelson's lnstitution Type
GDA/Spectrum Institution Tvpe
TOTALBanks Insurance tlutual Funds Inv. Advisors Pensions Other
Bank/Trust Co. 0 0 10 0 1 84
Insurance 0 2 11 0 3 32
Inv. Advisols 5 7 0 31 311
Investment Banks 0 0 0 26 0 2 28
Pensions* 0 0 0 0 0 75
n e a of Nelson's lns;titution
Nelson's Institution Type
GDA/Spectrum lnstitution Type
TOTALBanks Insurance Mutual Funds lnv. Advisors Pensions Other
Bank/Trust Go. 0o/o Oo/o 12o/o 0o/o 1o/o 100o/o
lnsurance 0o/o 60/o 34o/o 0o/o 9o/o 100o/o
Inv. Advisors 2o/o 2o/o 0o/o 10o/o 100%
Investment Banks 0o/o 0o/o Oo/o 93o/o 0o/o 7o/o lOOo/o
Pensions* 0o/o 0o/o 0o/o 0o/o 0o/o 100o/o
Table I.b
Institutions in sample 
- 
Breakdown of coverage and institutional classifications (As ofDecember 31, 2003)
* Pensions are not included in Nelson's directorv but are added to samole as an institution with a sinsle client tvDe based on CDA institution name.
i. tsreakdown of samnle cove
CDA/Spectrum Institution Type
TOTALBanks Insurance Mutual Funds Inv. Advisors Pensions Other
All CDA/Spectrum Institutions 145 50 20 508 68 1243 2034
7o Institutions Matched with Nelson's 27% 36% 45% 58% l00%o * 34% 42o/o
7o Institutions missine data on clients 7% 8% l5o/o 4% 0% 5% 5o/o
7o Institutions in final samnle 20% 28% 30% 54% 100% * 30% 370h
Total Institutions in sample 29 t4 6 276 68* 367 760
l|. n
Nelson's Institution Type
CDA/Spectrum Institution Tvpe
TOTALBanks Insurance Mutual Funds Inv. Advisors Pensions Other
Bank/Trust Co. 26 0 0 t4 0 l3 53
Insurance 0 9 I I 0 9 27
Inv. Advisors aJ 4 5 240 0 332 584
Investment Banks 0 I 0 l4 0 l3 28
Pensions* 0 0 0 0 68 0 68
e s Institution
Nelson's Institution Type
CDA/Spectrum Institution Type
TOTALBanks Insurance Mutual Funds Inv. Advisors Pensions Other
Bank/Trust Co. 49o/o 0% 0% 26% 0% 25% 1000
Insurance 0% 33o/o 4% 30% 0% 33% 1000h
Inv. Advisors t% t% l%o 4lo/o 0% 57% l00o/o
Investment Banks 0% 4Yo 0o/o 50% 0% 46% l00o/o
Pensions* 0% 0% 0% 0% l00o/o 0% 1000h
Table II.a
Characterigtics of institutions in sample and CDA database (December 1990)
The t-statistic shows the difference in means between the institutions in the final sample and those dropped from the sample.
All Institutions CDA Mutual Funds
Aggressive growth investor (CRSP)
% Dividend Paying
Portfolio dividend yield (pfcly)
Portfolio average sales growth (pfsg)
Portlolio average stock market cap ($m)
Log of portfolio avg market cap
Porfolio average beta (pfbeta)
Portfolio variance (pfrar)
Portfolio stock return std. dev. (pfretsd)
Turnover
Portfolio market risk factor weighting (pfmktrf)
Portfolio small cap factor weighting (pfsmb)
Portfo lio value/growth factor wei ghting (pfhm l)
Portfolio momentum factor weighting (pfumd)
Log of total equity portfolio value
Total equity portfolio value ($Bn) (pfualue)
% S&P A-Rated stocks
% S&P rated stocks
Number of Institutions
Missing
from
Sample
Mean
2.94s/o
82.43%
2.97%
14.39%
11.25
14.87
0.99
0.98%
8.48%
16.46%
r.02
0.07
-0.10
-0.02
-1.42
0.87
73.82o/o
79.73%
442
Missing
from
Sample
Mean
0.77%
93.18%
3.50%
t2.69%
16.33
15.53
0.94
0.94%
7.67%
12.98%
0.98
-0.13
-0.05
0.02
-1. l9
0.81
81.28%
89.04%
130
Missing
from
Sample
Mean
3.70%
8156%
2.610/o
16.040h
10.68
15.06
1.00
0.950/o
8.670
r5.54%
l 0l
0.02
-0.17
0.02
-1.00
0.95
72.42%
78.36%
27
In
Sample
Mean T-stat
3.27o/o 0.239
83.03% 0.476
2.9s% -0.353
1523% r.338
lt.2t -0.076
14.99 1.490
l.0l 2.246
0.96% - r .498
8.47% -0.187
16.57% 0.121
1.04 1.460
0.04 -1.250
-0.l3 -1.245
-0.04 -1.406
-0.62 7.715
1.87 4.438
73.57% -0.248
81.44% t.520
530
In
Sample
Mean T-stat
8.33% 0.592
72.76% -l.660
2.35o/o -0.758
r7.25% 0.581
7.26 -2.508
t4.48 -2.350
1.08 t343
0.99% 0.604
9 .59% I .816
20.28% 1.447
l.l0 1.436
0.27 2.608
-0.31 -0.984
-0.03 -0.959
-0.20 t.429
1.77 r.627
6333% -1.746
78.53% 0.042
t2
CDA Banks
In
Sample
Mean T-stat
0.00% -0.774
93.9t% 0.604
3.55% 0.680
12.23% -0.424
16.43 0.120
15.68 1.457
0.93 -0.708
0.95o/o 0.308
7.s6% -0.937
14.r3% 0.440
0.98 0.064
-0. l 5 -0.814
-0.04 0.388
0.03 0.580
0.20 6341
3.32 4.714
8t.00% -0.176
89.88% 0.61l
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Table II.a (Continued)
The t-statistic shows the difference in means between the institutions in the final sample and those dropped from the sample.
CDA Investment Advisors CDA Other / Pensions
Aggressive growth investor (CRSP)
% Dividend Paying
Portfolio dividend yield (pfdy)
Portfolio average sales growth (pfsg)
Portfolio average stock market cap ($m)
Log of portfolio avg market cap
Porfolio average beta (pfbeta)
Portfolio variance (pfuar)
Portfolio stock return std. dev. (pfretsd)
Turnover
Portfolio market risk factor weighting (pfmktrfl
Portfolio small cap factor weighting (pfsmb)
Portfo I io val ue/growth factor we ighting (pfhm l)
Portfolio momentum factor weighting (pfumd)
Log of total equity portfolio value
Total equity portfolio value ($Bn) (ptualue)
% S&P A-Rated stocks
% S&P rated stocks
Number of Institutions
Missing
from
Sample
Mean
5.70%
76.81o/o
2.76%
14.81%
8.68
14.50
1.02
0.98%
8.91o/o
19.s6%
1.05
0.17
-0.15
-0.04
-1.70
0.95
7r.09%
74.87%
r93
Missing
from
Sample
Mean
0.00%
75.96%
2.55%
13.85%
9.26
t4.57
r.02
0.98%
8.89%
18.57%
l.05
0.20
-0.05
-0.04
-1.45
0.68
67.17%
74.60%
43
In
Sample
Mean T-stat
3.28% -1.309
80.77o/o 2.163
2.77% 0. 140
t6.58% r.823
9.89 2.377
14.8t 2.872
1.04 1.31 l
0.94o/o -2.231
8.670/o -l .801
18.57% -0.845
1.05 0.251
0.10 -2.414
-0.18 -0.792
,0.06 
-0.953
-0.97 4.994
t.28 1.028
72.23o/o 0.869
79.48% 2.960
305
In
Sample
Mean T-stat
s.36% 1.550
82.65% 1.588
3.07% 2.198
13.84% -0.01l
t1.75 2.A23
15.06 1.584
0.99 -0.801
1.00% 0.392
8.44% -t.687
12.06% -2.755
1.03 -0.622
-0.01 -2.974
-0.08 -0.334
-0.02 0394
-0.42 3.389
2.45 2.5t6
74.35% 2.093
80.66% 1.468
lt2
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Table II.b
Characteristics of institutions in sample and CDA database (December 2003)
The t-statistic shows the difference in means between the institutions in the final sample and those dropped from the sample due to a lack of
match with the Nelson's directorv.
Aggressive growth investor (CRSP)
% Dividend Paying
Portfolio dividend yield (pfdy)
Portfolio average sales growth (pfsg)
Portfolio average stock market cap ($m)
Log of portfolio avg market cap
Porfolio average beta (pfbeta)
Portfolio variance (pfuar)
Portfolio stock return std. dev. (pfretsd)
Turnover
Portfolio market risk factor weighting (pfmktrf)
Portfolio small cap factor weighting (pfsmb)
Portfo lio valueigrowth factor we ighting (pfhm l)
Portfolio momentum factor weighting (pfumd)
Log of total equity portfolio value
Total equity portfolio value ($Bn; (pfvalue)
% S&P A-Rated stocks
% S&P rated stocks
Number of Institutions
All Institutions
Missing
from InSample Sample
Mean Mean T-stat
9 .ll% 5.92% -2.576
52.15% 56.5t% 3.747
0.95% 1.00% 1.696
13.63% t2.60% -1.331
46.31 48.12 1.083
15.90 16.10 2.866
0.95 0.95 0.213
1.46% t.4t% -2.694
12.09% tz.tt% 0.102
17.57% t7.45% -0.165
1.00 1.02 2.002
0.18 0.17 -0.763
0.06 0.04 -1.376
-0.07 ,0.05 t.406
-l.l0 -0.03 13.57|
1.88 7 .63 6.007
6r.9r% s9.9r% ,2.883
68.73% 73 .54% 4.905
1274 760
CDA Banks
Missing
from In
Sample Sample
Mean Mean T-stat
0.00% 0.00% 0.000
78.29% 73.54% -2.298
t.58% l.4t% -2.161
7.1r% 7.t4% 0.017
8 I .89 83.08 0.21r
17.00 t7.23 0.773
0.68 0.71 3.741
l.3lo/o 1.32% 0.719
9.52% 10.05% 2301
tr.lr% 1952% 3.073
0.96 0.99 r.661
-0.10 -0.09 0.403
-0.06 -0.12 -1.462
0.01 -0.05 -2.774
-0.78 1.88 7.043
s.66 31 .61 3.091
69.33% 67.08% -L108
86.45% 85.03% -0.756
116 29
CDA Mutual Funds
Missing
from InSample Sample
Mean Mean T-stat
l4.29Yo 16.670 0.130
48.68% 52.01o/o 0.302
0.87% 0.82% -0.175
9.34oh I9.85Vo 1.405
39.88 30.69 -0.7s7
15.87 15.87 0.008
1.06 1.03 -0.164
t.6t% 1.31% -1.277
13.46% 13.38% -0.040
2t.07yo 22.67% 0.267
L05 1.03 -0.235
0.29 0.28 -0.008
0.06 -0.03 -0.585
-0.06 -0.1I -1.055
0.18 I .10 0.848
10.04 t2.10 0.211
58.42oA 53.35o/o -0.799
67.96% 72.12% 0.463
146
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fable II.b (Continued)
The t-statistic shows the difference in means between the institutions in the final sample and those dropped from the sample due to a lack of
match with the Nelson's directory.
CDA Investment Advisors CDA Other / Pensions
Aggressive growth investor (CRSP)
% Dividend Paying
Portfolio dividend yield (pfdy)
Portfolio average sales growth (pfsg)
Portfolio average stock market cap ($m)
Log of portfolio avg market cap
Porfolio average beta (pfbeta)
Portfolio variance (pfrar)
Portfolio stock return std. dev. (pfretsd)
Turnover
Portfolio market risk factor weighting (pfmktrfl
Portfolio small cap factor weighting (pfsmb)
Portfo I io value/growth factor wei ghti ng (pfhm | )
Portfolio momentum factor weighting (pfumd)
Log of total equity portfolio value
Total equity portfolio value ($Bn) (pfralue)
% S&P A-Rated stocks
% S&P rated stocks
Number of Institutions
Missing
from
Sample
Mean
9.05%
5r.t2%
0.93%
t3.42%
47.0r
t5.97
0.92
r.42%
11.73Yo
17.t6%
0.98
0.16
0.07
-0.06
-0.66
2.44
62.96%
67.7s%
232
In
Sample
Mean T-stat
4.71% -1.954
5s.90% 2.266
0 .96% 0.57 4
t2.97% -0.335
44.84 -0.707
16.01 0.332
0.98 r.508
| .40% -0.670
12.37% 2.044
17.47% 0.295
l.04 4.031
0.19 l.r7r
0.02 -1.88r
-0.06 -0.3s7
0.35 6.854
5.62 2.698
58.22% -4.t69
73.96% 3.s59
276
In
Sample
Mean T-stat
7.13o/o -2.035
55.62% 4.779
r.00% 3.808
12530A -2.178
47 .56 3.086
16.05 3.874
0.95 -1.752
1.43% -2.980
12.7l%o -2.050
17.19% -1.325
1.00 -0.463
0.17 -2.560
0.06 -0.596
-0.05 2.220
-0.44 9.229
6.96 s.r57
64.60% 0.110
72.31% 4.558
435
Missing
from
Sample
Mean
r0.62%
48.39%
0.86%
t4.84%
40.99
15.72
1.00
r.52%
12.60%
18.57%
l 01
0.23
0.07
-0.08
-1.33
1.00
60.49%
66.35o/o
876
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Entire Sample
Mean Std
3.2lYo 17.640/0Aggressive growth investor (CRSP)
% Dividend Paying
Portfolio dividend yield (pfdy)
Portfolio average sales growth (pfsg)
Portfolio average stock market cap ($m)
Log of portfolio avg market cap
Porfolio average beta (pfbeta)
Portfolio variance (pfvar)
Portfolio stock return std. dev. (pfretsd)
Turnover
Portfolio market risk factor weighting
Portfolio small cap factor weighting
Portfolio value/growth factor weighting
Portfolio momentum factor weighting
Number of Companies Followed
Research (Street)
Research (Consultant)
Research (In House)
Log of total equity portfolio value
Total equity portfolio value ($Bn) (pfvalue)
Log of total portfolio value
Total assets under management ($Bn)
Fraction of assets in US Equities
Fraction of investments on behalf of:
Individuals
Mutual Funds
Corporate funds
Pension funds
Foundations
Insurance funds
Individual trusts
Other clients
Fraction of investments taxable
% S&P A-Rated stocks
% S&P rated stocks
Number of Institutions
83.03%
295%
r5.23%
tt.2l
t4.99
l.0l
0.96%
8,470/o
r6.57%
1.04
0.04
-0.13
-0.04
445
33.23%
6.59%
60.29o/o
-0.62
r.87
0.42
5.63
50.50%
13.93Vo
7.54Vo
0.71%
58.61%
7.97Yo
3.24%
0.43Vo
7.56%
32,520/o
7357%
8r.44%
18.23%
l.l4Yo
9.02%
s.78
l.2l
0.15
0.14%
l.28Yo
13.25%
0. l3
0.31
0.35
0.17
812
24.950h
11.260
26.95Yo
r.66
3.95
r.67
I 1.83
27.85%
2l.48Vo
l7.70%
3.13o/o
3r.33Vo
10.72%
12.21%
3.80%
16.93%
29.2s%
l4.50Yo
t5.78%
530
9r
Table III
Characteristics of institutions @ec 1990; Nelsonrs Classifications)
For each institution q?e, we calculate the mean and standard deviation ofeach statistic. The t-statistic compares the difference in
means between that institution t)?e and all other institutions in the sample.
Bank/Trust Companies
Mean Std T-stat
0.00o/o 0.00% -1.817
92.72%
3.51o/o
13.04%
15.89
15.61
0.94
0.95%
7.680/o
15.08%
0.99
-0.l3
-0.06
0.01
550
43.7t%
5.99%
50.95o/o
0.21
3.59
r.36
9.13
34.44%
17.46o/o
3.14%
0.83%
42.l}Vo
9.42%
132%
|.060/o
24.66%
45.39%
80.65%
89.23o/o
7.4404 5.312
0.70o/r 4.947
7.43% -2.430
5.33 8.085
0.s9 5.124
0.09 -4.455
0.08% -0.833
0.70o/o -6.145
2r98% -r.rr4
0.08 -3.844
0.r7 -5.505
0.20 2.235
0.15 2.903
1,008 r.244
27.62% 3.775
10.83% -0.479
27.72o/o -3.117
r.5'7 5.015
6.53 4.359
r.32 5.749
14.91 3.00r
17.74% -5.062
24.25o/o 1.415
8.14% -2.t4r
3.20% 4342
24.7601o -4.539
12.17% 1.158
4.34o/o -1.356
7.64Yo 1.442
273lYo 8.701
23.96% 4.21s
9.75% 4.880
8.86% 4.931
84
Insurance Companies
Mean Std T-stat
0.00% 0.00% -1.061
84.90%
2.94Vo
13.41%
tL57
15.17
0.98
0.95%
8.24Vo
18.70%
0.09
2.57
2.t5
t7.04
23.370
3.24Vo
16.00%
1.31%
34.r0%
r.05%
33.r0%
0.tt%
lI.I00
52.97vo
70.84%
84jto/o
l4.7lo/o 0.600
0.85% -0.033
3.26% -1.r79
4.01 0.357
0.64 0.874
0.08 -1.093
0.09% -0.180
0.52o/o -1.042
tr.6r% 0.891
1.01 0.09 -1.142
-0.01 0.22 -0.913
-0.13 0.28 0.085
-0.03 0.12 0.363
473 332 0.174
29.78% 2r.52% -0.682
4.r3% 6.51% -1.078
66.30% 21.82% 1.103
1.34 2.504
4.26 1.035
1.30 6.105
18.93 5.660
2332% -4.709
7.87% -2.612
25.r2% 2.508
6.66% 1.006
3097% -4.106
r.78% -3.390
34.19% t2.831
0.54% -0.44r
24.2r% 1.095
29.88% 3.740
t2.92% -1.101
7.llYo 1.232
32
Table III (continued)
For each institution type, we oalculate the mean and standard deviation of each statistic. The t-statistic compares the difference in
means between that institution type and all other institutions in the sample.
Aggressive growth investor (CRSP)
% Dividend Paying
Portfolio dividend yield (pfdy)
Portfolio average sales growth (pfsg)
Ponfolio average stock market cap ($m)
Log of portfolio avg market cap
Porfolio average beta (pfbeta)
Portfolio variance (pfvar)
Portfolio stock return std. dev. (pfretsd)
Turnover
Portfolio market risk factor weighting
Portfolio small cap factor weighting
Portfolio value/growth factor weighting
Portfolio momentum factor weighting
Number of Companies Followed
Research (Street)
Research (Consultant)
Research (In House)
Log of total equity portfolio value
Total equity portfolio value ($Bn) (ptualue)
Log of total portfolio value
Total assets under management ($Bn)
Fraction of assets in US Equities
Fraction of investments on behalf of:
lndividuals
Mutual Funds
Corporate funds
Pension funds
Foundations
Insurance funds
Individual trusts
Other clients
Fraction of investments taxable
% S&P A-Rated stocks
% S&P rated stocks
Number of Institutions
Inv. Advisors
Mean Std T-stat
4.820 21.460/0 2.513
79.61% 19.07o/o -5.148
2.77% l.24%o -4.284
I6.83Yo 10.43% 4.866
9.51 5.30 -8.097
14.75 1.07 -5.451
1.04 0.1s 5.540
0.95% 0.12% -1.623
8.76% 1.34% 6.306
17.7r% 10.09% 2.233
1.06 0.14 s326
0.t2 0.32 7.213
-0.r7 0.36 -3.22r
-0.06 0.15 -3.572
43r 814 -0.5t7
30.67% 24.44o/o -3.143
6.90% Il.69Yo 0.863
62.35% 27.24% 2.34r
-0.94 t.6r -s.341
1.25 2.48 -4.311
-0.05 ]l54 -8.739
3.42 8.94 -5.857
s7.71% 27.14% 7.829
t7.83% 23.t4yo 4.762
8.610/o 1855% 1.585
0.750h 3.03% 0.390
54.78% 27.37% -3.210
10.31% 10.3s% 5.72r
1.88% 7.04Yo -2.932
0.38% 3.lsYo -0.351
5.46% 12.36% -3.26r
34.930 28.14o/o 2.089
7t.rs% 13.76% -4.580
78.99% 14.760/o -4.267
Investment Banks
Mean Std T-stat
0.00% 0.00% -0.989
84.25o/o 9.39Vo 0.362
2.86% 0.73% -0.426
1s.25% 3.22% 0.013
10.90 3.4r -0.297
14.93 0.98 -0.290
1.02 0.09 0.412
0.94% 0.07o/o -0.819
8.58% r.r3% 0.502
22.78% 15.r0% 2.455
r.02 0.07 -0.545
0.03 0.18 -0.155
-0.t7 0.28 -0.568
-0.03 0.l l 0.208
279 352 -1.099
37.20% 18.99% 0.823
7.200 11.28% 0.282
56.20% 20.43% -0.785
-0.56 1.31 0.179
1.35 2.24 -0.723
0.69 1.73 0.883
6.26 9.51 0.292
37.5r% 25.20% -2.309
l454Yo 15.05% 0.139
21.90% 2857% 3.990
r.42% 3.03% 1.1 l8
43.59% 26.58% -2.358
9.56yo t7.31% 0.727
t.glyo 4.36% -0.539
r.03% 3.34% 0.775
6.06% t4.63% -0.436
4l ]3Yo 27 .620/o 1.57 4
75.050 l2.l3o/o 0.553
81.50% 8.06% 0.021
Pensions
Mean Std T-stat
2.67% 16.22% -0.287
85.1l% 22.46Yo 1.064
3.09% t.t7% 1.16s
11.78% 5.0lYo -3.543
13.03 6.17 2.919
t5.24 2.01 t.922
0.97 0.20 -2.676
1.02% 0.24o/o 3.890
8.18% r38% -2.080
1058% 8.4r% -4.124
1.00 0.15 -2.366
-0.08 0.32 -3.699
-0.04 0.42 2.514
-0.01 0.28 r.624
250 0 -0.240
20.00% 0.00% -0.531
0.00% 0.04o/o -0.586
80.00% 0.00% 0.732
-0.54 1.80 0.465
2.4r 4.77 l.281
2.88 0.00 1.480
17 .84 0.00 1.034
49.40o/o 0.00% -0.040
0.00% 0.00% -6.134
0.00% 0.00% -4.029
0.00% 0.00% -2.130
100.00% 0.00o/o 12.491
0.00% 0.00% -7.033
0.00% 0.00% -2.sr2
0.00% 0.00% -1,063
0.00% 0.00% -4.223
0.00% 0.00% -10.480
76.29% I9.68Vo 1.755
81.45% 25.21o/o 0.006
31r
92
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Table IV
Taxability of client types
Each column represents a regression of the taxability of institutions on the fractional
institutions reporting to Nelsons' at the end of that year. *, ** and :r'** represent tax
l|Vqs%o and l%o level.
investment on behalf of each client group for
levels significantly different from zero at the
Observation year 1990 1994 1998
Individuals 91.9o/o >F*>r 89.3%0 ,l,,ts:s 78.9o/o ***
Mutual Funds 86.30/0 *** g5.9o ,r** 77.5o **'r
Corporate ll2.2o/o *** 7 5.4o/o *** 43.8yo **
Other Institutions 6l.4oh *** 50.6010 *** 68.5yo ***
Pension Funds 0.5% 0.5% 3.4Yo **
Foundations 6.7% 8.2% 18.9o4:r"r'<{'.
Insurance Funds 86.30/0 *'k* 83.09/0 **'r'< 81.3%0 {'G{'.*
Individual Trusts ll4.4oh >k*'F 98.8o4 **{< 78.3oh ***
Number of institutions 417 503 519
2000
gl.6010 ***
82.5o/o ***
44.4o/o ***
55.5yo ***
1.2%
18.2o/o **t6
85.59lo {'.t'!t'
73.4o/o ***
688
2001
79.goh *,r*
85.5%0 *{sx
46.7o/o ***
51.7o/o ***
1.5%
14.IVo **
79.loA ***
80.7o/o ***
656
2002
82.3o/o,F**
87 .go/o *,8*
54.2o/o ,ktf *
5g.3yo ***
r.2%
6.2%
8l.4oh,r*'F
74.60/0 ***
654
2003
79.60/0 ***
83.6%0 **'!{'<
79.1o/o ***
5g.5yo {.**
- 0.s%
12.lo **
80.5%0 *:t*
54.5oA *>E*
645
All
87.7o/o ***
94.2o/o ***
60.7oh ***
57 .2oA ***
l.3o/o ***
12.5o/o +t6*
82.3oA,r**
92.7o/o ***
4082
93
Table V.a
Regression tests of Prudent Man Hypothesis (Institutional Charter Effects)
Dependent variables are portfolio characteristics (displayed in bold). Standard enors are calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for the autocorrelation of
observationsofinstitutionsovertime.Fixedefectscoeflcientsareusedforeachinstitutionbutarnotreported.*,**and***representtaxlevelssignifctlydifrentfom
zero at the 10o/o. 5o/o and 1o/o level.
Intercept
Log Value of Equity
Fraction of Portfolio in U.S. Equity
Lag Portfolio Beta
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
1/0 CDA Pension Company
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
(l)
Yo A-Rated Stocks
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
-0.008 0.003 ({'c*'i*)
-0.019 0.021
-0.063 0.019 (*,|'{'<)
0.054 0.022 ('&**)
0.028 0.021 (*)
0.041
3805
(2)
% Dividend Paying
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.009 0.006 (*)
-0.1 l5 0.039 (x:'<*)
-0.370 0.036 (***)
0.0s2 0.040 (*)
0.074 0.038 (**)
0.245
3805
(3)
PF Avg. Div. Yield
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 (*)
-0.002 0.001 (*)
-0.01I 0.001 (:t"r'.*)
0.001 0.001
0.002 0.001 (**)
0.224
3805
(4\
Avg. Log Mkt. Cap.
s.e.
0.000
0.036 (*x*)
0.256 (***)
0.227 (:r'<*:k)
0.257
0.?41('t*'r'.)
0.13 5
3805
(s)
Portfolio Variance
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 (*)
0.000 0.001
0.008 0.001 (***)
0.000 0.001
0.001 0.001 (*)
0.429
3l2r
(6)
Avg. return std. dev.
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001
0.010 0.005 (*t)
0.072 0.004 (***)
-0.004 0.005
-0.007 0.004 (**)
0.600
3805
Beta
0.000
0.110
-4.994
-1.231
0.297
0.607
Intercept
Log Value of Equity
Fraction of Portfolio in U.S. Equity
Lag Portfolio Beta
1/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
1/0 CDA Bank
1/0 CDA Pension Company
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
Beta
0.000
0.062
0.488
0.595
-0.468
-0.975
(7)
Stock/Portfolio Vol. Ratio
s.e.
0.000
0.042 (+)
0.297 (*)
a.267 (**)
0.30s (*)
0.281 (**'i*)
0.046
3tzl
(8)
7o A-Rated Stocks
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
-0.007 0.003 ({<*'r'<)
-0.021 4.022
-0.063 0.019 (**;r€)
0.059 0.030 (**)
0.027 0.020 (*)
0.038
3805
(e)
%o Dividend Paying
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (*)
0.009 0.006 (*)
-0.1l3 0.040 (***;
-0.369 0.035 (**r")
0.079 0.0s6 (*)
0.073 0.038 (*x)
0.246
3805
(10)
%o A-Rated Stocks
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
-0.007 0.003 (**)
-0.016 0.020
-0.081 0.021 (*)"*)
0.059 0.021(***)
0.060
3388
(1 1)
7o Dividend Paying
Beta s.e-
0.000 0.000 (**)
0.007 0.006
-0.086 0.039 (**)
-0.456 0.040 (t'<**)
0.067 0.041 (**)
0.296
3388
P e n s i on fu nd in s t itut i on s exc I ude d fr o m r e gre s s i o ns
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Table V.b
Regression tests ofPrudent Man Hypothesis (Client Effects)
Dependent variables are porffolio characteristics (displayed in bold). Standard errots are calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for lhe autocorrelation of
obserVationsofinstitutionsovertime.Fixedefectscoeflcientsareusedfoleachinstitutionbutarenotreported.*,**and*++representtaxl€ve[s
zero at the l0o/o, 5"/o and 1o/o level.
Intercept
Log Value of Equity
% U.S. Equity
Lag Portfolio Beta
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust
1/0 CDA Pension Co.
o/o Pens ion/Trust Clients
% Individual Clients
% Mutual Fund Clients
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
%o owned by:
Firm Age
log Market Cap
l/0 A-rated Stock
l/0 Not Rated
1/0 +ve EPS
l/Risk
Book/Market
Dividend Yield
Number of Observations
(1)
7o A-Rated
Stocks
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (*)
-0.008 0.003 ({'.{'{:'<)
-0.01| 0.022
-0.068 0.019 ('r'<*:r'<)
0.057 0.023 (*{'<*)
0.052 0.023 (**)
-0.044 0.020 (*+)
0.054
3696
(2)
7o Dividend
Paying
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.010 0.006 (*+)
-0.098 0.041 (*'r'<*)
-0.373 0.035 (:r'<{'.:r'<)
0.054 0.041 (*)
0.061 0.043 (*)
0.014 0.037
0.247
3696
(3)
Portfolio
Variance
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.000 o.oo0 (*)
0.000 0.001
0.008 o.ool (**x)
0.000 0.001
0.001 0.001
0.000 0.001
(4)
Avg. return std.
dev.
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001
0.009 0.005 (**)
0.073 0.004 (***')
-0.005 0.005
-0.008 0.005 (*)
0.002 0.004
(s)
Stock/Portfolio
Vol. Ratio
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.037 0.042
0.476 0.307 (*)
0.619 0.266 (:r'*':r'<)
-0.278 0.3 l6
-1.137 0.323 ({'**)
0.323 0.274
0.048
302r
(4)
Nelson's Investment
Advisors
T-stat
-0.554
8.622
-5.719
-s.668
8.205
-9.820
12.539
-5.225
(6)
7o A-Rated
Stocks
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (*)
-0.006 o.oo3 (**)
-0.01| 0.022
-0.064 0.019 ({'c*{'<)
0.056 0.022 (*:r'i:r'<)
0.054 0.023 (*x)
-0.051 0.029 (**)
0.012 0.029
-0.039 0.032
0.059
3696
(7)
7o Dividend
Paying
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.018 0.006 (*{c*)
-0.109 0.041 ('r'*:f)
-0.354 0.036 (***)
0.055 0.041 (*)
0.056 0.044 (*)
0.091 0.0s1 1't*';
0.164 0.055 (*l"k)
-0.002 0.060
0.271
3696
(1)
All CDA Banks
Coeff T-stat
0.058 4.017
0.233 4.102
0.067 5.172
-0.001 -0.t32
0.035 5.305
0.002 0.200
0.094 7.349
0.006 0.666
37285
(2\
CDA Banks with
Nelson's data
Coeff T-stat
0.059 4.688
0.228 4.028
0.050 4.559
0.005 0.756
0.030 5.012
-0.01 I -l.035
0.076 s.872
0.003 0.292
37285
0.605
3696
(3)
Nelson's Bank/Trust
Companies
Coeff T-stat
0.058 5.t21
0.300 4.s16
0.037 4.916
0.004 0.546
0.036 6.003
-0.03 | -2.559
0.086 6.289
-0.007 -0.886
37285
0.445
3021
Table V.c
Stock level regression tests ofPrudent Man Hypothesis
Dependentvariablesarelevelsofinstitutionalownership.Bothindependentanddependentvariablesarecross-sectionallydemeanedonayearlybasispriortoa
BennettSiasandstaIks(l999)).Standarderrorsandt.statisticsarecalculatedusingMonteCarlotechniquestoaccountfortheautocorelationofo
over ume.
Coeff
-0.006
0.425
-0.083
-0.064
0.080
-0.102
0.172
-0.043
95
37285
Table VI
Regression tests ofTax Elliciency Hypothesis
Dependent variables are portfolio characteristics (displayed in bold). Standaxd erors are calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for the autocoffelation of
observationsofinstitutionsovertime'Fixedefectscoefcientsareusedforeachinstitutionbutarenotreport€d.+'+tand*+lrepresenttaxlevelssiifcmtlydiferentfom
zero at the l0%o, 5o/o and lo/o level.
Intercept
Log Value of Equity
Fraction of Portfolio in U.S. Equity
Lag Portfolio Beta
Fraction of investments taxable
Average log stock market cap
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
(1)
%o Dividend Paying
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (**)
0.012 0.006 (**)
-0.116 0.039 (:r'<*{<)
-0.376 0.037 (lN'<*{'<)
-0.037 0.036
0.221
3502
(21
PF Avg. Div. Yield
Beta s.e.
0.000 o.ooo (*)
0.000 0.000 (**)
-0.002 0.001 (**)
-0.012 0.001 ('r'<*"N'<)
-0.002 0.001 (**)
0.218
3502
(3)
Portfolio Turnover
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.004 0.003 (*)
-0.036 0.020 (**)
0.079 0.019 (""t'*)
-0.034 0.019 (**)
0.034
3368
(4)
7o Dividend Paying
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (*:'c*)
-0.001 0.006
-0.029 0.040
-0.240 0.037 (***)
-0.040 0.036
0.104 0.008 ('r"r'<*)
0.604
3502
(s)
PF Avg. Div. Yield
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 ({'<{<*)
0.000 0.000
-0.001 0.001
-0.010 0.001 (*'r"F)
-0.002 0.00t 1**;
0.002 0.000 ({"t'€:r')
0.304
3502
(6)
Portfolio Turnover
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.005 0.003 (**)
-0.043 0.020 (**)
0.066 0.019 (**{'<)
-0.033 o.ol9 (*x)
-0.010 0.004 ('k*{'.)
0.044
3368
Intercept
Log Value of Equity
Fraction of Portfolio in U.S. Equity
Lag Portfolio Beta
Fraction of investments taxable
Average log stock market cap
7o Foundation/Pension/Trust Clients
1/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
li0 CDA Pension Company
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
(7\
% Dividend Paying
Beta
0.000
-0.001
-0.034
-0.240
-0.018
0.1 03
0.013
0.608
3390
(8)
PF Avg. Div. Yield
Beta
0.000
0.000
-0.001
-0.010
-0.002
0.001
0.000
0.304
3390
(e)
Portfolio Turnover
(10)
7o Dividend Paying
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (*{'<!")
-0.002 0.006
-0.026 0.044
-0.239 0.038 (*{'<*)
-0.018 0.061
0.103 0.008 (**:")
0.013 0.056
0.028 0.043
-0.001 0.041
0.609
3390
(l 1)
PF Avg. Div, Yield
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (:Fr"{<)
0.000 0.000
-0.001 0.001
-0.010 0.001 ('N'<:r"r')
-0.002 0.002
0.001 0.000 (x'r"r)
0.000 0.002
0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001
0.306
3390
(r2)
Portfolio Turnover
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.006 0.003 (**)
-0.031 0.023 (*)
0.060 0.020 ({"r'<*)
-0.057 0.032 (**)
-0.008 0.00+ 1*'r;
-0.005 0.031
-0.027 0.022
-0.059 0.021 (tir:")
0.059
3257
s.e.
0.000
0.006
0.042
0.038 (*'<:k*)
0.061
0.008 (x'r"F)
0.056
s.e.
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001 (*'lr"N'<)
0.002
0.000 (*"F*)
0.001
Beta
0.000
0.005
-0.042
0.068
-0.052
-0.009
-0.023
0.000
0.003 (+*)
0.02t 1**';
0.020 (*'kt)
0.032 (*)
0.004 (**)
0.030
0.043
3257
96
Table VII
Regression analysis of portfolio exposure to stock return factors
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are portfolio exposures to Fama-French and momentum stock return factors. MKTRF is the excess market risk factor, SMB is the
small cap (vs. large cap) factor, HML is the Value/Growth factor and UMD is the mom€ntum factor. Standaxd enors axe calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account
fortheautocorrelationofobservationsofinstitutionsovertime'FixedefectscoemcientsareusedforeachinstitutionbutaIenotrepofed.*,+*and
significantly different from zero at the 10o/o, 5o/o urd lo/o level.
(t)
PF MKTRF Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.000
0.007
0.010
0.281
-0.023
-0.074 0.024 (***)
(2)
PF SMB Exposure
(3)
PF HML Exposure
(4)
PF UMD Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000 (***)
0.000
-0.001
-0.126 0.024 (:'<'**)
0.003
0.026
0.025
0.022
0.022
0.005 (:F't.\t)
0.083
3502
0.000
0.003
0.024
0.024
0.022 (**)
Intercept
Log Value of Equity
Fraction of Portfolio in U.S. Equity
Lag Portfolio Beta
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
l/0 CDA Pension Company
Fraction of investments taxable
Average log stock market cap
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
Intercept
Log Value of Equity
Fraction of Portfolio in U.S. Equity
Lag Portfolio Beta
1i0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
l/0 CDA Pension Company
Average log stock market cap
%o Foundation/Pension/Trust Clients
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
0.000
0.003 (**)
0.025
0.022 (* 'l'<x<)
0.02s
Beta
0.000
0.009
0.016
0.266
-0.028
-0.076
-0.02r
-0.189
Beta
0.000
0.008
s.e.
0.000
0.009
Beta
0.000
0.004
-0.026
-0.442
0.015
0.046
-0.069
-0.102
0.013
0.057
s.e.
0'000 ('r'.{'<*)
0.009
0.063
0.055 (***)
0.062
0.060
0.059
0.012 (**{'<)
0.759
3502
s.e.
0.000 (:**:rc)
0.007
0.055
0.048 ('r*:t'.)
0.053
0.052
0.049 (*)
0'010 ({'.*{'<)
0.262
3502
(s)
PF MKTRF Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.023
0.005 (**)
0.31I
3502
0.000
0.003 (**)
0.025
(6)
PF SMB Exposure
-0.024
,0.010
0.000
0.006
0.017
0.052
0.054
-0.004
-0.026
0.010
0.023
0.002
-0.037
(8)
PF UMD Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.000
-0.001
0.006
-0.133 0.022 (***)
(7)
PF HML Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.000 0.000
0.003 0.007
-0.037 0.053
-0.396 0.047 ({"N'<{'.)0.285 0.022 (***)
-0.020 0.024
-0.07 | 0.024 (*:"*)
-0.009 0.004 (**)
0.015 0.021
0.326
3696
0.025 0.063
0.280 0.053 (**'t)
-0.018 0.061
-0.077 0.063
-0.lgl 0.01I 1*'rx;
0.020 0.053
0.764
3696
-0.100 0.010 (:r',t"k)
0.075 0.045 (**)
0.246
3696
0.022 0.004 (*'r'<{'<)
-0.005 0.020
0.086
3696
97
Table VIII
Changes in client composition and portfolio characteristics
Observations are taken from sample of institutions r€porting client and portfolio statistics at the start and end ofthe four year periods, 1990-1994, 1994-1998, 1998-2002.
All Institutions Bank/Trust Companies
A MKTRF Exposure
A SMB Exposure
A HML Exposure
A UMD Exposure
A % A-Rated Stocks
A % Dividend Paying
A Portfolio Dividend Yield
A Avg. Log Market Cap
A % Portfolio Beta
A Portfolio Variance
A Turnover
A,%o of investments taxable
A AUM
A log AUM
A log AUM - A log Market AUM
A % Mutual Fund clients
A % Individuals
A % Pensions/Foundations/Trusts
Return on MKTRF portfolio
Return on SMB portfolio
Return on HML portfolio
Return on UMD portfolio
Number of Observations
Mean s.d. T-stat vs. All
0.001 0.149 0.708
0.018 0.112 0.687
0.024 0.170 -l.813
-0.004 0.179 -0.925
-6.52Vo 10.960/o -2.013
-6.87% 6.81% -0.241
-0.s6% 0.59% -0.8 84
0.378 0.656 -0.122
0.005 0.181 2.140
0.00% 0.36% -2.915
-4.37% 34.92% -2.629
-6.7lvo 28.06% -3 .628
18.564 43.910 4.439
0.458 l.l4t 1.226
-0.131 1.139 0.885
8.32% t9.64% 3.429
-1.26Vo 18.64% -0.915
-4.48% 24.19% ,0.250
29.59% 40.45% 0.776
8.03% 26.92% 0.654
21.s8% lt.7r% 0.060
47.84% 11.76% -2.s91
Investment Advisors
Mean s.d. T-stat vs. All
-0.014 0.156 -0.190
-0.002 0.205 -0.622
0.092 0.257 1.61 l
0.035 0.281 r.139
-2.90% 12.19% 1.668
-6.46% rz.ts% 0.068
-0.46% 0.78% 0.565
0.388 0.8s0 -0.243
-0.077 0.271 -t.236
0.15% 0 33% 2.308
1.56% 12.52% 1.564
2.97o/o 16.400/o 2.713
2.941 14.t28 -4.520
0.296 0.849 -1.012
-0.249 0.859 -0.760
| .89% rr .63% -0.614
0.72% 16.57% -0.544
-3 .80% 20 .7 6% -0. 1 1 6
23.8s% 46.84% -1.151
5.42% 29.08% -0.049
21.57% 13.22% 0.466
s4.68% r7.39% 2.393
Mean
-0.014
0.000
0.086
0.030
-3.21%
-6.48%
-0.46%
0.391
-0.072
0.r4%
l.t8%
2.lgVo
4.s69
0.310
-0.238
2.02%
0.86%
-3.76%
24.680/o
5.44%
21.47%
s4.03%
s.d.
0.154
0.r98
0.25r
0.270
12.0r%
ll.g70
0.77%
0.834
0.264
433%
14.84%
r7.96%
23.083
0.882
0.889
r3.45%
16.96%
21.05%
46.33%
28.96%
13.llo/o
17.47%
744 630
99
Table IX.a
Regression analysis ofchanges in portfolio factor exposures and changes in client composition
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio exposues to Fama-French and momentum stock retum factors. Standard enors are calculated using
Monte Caxlo techniques to account for the autocorrelation of observations of institutions over time. Wald statistics are reported for each variable across all four
regressions. Return contributions are treated as one variable for test statistic purposes.
Intercept
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
A,o/o of investments taxable
A 7o Mutual Fund clients
L%o lndividuals
A %o Pensions/Foundations/Trusts
Return on MKTRF portfolio
Return on SMB portfolio
Return on HML portfolio
Retuqn on UMD portfolio
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
(1)
A MKTRF Exposure
Beta s.e.
-0.020 0 007 
-(***)0.012 0.023
0.003 0.007
-0.039
-0.025
0.009
-0.065 0.035 (*)
0.018 0.013
-0.006
744
(2)
A SMB Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.005 0.008
0.015 0.029
0.007 0.009
-0.049 0.044
-0.01I 0.064
-0.099 0.0s2 (t)
-0.085 0:045 (*)
-0.109 0.027 (***)
0.025
744
(3)
A HML Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.012 0.018
-0.069 0.037 (*)
0.030 0.01I (,t<:rc+)
(4)
A UMD Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.035 0.032
-0.038 0.040
-0.040 0.011 ('r'.{'<!")
-0.055 0.061
-0.109 0.087
-0.192 0.069 ({'<{'.*)
-0.219 0.060 (:r'<4'i*)
-0.028 0.056
0.025
744
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
2.670 (0.031)
1.600 (0.17r)
s.02e (0.000)
r.044 (0.383)
0.446 (0.77s)
3.772 (0.00s)
4]er (0.002)
r2.r44 (0.000)
0.035
0.050
0.040
0.059
0.029
-0.0s3
-0.076
0.381
0.056
0.080
0.065
0.056
0.076 (xt'€x)
0.038
744
100
Table IX.b
Regression analysis of changes in portfolio factor exposures and changes in client composition
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio exposures to Fama-French and momentum stock retum factors. Standard erors are calculated using
Monte Carlo techniques to account for the autocorrelation of observations of institutions over time. Wald statistics are reported for each variable across all four
regressions. Return contributions are treated as one variable for test statistic purposes.
(1)
A MKTRF Exposure
Beta s.e.
-0.019 0.007 (*'N'<*)
0.009 0.023
0.004 0.007
-0.047 0.035
-0.012 0.051
0.038 0.042
-0.076 o:o_35 (**)
0.069 0.039 (*)
0.092 0.036 ({'<*{<)
0.029
0.017
0.029
0.013
0.001
744
(21
A SMB Exposure
(3)
A HML Exposure
Beta s.e.
(4)
A UMD Exposure
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
2.622 (0.033)
r.4s9 (0.212)
s.3r7 (0.000)
r.030 (0.3e0)
0:452- (0.77r)
3:606 (0.006)
4.s32 (0.001)
l:4J8 (0.219)
2.27r (0.0s9)
0:794 (0:529)
12.207 (0.000)
Intercept
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
L,Vo of investments taxable
A % Mutual Fund clients
A % Individuals
A % PensionsiFoundations/Trusts
A%MutualFunds*AAUM
A 7o Individuals * A AUM
A % Pens/Found/Trust * A AUM
Return on MKTRF portfolio
Return on SMB portfolio
Return on HML portfolio
Return on UMD portfolio
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
Beta
0.005
0.015
0.007
s.e.
0.008
0.029
0.009
0.049
0.045
Beta
0.034
-0.026
s.e.
0.032
0.0s6
0.023
744
-0.053 0.045
-0.010 0.066
-0.088 0.054
-0.088 0.045 (x)
0.010
0.028
0:003 0.037
-0.108 0.027 (x*'r'<)
0.022
744
0.010 0.018
-0.070 0.037 (*)
0.030 0.01I (***)
0.046 0.057
0.038 0.082
-0.010 0.067
-0:087 0.057
0.029 0.062
0.093
-0.003
0.387
0.057
0.047
0-076 (**'N'<)
0.041
744
-0.034 0.040
-0.042 0.012 ({"r"N'<)
-0.058 0.062
-0.112 0.089
-0.181 0.071 1**1
-0.218 0.061 (***;
-0.063 0.067
-0:022 0:062
,0.052 0.050
l0l
Table IX.c
Regression analysis ofchanges in portfolio factor exposures and changes in client composition
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio exposues to Fama-French and momentum stock retum factors. Standard erors are calculated using
Monte Carlo techniques to account for the autocorrelation of observations of institutions over time. Wald statistics are reported for each variable across all four
regressions. Retum contributions are treated as one variable for test statistic purposes.
Intercept
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
A % Mutual Fund clients
A % Individuals
A % Pensions/Foundations/Trusts
A%MutualFunds * AAUM
A %9 Indivi{ualq * A AUM
A % Pens/Found/Trust * A AUM
Return on MKTRF portfolio
Return on SMB portfolio
Return on HML portfolio
Return on UMD portfolio
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
-0.020 0.097 (:r"r'<*)
0.013 0.023
0.004 0.007
-0.018 0.0s1
0.035 0.042
-0.061 01033 (*)
0.070 0.039 (E)
0.088 0.035 (**)
0.027
0.017
0:029
0.013
Beta
0.034
-0.061
-0.0-28
-0.055
-0.026
s.e.
0.032
01067
0 062
0.050
0.056
0.023
744
(1)
A MKTRF Exposure
Beta
(2)
A SMB Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.004 0.008
0.020 0.029
0.007 0.009
-0.016 0.065
-0.092 0.054 (*)
-0.072 0.043 (*)
0.011 0.049
0.022 0:045
0.000 0:037
-0.109 0.027(x**)
0.021
744
(3)
A HML Exposure
Beta
0.011
0.043
-0.007
-0.101
0:029
0:097
0.000
o.rss
-0.074 0.037 (**)
0.030 0.01I (*'!*'{:f)
s.e.
0.018
0.082
0.067
0.054 (*)
0.062
0:057 (*)
0:046
A.orc 1*ii;
4.042
744
-0.029 0.040
-0.042 0.012 (***)
-0.119 0.089
-0.184 0.071 (*:r'<*)
-0.200 0.059 (*:"{'<)
(4)
A UMD Exposure
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
2.708 (0.029)
1.70s (0. r46)
5:274 (0.000)
0.53l (0.7r3)
3.670 (0.00s)
4:334 (0.002)
r.44e (0.2 r 5)
2.236 (0:063)
o 780 (0.538)
r2.22e (0.000)
0.000
744
102
Table X.a
Regression analysis ofchanges in portfolio characteristics and changes in client cornposition
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio characteristics. Standard errors are calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for the
autocorrelation of observations of institutions over time. Wald statistics are reported for each variable across all four regressions.
Intercept
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
A % of investments taxable
A % Mutual Fund clients
A % Individuals
A o/o Pen si onsiFoundations/Tru sts
A%MutualFunds+AAUM
A%Individuals+AAUM
A % Pens/Found/Trust * A AUM
Return on MKTRF portfolio
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
(1)
A 7o A-Rated Stoclis
Beta s.e.
-0.025 0,007 (***)
-0.043 0.012 (**)
-0.006 0.006
-0.007 0.032
0.010 0.045
0.083 0.037 (**)
0.041 0:031
0.024 0.032
0.025 0,031
0.038 0.027
-0.020 0 012 (*)
0.026
744
(2)
A %o Dividend Paying
Beta S,o,
:0.0s8 0 OQz 1***;
0.010 0.018
0.008 0.006
0.026 0.031
-0.069 0.044
0.062 0.036 (*)
0 065 0,030 (**)
-0.016 0.031
-0.012 0 030
0.019 0.026
:_0:019 0.012
0.015
744
(3)
A o/o Portfolio Beta
Beta s.€,
-0.088 0.0151*t'x;
0.097 0.0421**;
0.001 0.014
0.113 0.072
-0.I 15 0.102
-0.253 0.083 1***;
-0.143 0 070 (**)
-0.049 0.071
-0.0s0 0 069
-0.070 0.060
0:016 0927
0.025
743
(4)
A Avg. Log Market Cap
(s)
A Portfolio Variance
Beta s.e.
0.002 0.000 1***;
-0.001 0.001 (***)
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001
0.000 0.001
0.002 0.00t 1*+1
0 002 0.001 (**)
0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001
0.001 0 001
-0.002 0:000 (***)
0.060
584
(6)
A Turnover
Beta s.e.
0.009 0.009
-0.062 0 024 (*1*)
-0.001 0.008
-0.024 0.041
0.000 0.058
-0.032 0.047
0.002 0.040
-0.038 0.040
-0.051 0:039
-0 041 0.034
0 ol9 0:015
0.004
679
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
62.67s (0.000)
ton io.ooij
r.22r (0.292)
0.9s2 (0.4s6)|.079 (0.373)
3.0e1 (0.00s)
r.66e (0.124)
0.693 (0.655)
0.800 (0.s70)
r 0r0 (0 4r7)
37.0e7 (0.000)
Beta
0.269
-0.070
0.043
-0.093
-0.009
0.756
0.434
0.222
0.220
0.267
0.6t7
s.e.
0'041 1t**;
0.1l5
0.039
0.1 98
0.279
0'228 1***;
0.193 (**)
0.1 95
0.1 89
0:164
0.07+ 1*'r*;
0.181
744
103
Table X.b
Regression analysis of changes in portfolio characteristics and changes in client composition
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio characteristics. Standard errors are calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for the
autocorelation ofobservations ofinstitutions over time. Wald statistics are reoorted for each variable across all four resressions.
Intercept
l/0 Nelson's Bankffrust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
A % Mutual Fund clients
A % lndividuals
A o/o Pensions/Foundations/Trusts
A%MutualFunds*AAUM
A%Individuals*AAUM
A o/o Pens/Found/Trust * A AUM
Retum on MKTRF portfolio
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
Intercept
l/0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
A Yo of investments taxable
Lelgm on MSTRF portfolio
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
(l)
A 7o A-Rated Stocks
Beta s.€,
-0.025 0:007 (***)
.0.042 0 OtS 1*'t;
-0.006 0 006
0.010 0.045
0.083 0.037 (**)
0.043 0 030
0.024 0.032
0.024 0,031
0.038 0.027
-0.020 0 012 (*)
0.028
744
(t)
A 7o A-Rated Stocks
Beta 
.. 
s.e,
-0,029 0:007 (+**)
-0:046 o Ott 1**;
-0 010 0.006 (*)
-0.016 0 029
-q 013 0 012
0.019
744
(2)
A 7o Dividend Paying
Beta s.e
:0 058 0.007 1***;
0_,008 0.018
0.007 0.006
-0.066 0.044
0.062 0.036 (*)
0.057 0.0291*+;
-0 017 0.031
-0 0r0 0.030
0 019 0.026
-0.018 0.012
0.015
744
(2)
A 9o Dividend Paying
Beta s.e.
-0.064 0.0061+**;
-0.003 0.018
0.002 0.006
-0.005 0.029
:0 012 0.01I
-0.005
744
(3)
A 7o Portfolio Beta
Beta S,€.
-0.087 0.015 1***;
0.084 0.041 (**)
0.000 0.014
-0.100 0.101
-0.254 0.083 1***1
-0.175 0.0671***;
-0.054 0.071
-0.040 0.069
-0.070 0.060
0,019 0.027
0.022
743
(3)
A Yo Portfolio Beta
Beta q.g.
-0.080 0 0ls 1***;
0.100 0.041 (**)
0.01I 0 014
0. 135 0.066 (**)
-0.006 0 026
0.01I
743
(41
A Avg. Log Market Cap
Beta s.e.
o 267 0,041 (***)
-0.059 0.113
0.044 0.039
-0.021 0.278
0.756 0.2281***;
0.460 0.18s 1**1
0.226 0.194
0.212 0 188
0.267 0.164
0.615 0.0741***1
0.1 82
744
(4)
A Avg. Log Market Cap
Beta s.e.
0,233 0 040 (**1)
-0.r07 0.113
-0.003 0.038
-0.232 0 r 82
0.688 0.072 1**x;
0.161
744
(s)
A Portfolio Variance
Beta s.e.
0.002 0 000 (**1)
:0.001 0.001 1***;
0.000 0 000
0.000 0.001
0.002 0.001 (+*)
0.002 0.001 (**)
0.001 0.001
0.001 0 001
0.001 0.001
-0.002 0,000 (***)
0.061
584
(s)
A Portfolio Variance
Beta s.e.
0.002 0.000 1***;
-0.002 0.001 (***)
0.000 0.000
-0.001 0.001
-0.002 0.000 1+**;
0.0s2
584
(6)
A Turnover
Beta S,€,
0:009 0 0,09
-0.060 0.023 e*)
-0.001 0,008
-0.003 0.057
-0.032 0.047
0.008 0.038
-0 037 0 040
-0.053 0.039
-0:041 0.034
0 ol9 0,015
0.00s
679
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
62.189 (0.000)
zB;; io otoi
l184 (0.3il)
o.et7 (0.481)
3.094 (0.00s)
r.ege (0.062)
0.730 (0.625)
0:752 (0.608)
l:011 (0.416)
36.7s7 (0.000)
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
66.9t2 (0.000)
3.32r (0.003)
1.038 (0.399)
1.018 (0.41 r )
4r.248 (0.000)
Table X.c
Regression analysis ofchanges in portfolio characteristics and changes in client composition
Dep€ndent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio charact€ristics. Standard errors are calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for the
autocorrelation ofobservations ofinstitutions over time. Wald statistics are reDorted for each variable across all four resressions.
(6)
A Turnover
Beta s e
0:010 0,q08
-0.062 0:023 (***)
0,000 o.oo8
-0.030 0:037
0.018 0.015
0.009
679
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Table XI
Regression analysis ofchanges in portfolio factor exposures following changes in client composition
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio exposures to Fama-French and momentum stock retum factors over the period December 2001 to
December 2003. Independent variables represent changes over the period December 2000 to December 2001 or levels as of December 2001. Standard errors are
calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for the autoconelation of observations of institutions over time. Wald statistics are reported for each variable across
all four regressions. Retum contributions are treated as one variable for test statistic purposes.
lntercept
li0 Nelson's Bank/Trust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
A^%o of investments taxable
A % Mutual Fund clients
A % Individuals
A 7o Pensions/Foundations/Trusts
A%MutualFunds*AAUM
A%Individuals*AAUM
A % Pens/Found/Trust * A AUM
Return on MKTRF portfolio
Return on SMB portfolio
Return on HML portfolio
Return on UMD portfolio
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
-0:019 0.005 ()k*)h)
0.012 0.020
-0.017 0.01I
-0.038 0.049
0.305 0.084 (*i'<*)
0.016 0.062
0:087 0.054
-0.161 0.128
-0.239 0.087 (*:F{'.)
0 025 0:046
-0.288 0.032 (*{'.*)
(l)
A MKTRF Exposure
Beta s.e.
(2)
A SMB Exposure
Beta s.e.
0.009 0.011
-0.026 0.035
-0.023 0.018
,0.101 0.083
0.280 0.142 (**)
-0 018 0.105
0.138 0.091
01143 0.217
0.153 0.148
0:100 0 078
-0.260 0.041 (:t.t':t')
(3)
A HML Exposure
Beta s.e.
-0.185 0.020 (:"{'.*)
-0.116 0.074
0.026 0.040
0.049 0.179
-0.056 0.304
-0.289 0.225
-0.077 0.195
0.226 0.467
:0:063 0.317
-0:078 0.167
-0.253 0.048 ('r'<:{<:t)
(4)
A UMD Exposure
Beta s.e.
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
89.584 (o.ooo)
0.722 (0.s77)
0:761 (0.551)
o:645 (0.631)
3.77r (0.005)
0.540 (0.707)
r.424 (0.223)
1.036 (0 387)
5.502 (0:0,00)
1:01I (0:400)
260.28s (0.000)
0.057 0.009 (:r'|t"r'g)
-0.026 0.032
0.009 0.017
-0.016 0:076
-0.141 Q,130
-0.119 0 096
0.029 0.083
0.189 0:199
0.141 0:135
0.028 0.071
-0.662 0.024 (:r'<+'r'<)
0.5r2
466
0.011
466
0.080
466
0.030
466
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Table XII
Regression analysis ofchanges in client composition following changes in portfolio factor exposures
Dependent variables (displayed in bold) are changes in portfolio exposures to Fama-French and momentum stock retum factors over the period December 2001 to
December 2003. Independent variables represent changes over the period December 2000 to December 2001 or levels as of December 2001. Standard enors are
calculated using Monte Carlo techniques to account for the autoconelation of obseNations of institutions over time. Wald statistics are reported for each variable across
all four regressions. Return contributions are treated as one variable for test statistic purposes.
Intercept
l/0 Nelson's BankiTrust Company
A AUM - A Market AUM
MKTRF Exposure (2001)
SMB Exposure (2001)
HML Exposure (2001)
UMD Exposure (2001)
A MKTRF F',xposure
A SMB Exposure
A HML Exposure
A UMD Exposure
LVo of investments taxable
A % Mutual Fund clients
A % Individuals
A % Pensions/Foundations/Trusts
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations
(1)
A 7o Taxable
Beta l:e.0.089 0.061
0.018 0:022
0.001 0.012
-0.081 0:058
0.021 0.022
0.015 0.034
-0 006 0.08s
-0.054 0.062
-0 036 0:039
-0.007 0.033
-0.009 0.037
-0.715 0.047 (***)
(2)
A 7o Mutual Fund
Beta s.e.
0.006 0.044
-0.014 0.016
0.011 0.008
-0.01| 0.042
0.014 0 016
0.011 0.024
0:002 0.061
-0.023 0.045
0:061 0:029 (**)
0.012 0.024
-0.004 0.027
-0.272 0.057 (*:r'<{<)
(3)
A % Individuals
Beta s.e.
-0.035 0.046
-0.006 0.016
-0.006 0.009
0.027 0.043
-0.025 0.017
-0.021 0.026
-0:050 0.064
0:003 0.047
0 010 0.029
-0:033 0.025
-0.034 0.028
(4)
A %o Pens/Found/Trust
Joint Significance
F-Statistic P-value
l.0le (0.3e6)
1.010 (0.401)
0.741 (0.564)
0.874 (0.479)
r.167 (0.323)
0.2e2 (0.883)
0.211 (0.e33)
0.336 (01854)
r.e56 (0 0e2)
0.673 (0:611)
0.e68 (0.424)
6e.0re (0.000)
Beta
-0.052
-0.024
0.009
0.055
-0.013
0.007
0.0s2
0.0s7
-0.002
-0.01l
-0.028
s.e.
0.060
0.022
0.012
0.058
a.022
0.034
0.085
0.062
0.039
0.033
0.037
0.261
425
0.032
473
-0.187 0.038 ('r'<)k*)
0.026
473
-0.142 0.040 (*'n'N'<)
0.000
473
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Table XIII.a
Change in Portfolio Characteristics following 57o Increase/Decrease in Fraction of Clients Subject to Taxation
Statistics represent change in portfolio characteristic over the period December 2001 to December 2003. Results are presented for all institutions and those experiencing
a 5olo increase or 57o decrease in the fraction ofclients subject to taxalion over the period December 2000 to December 2001.
> soh Decrease
:t.67yo
r.07%
-l7.160/o
0.68%
-5.09o/o
0.04%
9.66%
-13.58%
-3 iToh
51
Table XIII.b
Change in Portfolio Characteristics following 57" Incrtase/I)ecrease in Mutual Fund Clients
Statistics represent change in portfolio characteristic over the period December 2001 to December 2003. Results are presented for all institutions and those experiencing
a 5o/o increase or 5Vo decr€ase in mutual fund clients over the oeriod December 2000 to December 2001.
Average A MKTRF Exposure
Average A SMB Exposure
Average A HML Exposure
Average A UMD Exposure
Average A % A-Rated Stocks
Average A 7o Dividend Paying
Average A % Portfolio Beta
Average A Avg. Log Market Cap
Average A Turnover
Number of observations
Average A MKTRF Exposure
Average A SMB Exposure
Average A HML Exposure
Average A UMD Exposure
Average A 7o A-Rated Stocks
Ave,rage A %9 Dividend Paying
Average A 7o Portfolio Beta
Average A Avg, Log Market Cap
Average A TurnoveJ
Number of observations
All
lnstitutions
-0,860/o
1,8!o/o
-15.960/o
-4.73%
-3.85%
-0.43%
5.00':yo
-13.58%
-2.65%
466
All
Institutions
-0.86%
-2.84%
-rs.96%
-4.73%
-3:85oh
'0.43o/o
-13.587o
5:00yo
-2:6|Vo
466
T-Statistic Decreases vs.
All Other Institutions
-0.554
r.5t7
-0.223
r.672
-0.947
0.370
t.416
-0.001
-0.549
T-Statistic Decreases vs.
> 5o/o Decrease All Other Institutions
0.30% 0.572
-1.71% 0.317
-t6.06% -0.013
-4.63% 0.022
-4:7 5o/o -0.495
-l:70oh -0.724
-16.57% -0.296
7.99% 0.654
-s.45% -1.206
28
>50
Increase
-0,17o/o
-3?7%
-12.90%
-6.51%
-3.20%
0.74o/o
9.97%
-6.09%
-2.87%
70
T-Statistic Increases vs.
All Other Institutions
0.604
-0.199
0.682
-0.663
0.596
1 .103
l .810
1.233
-0.153
> 50 T-Statistic Increases vs.
Increase All Other Institutions
3.44% 2.567
-0.17% 0.904
-19:27o/o -0:53 8
-4.73o/o -0i001
-3.03o/o 0:545
-2.12% |.167
-2.89% r.283
6.69% 0.447
-1,74o/o 0482
40
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Table XIII.c
Change in Portfolio Chrracteristics following 57o Increlse/Decrease in Individual Clients
Statistics represent change in portfolio characteristic over the period December 2001 to December 2003. Results axe presented for all institutions and those experiencing
a 5o/o increase or 5Vo decrease in individual clients over the period December 2000 to December 2001.
Average A MKTRF Exposure
Average A SMB Exposure
Average A HML Exposure
Average A UMD Exposure
Average A % A-Rated Stocks
Average A 7o Dividend Paying
Average A % Portfolio Beta
Average A Avg. Log Market Cap
Average A Turnover
Number of observations
Average A MKTRF Exposure
Average A SMB Exposure
Average A HML Exposure
Average A UMD Exposure
Average A %o A-Rated Stocks
Av,erage- A 7o Di,vldend Paying
Averag,e { 7o Pgrtfolio BeJa
Average A Avg. Log Market Cap
Average A Turnover
Number of observations
All
Institutions
-0$6Yo
-2.84%
-15.96%
-4.73%
'3.85o/o
-0.43%
-13.58%
5.00%
-255%
466
All
Institutions
-0.86%
-2.84%
-r5.96%
-4.73%
-3.85%
-0.43o/o
-13.58%
5.00%
-2.65%
466
> 5% Dgg,rease
-l,087o
-4.86%
-r4.68%
-1.17%
-5.25%
t.t9%
4.47o/o
-0.74%
-4.87%
T-Statistic Decreases vs.
AU Other Institutionp
-0. 133
-0.697
0.210
0:974
-0.951
l.l3l
2.197
-1.546
-1.184
> 5"h
Increaqg
-4,98o/o
-8.60%
-24.49%
-rr.36%
-2.560h
-t.48%
-22.80%
-127%
-4.r5%
42
T-Statistic Increases vs.
All Olher I1,qlitgtions
-2.530
-2.008
-1.423
-1.8+2
0.879
-0.743
-1.138
-1.712
-0.776
T-Statistic Increases Ys.
All Other Institutions
0.800
2.048
-0.466
t.532
-2.522
1.040
-0.325
0:955
-0.470
4l
Table XIILd
Change in Portfolio Characteristics following 57o Increase/Decrease in Pensions, Foundgtions and Trust Funds
Statistics represent change in portfolio chaxacteristic over the period December 2001 to December 2003. Results are presented for all institutions and those experiencing
a 57o increase or 5olo decrease in oension fund. foundation and trust fund clients over the period December 2000 to December 2001.
T-Statistic Decreases vs.
> joh Decrease All Other Institutions
-2.14% -t.243
-4.66% -1.003
-1t.25% 1.237
-4.97% -0.107
-4?6Yo -0.446
-0.93%- -0.553
-10 00%9 01694
8.09% r.327
-4:27Yo -1.326
92
>50
Increase
0.33Vo
2.50%
-18.49%
0.28o/o
-7.|9',o/o
0.90Yo
-15:97yo
7.85%
-3.45%
50
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